We live in a highly connected world with multiple self-interested agents interacting and myriad opportunities for conflict and cooperation. The goal of game theory is to understand these opportunities. This book presents a rigorous introduction to the mathematics of game theory without losing sight of the joy of the subject. This is done by focusing on theoretical highlights (e.g., at least six Nobel Prize winning results are developed from scratch) and by presenting exciting connections of game theory to other fields such as computer science (algorithmic game theory), economics (auctions and matching markets), social choice (voting theory), biology (signaling and evolutionary stability), and learning theory. Both classical topics, such as zero-sum games, and modern topics, such as sponsored search auctions, are covered. Along the way, beautiful mathematical tools used in game theory are introduced, including convexity, fixed-point theorems, and probabilistic arguments. The book is appropriate for a first course in game theory at either the undergraduate or graduate level, whether in mathematics, economics, computer science, or statistics. The importance of game-theoretic thinking transcends the academic setting—for every action we take, we must consider not only its direct effects, but also how it influences the incentives of others.

Market_Desc: · Mathematics Students · Instructors About The Book: This Second Edition of a standard numerical analysis text retains organization of the original edition, but all sections have been revised, some extensively, and bibliographies have been updated. New topics covered include optimization, trigonometric interpolation and the fast Fourier transform, numerical differentiation, the method of lines, boundary value problems, the conjugate gradient method, and the least squares solutions of systems of linear equations.

Traditionally, much of big business in the industrialized Western world has been organized around particular corporate societies—notoriously referred to as “old boy” networks. With the recent drift toward a more liberal market economy, however, these networks have been showing signs of decline—in some cases, all but disappearing. Eelke M. Heemskerk combines formal network analysis and interviews with key members of the corporate elite in order to examine how this decline has affected Dutch capitalism. Even in a liberal market economy, however, corporate directors need social networks to communicate and coordinate their strategic decisions, and Decline of the Corporate Community considers the shift of the corporate elite to the new private and informal circles where networking takes place.