"A 'must read' by historian and layman alike."—Col. David M. Glantz, author of Kursk "An important book that will surely become the definitive account." —John Prados, author of Normandy Crucible Compelling study of how the Soviets inflicted a stunning defeat on the Germans during the early years of World War II Relies on archival records from both sides to shatter old myths about this battle

A visual look at the Nazi assault on the Soviet capital in the series that’s “a welcome addition . . . targeted at the general World War II enthusiast” (Globe at War). After the initial successes of Operation Barbarossa, at the end of September 1941, Hitler turned his focus to Moscow, with the unshakeable belief that capturing the capital would knock the Soviets out of the war. On the face of it, it was an unequal matchup in Germany’s favor, but the picture was, in fact, a great deal more complex; the Germans had suffered very significant losses since the invasion of Russia had begun and had issues with logistics and air support. The Soviets, under the command of Gen. Zhukov, were beginning to be better supplied with reinforcements and were prepared to defend to the death. This volume in the Casemate Illustrated series concentrates on the main German assault of October 1941. Guderian’s panzer divisions at first made sweeping gains, as they had done so many times before, and large parts of the Red Army were encircled at Vyazma and Bryansk. These successes allowed the Soviets time to regroup, as the encircled armies did not surrender and had to be dealt with. Then, three engagements followed at Mtsensk, Maloyaroslavets and the Mojaisk defense line that proved that the war in the east was not entering its final days, as German high command believed. Illustrated with over 150 photographs, plus profile drawings of tanks, vehicles, and aircraft, this book gives a vivid impression of the situation for both protagonists, and a detailed analysis of the critical days as the fate of Moscow—and perhaps the whole war—hung in the balance.

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How Nazi forces were driven back by the Soviets amid mud and freezing temperatures: “Excellent . . . well researched, fast paced and enjoyable to read.” —Military Review At the end of September 1941, more than a million German soldiers lined up along the frontline just 180 miles west of Moscow. They were well-trained, confident, and had good reasons to hope that the war in the East would be over with one last offensive. Facing them was an equally large Soviet force, but whose soldiers were neither as well-trained nor as confident. When the Germans struck, disaster soon befell the Soviet defenders. German panzer spearheads cut through enemy defenses and thrust deeply to encircle most of the Soviet soldiers on the approaches to Moscow. Within a few weeks, most of the Russian soldiers marched into captivity, where a grim fate awaited them. Despite the overwhelming initial German success, however, the Soviet capital did not fall. German combat units, as well as supply transport, were bogged down in mud caused by autumn rains. General Zhukov was called back to Moscow and given the desperate task to recreate defense lines west of Moscow. The mud allowed him time to accomplish this, and when the Germans again began to attack in November, they met stiffer resistance. Even so, they came perilously close to the capital, and if the vicissitudes of weather had cooperated, would have seized it. Though German units were also fighting desperately by now, the Soviet build-up soon exceeded their own. The Drive on Moscow, 1941 is based on numerous archival records, personal diaries, letters, and other sources. It recreates the battle from the perspective of the soldiers as well as the generals. The battle had a crucial role in the overall German strategy in the East, and its outcome reveals why the failure of the German assault on Moscow may well have been true turning point of World War II.

A gripping and authoritative revisionist account of the German Winter Campaign of 1941–1942 Germany’s winter campaign of 1941–1942 is commonly seen as its first defeat. In Retreat from Moscow, a bold, gripping account of one of the seminal moments of World War II, David Stahel argues that instead it was its first strategic success in the East. The Soviet counteroffensive was in fact a Pyrrhic victory. Despite being pushed back from Moscow, the Wehrmacht lost far fewer men, frustrated its enemy’s strategy, and emerged in the spring unbroken and poised to recapture the initiative. Hitler’s strategic plan called for holding important Russian industrial cities, and the German army succeeded. The Soviets as of January 1942 aimed for nothing less than the destruction of Army Group Center, yet not a single German unit was ever destroyed. Lacking the professionalism, training, and experience of the Wehrmacht, the Red Army’s offensive attempting to break German lines in countless head-on assaults led to far more tactical defeats than victories. Using accounts from journals, memoirs, and wartime correspondence, Stahel takes us directly into the Wolf’s Lair to reveal a German command at war with itself as generals on the ground fought to maintain order and save their troops in the face of Hitler’s capricious, increasingly irrational directives. Excerpts from soldiers’ diaries and letters home paint a rich portrait of life and death on the front, where the men of the Ostheer battled frostbite nearly as deadly as Soviet artillery. With this latest installment of his pathbreaking series on the Eastern Front, David Stahel completes a military history of the highest order.

In late September 1941 the war in the east was approaching a climax. Since the beginning of the German invasion on 22 June 1941, Soviet forces had suffered the staggering loss of over 2 million troops. Operation Typhoon began and in the first week of the offensive, the three German panzer armies surrounded virtually the bulk of the Soviet forces barring the way to Moscow. This title details the dramatic battle that took place right up to the suburbs of Moscow itself, and the defeat which altered Hitler's strategic management of World War II (1939-1945).