This report describes the work of the Committee on Proposal Evaluation for Allocation of Supercomputing Time for the Study of Molecular Dynamics, Eighth Round. The committee evaluated submissions received in response to a Request for Proposals (RFP) for biomolecular simulation time on Anton 2, a supercomputer specially designed and built by D.E. Shaw Research (DESRES). Over the past five years, DESRES has made an Anton or Anton 2 system housed at the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center (PSC) available to the non-commercial research community, based on the advice of previous National Research Council committees. As in prior rounds, the goal of the eighth RFP for simulation time on Anton 2 is to continue to facilitate breakthrough research in the study of biomolecular systems by providing a massively parallel system specially designed for molecular dynamics simulations. The program seeks to continue to support research that addresses important and high impact questions demonstrating a clear need for Anton's special capabilities. Report of the Committee on Proposal Evaluation for Allocation of Supercomputing Time for the Study of Molecular Dynamics, Eighth Round is the report of the committee's evaluation of proposals based on scientific merit, justification for requested time allocation, and investigator qualifications and past accomplishments. This report identifies the proposals that best met the selection criteria.

Congress requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produce a site-specific biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment (SSRA) of the proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas. The laboratory would study dangerous foreign animal diseases-including the highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which affects cattle, pigs, deer, and other cloven-hoofed animals-and diseases deadly to humans that can be transmitted between animals and people. Congress also asked the Research Council to review the validity and adequacy of the document. Until these studies are complete, Congress has withheld funds to build the NBAF. Upon review of the DHS assessment, the National Research Council found "several major shortcomings." Based on the DHS risk assessment, there is nearly a 70 percent chance over the 50-year lifetime of the facility that a release of FMD could result in an infection outside the laboratory, impacting the economy by estimates of $9 billion to $50 billion. The present Research Council report says the risks and costs of a pathogen being accidently released from the facility could be significantly higher. The committee found that the SSRA has many legitimate conclusions, but it was concerned that the assessment does not fully account for how a Biosafety-Level 3 Agriculture and Biosafety-Level 4 Pathogen facility would operate or how pathogens might be accidently released. In particular, the SSRA does not include important operation risks and mitigation issues, such as the risk associated with the daily cleaning of large animal rooms. It also fails to address risks that would likely increase the chances of an FMD leak or of the disease's spread after a leak, including the NBAF's close proximity to the Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine clinics and KSU football stadium or personnel moving among KSU facilities.