Today, Islamicist organizations are becoming more widespread and diffuse. They often lack a direct connection to al Qaeda's strategic leadership but are inspired by its ideology. Al Qaeda's operational role is subdued, but its ideological, propaganda, and support roles are critical to its affiliates. Many groups now adhere to the original goals and ideology of al Qaeda, which extends the scope of its influence well beyond that of the original organization, although al Qaeda itself is still considered the most dangerous of all transnational extremist groups and is America's principal enemy.

Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, , language: English, abstract: The center of gravity paradigm created and published by Carl von Clausewitz in his famous study about the appearance of war is nowadays still widely used to describe the core incitements and driving factors of warring factions, political parties, militias and even terrorist groups. In a short summary this military term of a center of gravity is defined as the one or few main forces where a party in a conflict drives its willpower and its strength from. It is a common element amongst the members and supporters of this group and with reference to Clausewitz’s study, it is this key element the opponent needs to identify and to overcome in order to break the willpower of the party and to finally conquer them. For that reason various studies have been undertaken und research has been performed with regards to the center of gravity in warfare as well as the center of gravity for terrorist groups and esp. for Al Qaeda. In the case of Al Qaeda most completed studies and published documents agreed to the point that the ideology preached by the core leaders of the network is the key element, where their followers draw their support and willpower from. At the same time Al Qaeda these days transformed itself to a loose network with just a common brand name and ideology, but without much central guidance or command. Numerous groups throughout all parts of world emerge and entitle themselves with the name Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliated. Often there are no or just minor links to the former core leadership of Al Qaeda. For that reason it seems, that the network called Al Qaeda with most of its global affiliates is not more a strict hierarchical structured group, nor is it a self-contained network anymore with its origin in the mountain region of the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) border area. Al Qaeda seems to have many different appearances. Therefore the underlying hypothesis of this essay is that beside the remaining core of Al Qaeda in the AfPak region, the name Al Qaeda is nowadays used as a corporate name of different local or regional acting terrorist groups in order to provide a powerful proof of their willingness and capability. In that line the outcome of the hypothesis argues that the CoG for Al Qaeda affiliates is derived from their own and individual domestic or regional issues and interests as well as their regional supremacy.

Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

This monograph reviews events since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and discusses the current state of al Qaeda and the kinds of actions that can be expected of it in the future. Al Qaeda constitutes the most serious immediate threat to the security of the United States, so the campaign against terrorism must remain focused. The monograph describes the central elements that must be emphasized in the next, more-complex phase of that campaign.

This fascinating reference chronicles the individuals, operations, and events of the War on Terror around the world, exploring its causes and consequences through the lens of policy, doctrine, and tactics of combat. The War on Terror is more than a political movement to identify and prosecute terrorists ... it has become a cornerstone of economic and military importance. This campaign has shaped policy in the Middle East, prompted uprisings of Islamic fundamentalists against the West, and redefined the ideology of warfare. This single-volume encyclopedia provides readers with more than 200 engaging entries on the myriad events, key individuals, and organizations that have played a major role in the War on Terror. The A–Z entries define the policies and doctrines; describe the armies, battlefields, and weapons employed; and profile the figures whose actions and decisions set the course of history. The expert contributors decode military jargon for non-specialist readers and explain the unconventional tactics used in the War on Terror, shedding light on the reason behind the attacks, the political maneuvering of the leaders involved, and the internal conflicts and external clashes that drove terrorists to settle all over the world. The book also includes detailed essays on the impact of the September 11 attacks on U.S. foreign policy, presidential powers, and public opinion.

It may not be possible to deter fanatical terrorists, but members of terrorist systems may be amenable to influence. The U.S. counterterrorism strategy should therefore include political warfare, placing at risk things the terrorists hold dear, a credible threat of force against states or groups that support acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and maintaining cooperation with other nations engaged in the war on terror, while also preserving core American values.