Army Techniques Publication ATP 3-92 Corps Operations April 2016 ATP 3-92 provides the Army and joint community with guidance on the conduct of operational and tactical tasks performed by the corps echelon. (Defense support of civil authorities tasks are discussed in ADP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28.) ATP 3-92 describes tactics and techniques tested in the conduct of actual operations. It expounds on the doctrinal fundamentals established in ADRP 3-0, ADRP 3-07, and ADRP 3-90, which establish doctrine for the conduct of decisive action and describe the operational art and the art and science of tactics. These ADRPs must be read before reading ATP 3-92 to gain a better understanding of the tactics and techniques discussed in ATP 3-92. It is necessary to study ADRP 1-02, ADRP 5-0, and ADRP 6-0 to understand the Army's operational terms and military symbols that form the basis of the language of land operations, the Army operations process, and Army mission command. These ADRPs provide the foundation for ATP 3-92. It is also necessary to study ADRP 1, ADRP 2-0, ADRP 3-05, ADRP 3-09, ADRP 3-37, ADRP 4-0, ADRP 6-22, and ADRP 7-0 that provide basic information on the profession of arms, other elements of combat power, and how to conduct effective training. It is recommended that FM 3-13, FM 3-53, and FM 3-57 be reviewed in order to obtain a greater understanding of how the corps commander's exercise of mission command is supported by information related capabilities and the information element of combat power. It is recommended to study applicable joint doctrine, such as JP 1 and JP 3-0, to become familiar with the operational environment existing in the region where they will conduct operations.

Researchers identify the effects of Focus Area Review Group II headquarters design and its new unit type--the Main Command Post-Operational Detachment--on division headquarters readiness.

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language, a purpose, and unity of effort. Rather than establishing a set of hard and fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and creative thinking. To this end, FM 3-06 discusses major Army operations in an urban environment. This environment, consisting of complex terrain, a concentrated population, and an infrastructure of systems, is an operational environment in which Army forces will operate. In the future, it may be the predominant operational environment. Each urban operation is unique and will differ because of the multitude of combinations presented by the threat, the urban area itself, the major operation of which it may be part (or the focus), and the fluidity of societal and geopolitical considerations. Therefore, there will always exist an innate tension between Army doctrine, the actual context of the urban operation, and future realities. Commanders must strike the proper balance between maintaining the capability to respond to current threats and preparing for future challenges.

Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large Scale Combat Operations, provides a collection of ten historical case studies from World War I through Desert Storm. The case studies detail the use of lethal and non-lethal fires conducted by US, British, Canadian, and Israeli forces against peer or near-peer threats. The case studies span the major wars of the twentieth-century and present the doctrine the various organizations used, together with the challenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and the operational environment, as well as the leaders' actions and decisions during the conduct of operations. Most importantly, each chapter highlights the lessons learned from those large scale combat operations, how they were applied or ignored and how they remain relevant today and in the future.

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.

This field manual aims to provide techniques to assist planners in planning, coordinating, executing, synchronizing, and assessing military deception (MILDEC). While the means and techniques may evolve over generations, the principles and fundamentals of deception planning remain constant. FM 3-13.4 applies to all members of the Army profession: leaders, Soldiers, Army Civilians, and contractors. The principal audience for this publication is Army commanders, staffs, and all leaders. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning joint or multinational planning. Trainers and educators throughout the Army also use this publication as a guide for teaching MILDEC. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations.