These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.

This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed post-conference proceedings of the Second International ICST on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA 2011) held in New York, USA, August 22-23, 2011. The 22 revised full papers presented were carefully selected from numerous submissions covering topics such as school choice, markets for housing, energy, and advertising, prediction markets, and the theory of market design.

These proceedings present the technical contributions to the First Conference on A- tions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA), held May 8-9, 2009 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA. The conference was devoted to issues that arise in all stages of deploying a market mechanism to solve a problem, including theoretical and empirical examinations. In addition to more traditional academic papers, the conf- ence placed emphasis on experiences from the real world, including case studies and new applications. The main goal of AMMA was to explore the synergy required for good mechanism design. This includes an understanding of the economic and game-theoretic issues, the ability to design protocols and algorithms for realizing desired outcomes, and the knowledge of specific institutional details that are important in practical applications. We were lucky enough to attract papers and talks from economists and computer scientists, theorists and empiricists, academics and practitioners. The program, as reflected in these proceedings, ranged from fundamental theory on auctions and m- kets to empirical design and analysis of matching mechanisms, peer-to-peer-systems, and prediction markets.

A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.

Dynamic pricing and on-line auctions are emerging as the preferred models for e-business. Forrester Research predicts that business-to-business Internet auctions will grow to $52.6 billion by 2002, while dynamically priced business-to-business transactions will rise to $88 billion, representing 27% of the value of all business-to-business e-commerce transactions. This multi-disciplinary book presents a framework of negotiation protocols for electronic markets. It is the first book to combine economics with computer science and the first to describe multidimensional auction mechanisms - i.e. automated negotiations on multiple attributes and/or multiple units of a product. In addition it summarises the introductory economics needed to understand electronic markets, and surveys the literature on negotiation and auction theory. Case studies include the trading of financial derivatives. For use in the design, implementation and upgrade of electronic markets, for researchers in: economics, information systems and operations management, computer science and all students of the e-commerce phenomenon.

A broad overview of market mechanisms, with an emphasis on the interplay between theory and real-life applications; examples range from eBay auctions to school choice. This book offers an introduction to market design, providing students with a broad overview of issues related to the design and analysis of market mechanisms. It defines a market as a demand and a supply, without specifying a price system or mechanism. This allows the text to analyze a broad set of situations—including such unconventional markets as college admissions and organ donation—and forces readers to pay attention to details that might otherwise be overlooked. Students often complain that microeconomics is too abstract and disconnected from reality; the study of market design shows how theory can help solve existing, real-life problems. The book focuses on the interplay between theory and applications. To keep the text as accessible as possible, special effort has been made to minimize formal description of the models while emphasizing the intuitive, with detailed explanations and resolution of examples. Appendixes offer general reviews of elements of game theory and mechanism design that are related to the themes explored in the book, presenting the basic concepts with as many explanations and illustrations as possible. The book covers topics including the basics of simple auctions; eBay auctions; Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions; keyword auctions, with examples from Google and Facebook; spectrum auctions; financial markets, with discussions of treasury auctions and IPOs; trading on the stock market; the basic matching model; medical match; assignment problems; probabilistic assignments; school choice; course allocation, with examples from Harvard and Wharton; and kidney exchange.

`Electric energy must be treated as a commodity which can be bought, sold, and traded, taking into account its time- and space-varying values and costs.` Spot Pricing of Electricity, Schweppe et al, 1988. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation outlines the application of auction methods for all aspects of power system operation, primarily for a competitive environment. A complete description of the industry structure as well as the various markets now being formed is given. A thorough introduction to auction basics is included to explain how auctions have grown in other industries. Auction methods are compared to classical techniques for power system analysis, operations, and planning. The traditional applications of economic dispatch, optimal power flow and unit commitment are compared to auction mechanisms. Algorithms for auctions using linearized power flow equations, DC power flow equations, and AC power flow equations are included. The bundling of supportive services, known as ancillary services within the United States, is discussed. Extensions to the basic auction algorithms for inclusion of supportive services as well as algorithms for scheduling and bidding on generation for GENCOs or independent power producers are presented. Algorithms for scheduling and contracting with customers are also presented for energy service companies. An introduction to the various commodity and financial market products includes the use of futures and options for GENCOs. The material is useful for students performing research on the new business environment based on competition. Regulators will find information on initial methods of designing and evaluating market systems, and power exchange and financial analysts will find information on the interdependence of markets and power system-based techniques for risk management. This information compares the new business environment solutions with old business environment solutions. Computational Auction Mechanisms for Restructured Power Industry Operation provides a first introduction to how electricity will be traded as a commodity in the future.