Many developing and emerging countries do not fully pass-through increases in international fuel prices to domestic retail prices, with adverse consequences for fuel tax revenues and tax volatility. The adoption of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism can help to address this problem, and the incorporation of a price smoothing mechanism can ensure pass-through over the medium term but also avoid sharp increases (and decreases) in domestic prices. This technical note addresses the following issues: (i) the design of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism; (ii) the incorporation of domestic price smoothing and resulting tradeoffs; (iii) the transition from ad hoc pricing adjustments to an automatic mechanism; and (iv) policies to support this transition and the maintenance of an automatic mechanism. A standardized template for simulating and evaluating the implications of alternative pricing mechanisms for price and fiscal volatility is available on request.

Many developing and emerging countries do not fully pass-through increases in international fuel prices to domestic retail prices, with adverse consequences for fuel tax revenues and tax volatility. The adoption of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism can help to address this problem, and the incorporation of a price smoothing mechanism can ensure pass-through over the medium term but also avoid sharp increases (and decreases) in domestic prices. This technical note addresses the following issues: (i) the design of an automatic fuel pricing mechanism; (ii) the incorporation of domestic price smoothing and resulting tradeoffs; (iii) the transition from ad hoc pricing adjustments to an automatic mechanism; and (iv) policies to support this transition and the maintenance of an automatic mechanism. A standardized template for simulating and evaluating the implications of alternative pricing mechanisms for price and fiscal volatility is available on request.

This Technical Assistance Report on Mali discusses automatic pricing mechanism options and identifies issues that need to be addressed for the application of such a mechanism. Mali stands to benefit from moving from the current discretionary approach to fuel product pricing to a transparent and automatic price adjustment mechanism. Although smoothing can help to mitigate the adverse impact of price increases and volatile international fuel prices, additional supporting policies are warranted. In particular, an effective safety net is required to protect the poorest and most vulnerable groups from the adverse impacts of sizeable domestic fuel price increases.

This Selected Issues paper analyzes energy price reform in Kuwait. It emphasizes that Kuwait should take advantage of current low global energy prices to strengthen efforts to reform domestic energy prices. In the longer term, this would benefit growth by increasing efficiency in the economy and creating space for higher public and private investment. In the short-term, one-off effects on inflation should be manageable. Productive activities more sensitive to energy costs, particularly the transport sector, would be able to adjust to higher energy prices more easily if the reform is gradual.

Countries around the world are spending up to $500 billion per year on subsidising fossil fuel consumption. By some estimates, the G20 countries alone are spending around another $450 billion on subsidising fossil fuel production. In addition, the indirect social welfare costs of these subsidies have been shown to be substantial – for instance due to air pollution, road congestion, climate change, and economic inefficiency, to name a few. Considering these numbers, there is no doubt that fossil fuel subsidies cause severe economic distortions that compromise countries’ prospects of achieving equitable and sustainable development. This book provides a guide to the complex challenge of designing, assessing, and implementing effective fossil fuel subsidy reforms. It shows that subsidy reform requires a careful balancing of complex economic and political trade-offs, as well as measures to mitigate adverse effects on vulnerable households and to assist firms with implementing efficiency enhancing measures. Going beyond the purely fiscal perspective, this book emphasises that smart subsidy reforms can contribute to all three dimensions of sustainable development – environment, society, and economy. Over the course of eight chapters, this book considers a wide range of agents and stakeholders, markets, and policy measures in order to distil the key principles of designing effective fossil fuel subsidy reforms. This book will be of great relevance to scholars and policy makers with an interest in energy economics and policy, climate change policy, and sustainable development more broadly.

This paper presents 2019 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Madagascar and its Sixth Review Under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement. Madagascar’s performance under its economic program supported by the ECF arrangement has been broadly satisfactory with solid growth, moderate single digit inflation, and a robust external position. As a fragile, low-income country, Madagascar continues to face risks associated with weak implementation capacity, potential fiscal slippages, social fragility in a context of widespread poverty, and vulnerability to exogenous shocks including to terms of trade and natural disasters. Going forward, a commitment to strong policies and an ambitious agenda to complete outstanding structural reforms remains crucial to mitigate internal and external risks, strengthen macroeconomic stability, and achieve higher, sustainable, and inclusive growth. The authorities’ economic reform agenda summarized in the Plan Emergence Madagascar aims to raise economic growth through increased public and private investment, strengthening human capital, and improving governance. Creating additional fiscal space by further improving revenue mobilization through a medium-term tax revenue strategy, containing lower priority spending, and enhancing investment implementation capacity is essential for scaling-up priority investment and social spending in education, health, and housing.

Energy prices in the GCC countries are low by international standards. These low prices have co-existed with rapid economic development in the region over the past 50 years, but the costs of this policy have also risen in terms of very high energy usage per capita. Providing energy at low prices has also effectively absorbed resources that could otherwise have been invested in human and physical capital or saved for future generations. The implicit cost of low energy prices in the GCC, in terms of foregone revenue, is estimated to be around 5 percent of GDP (about 8 percent of non-oil GDP) this year. GCC countries have been embarking on energy price reform in recent years. The recent decision of the UAE to remove fuel subsidies is an important initiative. Nevertheless, energy prices are generally still below international levels and differ substantially across the GCC countries. In most countries, further steps are needed to raise energy prices to reduce the growth in energy consumption and to support the fiscal adjustment that is necessary in the current lower oil price environment. Evidence in this paper suggests the inflationary impact of higher energy prices in the GCC is likely to be small, and while there may be some adverse effect on growth in the near-term, over the longer-term the growth benefits should be positive. Given the low weight of energy products in the CPI, first round effects of higher energy prices should be limited, while well anchored inflation expectations should help prevent second-round effects. On growth, a gradual increase in energy prices should have a manageable impact on industrial activity, although energy intensive industries will be adversely affected and will need to adjust. In the longer-term energy price reforms could generate significant permanent real income gains for the economy as a whole. More broadly, international experiences suggest that the likelihood of success with energy price reforms increases if the reforms are: