This book analyses the features and functionality of the relationship between the law, individual or collective values and medical-scientific evidence when they have to be interpreted by judges, courts and para-jurisdictional bodies. The various degrees to which scientific data and moral values have been integrated into the legal discourse reveal the need for a systematic review of the options and solutions that judges have elaborated on. In turn, the book presents a systematic approach, based on a proposed pattern for classifying these various degrees, together with an in-depth analysis of the multi-layered role of jurisdictions and the means available to them for properly handling new legal demands arising in plural societies. The book outlines a model that makes it possible to focus on and address these issues in a sustainable manner, that is, to respond to individual requests and technological advances in the field of biolaw by consistently and effectively applying suitable legal instruments and jurisdictional interpretation.

The purpose of this Introduction is to sketch our approach to the study of value, morality and action, and to show the place we assign it in the system of human knowledge. 1. VALUE, MORALITY AND ACTION: FACT, THEORY, AND METATHEORY We take it that all animals evaluate some things and some processes, and that some of them learn the social behavior patterns we call 'moral principles', and even act according to them at least some of the time. An animal incapable of evaluating anything would be very short-lived; and a social animal that did not observe the accepted social behavior patterns would be punished. These are facts about values, morals and behavior patterns: they are incorporated into the bodies of animals or the structure of social groups. We distinguish then the facts of valuation, morality and action from the study of such facts. This study can be scientific, philosophic or both. wayan animal evaluates environmental A zoologist may investigate the or internal stimuli; a social psychologist may examine the way children learn, or fail to learn, certain values and norms when placed in certain environments. And a philosopher may study such descriptive or explan atory studies, with a view to evaluating valuations, moral norms, or behavior patterns; he may analyze the very concepts of value, morals and action, as well as their cognates; or he may criticize or reconstruct value beliefs, moral norms and action plans.

The age-old debate about what constitutes just punishment has become deadlocked. Retributivists continue to privilege desert over all else, and consequentialists continue to privilege punishment's expected positive consequences, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, over all else. In this important intervention into the debate, Leo Zaibert argues that despite some obvious differences, these traditional positions are structurally very similar, and that the deadlock between them stems from the fact they both oversimplify the problem of punishment. Proponents of these positions pay insufficient attention to the conflicts of values that punishment, even when justified, generates. Mobilizing recent developments in moral philosophy, Zaibert offers a properly pluralistic justification of punishment that is necessarily more complex than its traditional counterparts. An understanding of this complexity should promote a more cautious approach to inflicting punishment on individual wrongdoers and to developing punitive policies and institutions.

All over the world immigration is one of the most urgent political issues, creating tensions and unrest as well as questions of justice and fairness. Academics as well as politicians have been relating to the question of how states should cope with immigrants; but 96% of immigrants end up in cities, and in Europe and the USA, two thirds of the immigrants settle in seven or eight cities. Indeed, most of us encounter with immigrants as city-zens, in our everyday life, rather than as citizens of states. So how should cities integrate immigrants? Should cities be allowed to design their autonomous integration policies? Could they issue visas and permits to immigrants? Should immigrants be granted voting rights in local elections before naturalization? And how do cities think about these issues? What can we learn from cities which are thought to be successful in integrating and assimilating immigrants? Is there a model of integration within the city which is best? The book discusses these questions both empirically and normatively. The book is based on hundreds of in depth discussions of these matters with city dwellers in San Francisco, New York, London, Amsterdam, Berlin, Thessaloniki and Jerusalem. It shifts the discourse on immigration from 'thinking like a state' to 'thinking like a city' .

Judges and lawyers have to shape their moral competences in order to maintain their professional ethics at a high standard if they want to effectively meet the challenges that modern society will throw at them. This requirement is due to the growing expectation that they will be socially and morally responsible for the law. Thus, the need to place ethics at the heart of legal education, and to make ethical reflection pervasive in academic courses, becomes more obvious every day. Using the concept and examples of moral dilemmas is a way of facilitating this task. The main purpose of this book is to analyse the concept of moral dilemma in context of judicial and legal ethics, and to provide material for legal education. The structure of this book is designed with this double aim in mind. The theoretical part presents the concept of dilemmas on grounds of metaethics and the perspectives for its application in a professional legal context. The former encompasses situations of conflict of duties or obligations, in which the choice of one conduct necessarily prevents a different conduct, and therefore leads to an unacceptable outcome. Hence, the situation of dilemma always involves an issue of moral responsibility and the problem of “dirty hands”. How such situations are present in legal practice and how to deal with them is the main concern of this part. The considerations are divided into three levels of reflection – deontological, axiological, and moral responsibility. The practical part of the book contains an overview of 150 dilemmas that can be useful in legal ethics or other legal courses. The dilemmas are divided into chapters covering the following branches of law: criminal law, civil and commercial law, family and custody law, labour and social security law, and constitutional law. Every dilemma presents a description of the facts, a reconstruction of dilemma, its standard solution and some critical remarks from a meta-ethical perspective. The dilemmas cover situations regularly met in everyday practice, as well as examples of more exceptional challenges in connection with constitutional crises that have occurred in Poland in recent years.

Law and Evilpresents an alternative evolutionary picture of man, focusing on the origins and nature of human evil, and demonstrating its useful application in legal-philosophical analyses. Using this representation of human nature, Wojciech Zaluski analyses the development of law, which he interprets as moving from evolutionary ethics to genuine ethics, as well as arguing in favour of metaethical realism and ius naturale. Zaluski argues that human nature is undoubtedly ambivalent: human beings have been endowed by natural selection with moral, immoral, and neutral tendencies (the first ambivalence), and the moral tendencies themselves are ambivalent (the second ambivalence), giving rise to an inferior form of ethics called 'evolutionary ethics' Introducing a novel distinction between two types of evil, primary and secondary, this book explores the differences between evolutionary ethics and genuine ethics in order to analyse the history of legal systems and the controversy between natural law and legal positivism. Engaging and thought-provoking, this insightful book will be vital reading for both legal scholars and philosophers, especially those of law and moral philosophy. Evolutionary biologists with an interest in a philosophical interpretation of the results of evolutionary biology will also find this book an important read.

Metatheory for the 21st Century is one of the many exciting results of over four years of in-depth engagement between two communities of scholar-practitioners: critical realism and integral theory. Building on its origins at a symposium in Luxembourg in 2010, this book examines the points of connection and divergence between critical realism and integral theory, arguably two of the most comprehensive and sophisticated contemporary metatheories. The Luxembourg symposium and the four more that followed explored the possibilities for their cross-pollination, culminating in five positions on their potential for integration, and began the process of fashioning a whole new evolutionary trajectory for both integral theory and critical realism. The contributors to this book bring together critical realism and integral theory in order to explore the potential of this collaboration for the advancement of both. Highlighting the ways in which these metatheories can transform scholarship and address the most pressing global issues of the 21st century, this book will be of interest to students, scholars and practitioners in the areas of metatheory, philosophy, social theory, critical realism, integral theory and current affairs more generally.