Political situation in Sri Lanka before and after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement of July 1987.

Political situation in Sri Lanka before and after the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement of July 1987.

Between 1983 and 2009 Sri Lanka was host to a bitter civil war fought between the Government and the Tamil Tigers, which sought the creation of an independent Tamil state. In May 2009 came the war's violent end with the crushing defeat of the Tamil Tigers at the hands of the Sri Lanka Army. But prior to this grim finale, for some time there had been hope for a peaceful end to the conflict. Beginning with a ceasefire agreement in early 2002, for almost five years a series of peace talks between the two sides took place in locations ranging from Thailand and Japan to Norway, Germany and Switzerland. To End a Civil War tells the story of trying to bring peace to Sri Lanka. In particular it tells the story of how a faraway European nation--Norway--came to play a central role in efforts to end the conflict, and what its small, dedicated team of mediators did in their untiring efforts to reach what ultimately proved the elusive goal of a negotiated peace. In doing so it fills a critical gap in our understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict. But it also illuminates in detail a much wider problem: the intense fragility that surrounds peace processes and the extraordinary lengths to which their proponents often stretch in order to secure their progress.

Insurgent cohesion is central to explaining patterns of violence, the effectiveness of counterinsurgency, and civil war outcomes. Cohesive insurgent groups produce more effective war-fighting forces and are more credible negotiators; organizational cohesion shapes both the duration of wars and their ultimate resolution. In Networks of Rebellion, Paul Staniland explains why insurgent leaders differ so radically in their ability to build strong organizations and why the cohesion of armed groups changes over time during conflicts. He outlines a new way of thinking about the sources and structure of insurgent groups, distinguishing among integrated, vanguard, parochial, and fragmented groups. Staniland compares insurgent groups, their differing social bases, and how the nature of the coalitions and networks within which these armed groups were built has determined their discipline and internal control. He examines insurgent groups in Afghanistan, 1975 to the present day, Kashmir (1988–2003), Sri Lanka from the 1970s to the defeat of the Tamil Tigers in 2009, and several communist uprisings in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. The initial organization of an insurgent group depends on the position of its leaders in prewar political networks. These social bases shape what leaders can and cannot do when they build a new insurgent group. Counterinsurgency, insurgent strategy, and international intervention can cause organizational change. During war, insurgent groups are embedded in social ties that determine they how they organize, fight, and negotiate; as these ties shift, organizational structure changes as well.

The art of successful negotiations over protracted conflicts presupposes a political commitment to peace and a willingness to compromise, which are sorely lacking in the current disorderly world. Part of the blame for this lies in weak and ineffective national and global leadership. This book’s sharp focus on the role of leadership at different levels—national government, rebel and Western/regional government mediators—as well as that of the UN and non-governmental players in settling intra-state disputes, is a unique feature which sets it apart from others. Much of the existing literature does not adequately discuss the role of the above actors in developing countries. Asia’s Trouble Spots is a serious attempt to fill this gap. The seven country studies in Asia—Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India and China—discuss, inter alia, how peace negotiations between national political and rebel leaders have unfolded. The role of state-sponsored cross-border terrorists and non-state spoilers such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS is addressed in the context of geopolitical rivalry among regional and global powers. A. S. Bhalla challenges the view that Western leaders can act as impartial mediators in intra-state and inter-state disputes. With few exceptions, their record has been dismal at best. Their failure in conflict resolution arises from a loss of moral authority and credibility, which follows the gradual erosion over the years of such liberal values as the rule of law and respect for democracy and human rights. Commercial and strategic self-interests have also tended to undermine peacebuilding efforts.

On 21 May 1991, journalist Neena Gopal had finished just one part of an interview with Rajiv Gandhi—the last of his life—when his car reached the election rally at Sriperumbudur. Moments later, Rajiv Gandhi was dead, blown up by suicide bomber Dhanu, irrevocably changing the course of Indian politics, as Neena Gopal, just yards behind him, watched in horror. In this gripping, definitive book, Gopal reconstructs the chain of events in India and at the LTTE’s headquarters in Sri Lanka where the assassination plot was hatched, and follows the trail of investigation that led to the assassins being brought to justice. Drawing on extensive interviews, research and her own vast experience as a journalist, she deftly establishes the background—the shortsightedness of India’s Sri Lanka policy; the friction between the intelligence agencies and between the agencies and the external affairs ministry; the many warnings that went unheeded; and the implacable hatred that LTTE supremo Prabhakaran felt for Rajiv Gandhi. Bringing all these complex threads together, Gopal takes us step by step to Sriperumbudur as Rajiv Gandhi walked inexorably to his death on that tragic May evening twenty-five years ago.