July 1996 Few areas of the world have escaped significant losses from episodes of bank insolvency. Bank insolvency is more costly in the developing world, where losses represent a greater share of income. The authors present data on bank insolvency episodes since the late 1970s. This new database can be used in conjunction with readily available data. Information and insights are presented in seven tables on: a) major bank insolvencies episodes and systemic banking crises; b) main characteristics of banking crises; c) trade terms in crisis countries; d) trade concentration prior to crises; e) restructuring characteristics; f) financial analysis of crisis countries; and g) restructuring outcome in crisis countries. In a companion paper the authors discuss possible preventatives and the tradeoff between safety and soundness versus efficiency. Meanwhile, this initial database suggests further avenues for research. There is a dearth of widely available indicators on bank performance. More attention should be focused on developing indicators that might predict bank insolvency for individual banks and systems as a whole. The authors devise criteria for assessing how governments deal with insolvency and find that countries handle it well.

Few areas of the world have escaped significant losses from episodes of bank insolvency. Bank insolvency is more costly in the developing world, where losses represent a greater share of income. The authors present data on bank insolvency episodes since the late 1970s. This new database can be used in conjunction with readily available data. Information and insights are presented in seven tables on: a) major bank insolvencies episodes and systemic banking crises; b) main characteristics of banking crises; c) trade terms in crisis countries; d) trade concentration prior to crises; e) restructuring characteristics; f) financial analysis of crisis countries; and g) restructuring outcome in crisis countries. In a companion paper the authors discuss possible preventatives and the tradeoff between safety and soundness versus efficiency. Meanwhile, this initial database suggests further avenues for research. There is a dearth of widely available indicators on bank performance. More attention should be focused on developing indicators that might predict bank insolvency for individual banks and systems as a whole. The authors devise criteria for assessing how governments deal with insolvency and find that countries handle it well.

Bank failures, like illness and taxes, are almost a certainty at some time in the future. What is less certain is their cost to and adverse implications for macroeconomies. Past failures have frequently been resolved at very high cost to society. However, the cost could be reduced through having a well-developed, credible and widely publicized plan ready to put into action by policymakers. If no such plan is ready when a large bank approaches insolvency, political pressures are likely to influence the response of regulators.Minimizing immediate, short-run costs are likely to outweigh minimizing further out, longer-run and longer-lasting costs, even if these delayed costs promise to be substantially greater. Stated differently, today will win out over tomorrow and politics will trump economics. How best to prevent such unfavorable outcomes is the major theme of this volume. The articles presented review past insolvency resolutions, draw lessons from these resolutions, discuss impediments to efficient resolutions — including cross-country, cross-regulator, and institutional challenges — and recommend how to move forward.

Abstract: Subnational insolvency is a reoccurring event in development, as demonstrated by historical and modern episodes of subnational defaults in both developed and developing countries. Insolvency procedures become more important as countries decentralize expenditure, taxation, and borrowing, and broaden subnational credit markets. As the first cross-country survey of procedures to resolve subnational financial distress, this paper has particular relevance for decentralizing countries. The authors explain central features and variations of subnational insolvency mechanisms across countries. They identify judicial, administrative, and hybrid procedures, and show how entry point and political factors drive their design. Like private insolvency law, subnational insolvency procedures predictably allocate default risk, while providing breathing space for orderly debt restructuring and fiscal adjustment. Policymakers' desire to mitigate the tension between creditor rights and the need to maintain essential public services, to strengthen ex ante fiscal rules, and to harden subnational budget constraints are motivations specific to the public sector.

The global economy has experienced four waves of rapid debt accumulation over the past 50 years. The first three debt waves ended with financial crises in many emerging market and developing economies. During the current wave, which started in 2010, the increase in debt in these economies has already been larger, faster, and broader-based than in the previous three waves. Current low interest rates mitigate some of the risks associated with high debt. However, emerging market and developing economies are also confronted by weak growth prospects, mounting vulnerabilities, and elevated global risks. A menu of policy options is available to reduce the likelihood that the current debt wave will end in crisis and, if crises do take place, will alleviate their impact.

Subnational insolvency is a reoccurring event in development, as demonstrated by historical and modern episodes of subnational defaults in both developed and developing countries. Insolvency procedures become more important as countries decentralize expenditure, taxation, and borrowing, and broaden subnational credit markets. As the first cross-country survey of procedures to resolve subnational financial distress, this paper has particular relevance for decentralizing countries. The authors explain central features and variations of subnational insolvency mechanisms across countries. They identify judicial, administrative, and hybrid procedures, and show how entry point and political factors drive their design. Like private insolvency law, subnational insolvency procedures predictably allocate default risk, while providing breathing space for orderly debt restructuring and fiscal adjustment. Policymakers' desire to mitigate the tension between creditor rights and the need to maintain essential public services, to strengthen ex ante fiscal rules, and to harden subnational budget constraints are motivations specific to the public sector.