The Great Power Peace has tenuously held since the end of World War II. However, it now appears on shakier ground than ever before. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the official National Security Strategy of the United States declared that “the risk of conflict between major powers is increasing.” Undoubtedly, such a conflict would cause unprecedented human, environmental, and economic damage. As noted by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985—and reiterated by Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in 2021—“a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” While a clear sentiment, how to ratchet tensions down and sustainably coexist is considerably less clear. Moreover, the need for international cooperation to address issues such as climate change, artificial intelligence, and future pandemics is greater than ever.

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about.

This timely book offers a comprehensive examination of the current state of nuclear stability postures worldwide, effectively highlighting their inherent limitations. Through their analysis, the authors illustrate how the seemingly contradictory perspectives of deterrence optimists, disarmament idealists, and warfighting pessimists can be reconfigured into a unified approach towards achieving regional and global peace. They suggest that these strategies can be reconciled as complementary, rather than substitute approaches, to achieve the common goal of nuclear stability. To achieve this objective, the book employs a game-theoretical framework to analytically define the conditions for nuclear war. Drawing from extensive observations of significant crises, the model incorporates identifiable systemic regularities that influence the strategic decision-making process during severe crises and establish the prerequisites for different levels of nuclear confrontation. Additionally, by tracing the strategic-technological trajectories of nuclear powers, the authors present a novel analysis that explores the potential for stable coexistence to replace unstable confrontation between global powers, ultimately fostering nuclear peace. The author's theoretical explorations lead to the policy conclusion that establishing a nuclear oligopolistic hierarchy, under the leadership of preponderant global powers committed to a no-first-use pledge, presents the most effective international system for enhancing both regional and global nuclear stability. This book aims to surpass the Cold War origins of current nuclear strategy and develop a comprehensive policy framework that guarantees enduring nuclear stability in the contemporary world.

Looking deeply into the matter of strategic vulnerability, the authors address questions that this vulnerability poses: Do conditions exist for Sino-U.S. mutual deterrence in these realms? Might the two states agree on reciprocal restraint? What practical measures might build confidence in restraint? How would strategic restraint affect Sino-U.S. relations as well as security in and beyond East Asia?

Averting Global War examines major regional disputes and conflicts throughout the world as they impact upon both American domestic and foreign policy. These include: The ongoing _war on terrorism_; NATO enlargement to Russian borders; US intervention in Iraq; US confrontation with Iran; the feud between Israel and the Palestinians; the widening _zone of conflict_ from Central Asia to sub-Saharan Africa; the global ramifications of North Korea_s nuclear program and China_s claims to Taiwan; Venezuela_s _Bolivarian Revolution_ and the _war on drugs_ in Latin America, the domestic socio-political effects of Latin American immigration upon the US. The book_s goal is to articulate an irenic American strategy intended to resolve, or at least transform, a number of these disputes and conflicts so as to prevent them from further _deepening_ or _widening__and to avert the real possibility of major power confrontation involving both clandestine and overt methods of warfare.

Deterrence as a strategic concept evolved during the Cold War. During that period, deterrence strategy was aimed mainly at preventing aggression against the United States and its close allies by the hostile Communist power centers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, Communist China and North Korea. In particular, the strategy was devised to prevent aggression involving nuclear attack by the USSR or China. Since the end of the Cold War, the risk of war among the major powers has subsided to the lowest point in modern history. Still, the changing nature of the threats to American and allied security interests has stimulated a considerable broadening of the deterrence concept. Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence examines the meaning of deterrence in this new environment and identifies key elements of a post-Cold War deterrence strategy and the critical issues in devising such a strategy. It further examines the significance of these findings for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Quantitative and qualitative measures to support judgments about the potential success or failure of deterrence are identified. Such measures will bear on the suitability of the naval forces to meet the deterrence objectives. The capabilities of U.S. naval forces that especially bear on the deterrence objectives also are examined. Finally, the book examines the utility of models, games, and simulations as decision aids in improving the naval forces' understanding of situations in which deterrence must be used and in improving the potential success of deterrence actions.

This book critically examines elements of America-First nationalism, neo-conservatism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, environmental theories, and social constructionism by way of developing an “alternative realist” approach to the study of the origins of major power war. The author critiques concepts of “polarity” and “sovereign” decision making and diplomacy before developing the concept of “highly uneven polycentrism.” The book then develops a unique comparative historical approach that seeks to compare and contrast the pre-World War I, pre-World War II, and Cold War eras with the contemporary post-Cold War period. It is argued that the US, as it remains the leading global hegemon, must fully engage in multilateral diplomacy with major friends and rivals alike in the establishment of differing forms of power sharing and joint sovereignty accords—in order to prevent the global system from polarizing into two contending alliances more reminiscent of both the pre-World War I and pre-World War II periods than the “new Cold War.”