Army Techniques Publication ATP 3-09.30 Observed Fires SEPTEMBER 2017 Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.30 sets forth the doctrine pertaining to the organization, equipment, mission command, operations, and provides techniques for employing fire support assets as an observer which can be applied within the framework of decisive action or unified land operations. It is applicable to any Army personnel observing for artillery or mortar fires, close air support, army attack aviation, or naval surface fire support. See ATP 3-09.32 for information on close air support, army attack aviation, or naval surface fire support. The principal audience for this publication is FA commanders, staffs, and personnel at the field artillery brigade (FAB), division artillery (DIVARTY), and brigade combat team (BCT) and separate FA battalions and below. Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure that their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States, international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure that their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement (See FM 27-10).

This publication supersedes ATP 3-09.30, Observed Fires dated 12 August 2013. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-09.30 sets forth the doctrine pertaining to the organization, equipment, mission command, operations, and provides techniques for employing fire support assets as an observer which can be applied within the framework of decisive action or unified land operations. It is applicable to any Army personnel observing for artillery or mortar fires, close air support, army attack aviation, or naval surface fire support. See ATP 3-09.32 for information on close air support, army attack aviation, or naval surface fire support. The principal audience for this publication is FA commanders, staffs, and personnel at the field artillery brigade (FAB), division artillery (DIVARTY), and brigade combat team (BCT) and separate FA battalions and below.

Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?

The Last 100 Yards: The Crucible of Close Combat in Large-Scale Combat Operations presents thirteen historical case studies of close combat operations from World War I through Operation Iraqi Freedom. This volume is a collection from the unique and deliberate perspective of the last 100 yards of ground combat. In today's Army, there are few leaders who have experienced multi-domain large-scale ground combat against a near-peer or peer enemy first hand. This volume serves to augment military professionals' understanding of the realities of large-scale ground combat operations through the experiences of those who lived it.

Dedicated to the Sailors and Marines who lost their lives on the final voyage of USS Indianapolis and to those who survived the torment at sea following its sinking. plus the crews that risked their lives in rescue ships. The USS Indianapolis (CA-35) was a decorated World War II warship that is primarily remembered for her worst 15 minutes. . This ship earned ten (10) battle stars for her service in World War II and was credited for shooting down nine (9) enemy planes. However, this fame was overshadowed by the first 15 minutes July 30, 1945, when she was struck by two (2) torpedoes from Japanese submarine I-58 and sent to the bottom of the Philippine Sea. The sinking of Indianapolis and the loss of 880 crew out of 1,196 --most deaths occurring in the 4-5 day wait for a rescue delayed --is a tragedy in U.S. naval history. This historical reference showcases primary source documents to tell the story of Indianapolis, the history of this tragedy from the U.S. Navy perspective. It recounts the sinking, rescue efforts, follow-up investigations, aftermath and continuing communications efforts. Included are deck logs to better understand the ship location when she sunk and testimony of survivors and participants. For additional historical publications produced by the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, please check out these resources here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/agency/naval-history-heritage-command Year 2016 marked the 71st anniversary of the sinking and another spike in public attention on the loss -- including a big screen adaptation of the story, talk of future films, documentaries, and planned expeditions to locate the wreckage of the warship.

"The Official US Army Ranger Handbook, as used in Fort Benning" -- Amazon website.

The U.S. Marine Corps' war in Vietnam was a mixtureof large-scale conventional battles against mainViet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA)units and smaller pacification operations designed to securethe South Vietnamese population from Communist insurgents.During the latter half of 1965, Marine forces foughtrepeated engagements against large Viet Cong units, mostnotably the 1st Viet Cong Regiment. The first battle, a fight inAugust to secure the area around Chu Lai called OperationStarlite, inflicted significant casualties upon this force. However,within just a few months, the Communist unit reconstituteditself, forcing the Marines to launch another operationto destroy the formation in December. The Marines codenamedthis action Operation Harvest Moon.Operation Harvest Moon has largely been overlooked inhistories of the Vietnam War. While Operation Starlite wasconsidered a major success and a clear demonstration of thesuperiority of America's conventional military forces comparedto the Viet Cong, Harvest Moon was less decisive.The following year, the Marine Corps' attention also beganto shift north toward the demilitarized zone (DMZ) as moreregular North Vietnamese combat forces put pressure on theMarines' area of operations. Consequently, the battle wasovershadowed by larger engagements.Nevertheless, the operation was important for a numberof reasons. Harvest Moon was the Marines' last large-scale,conventional operation of 1965 in Vietnam. Fought in thevalleys and hills between the city of Tam Ky and the inlandoutpost of Hiep Duc, it was the largest combined operationbetween Marine units and the South Vietnamese militaryto that date. Perhaps most importantly, the battle demonstratedmany of the frustrations and problems faced by allthe American forces in South Vietnam as they tried to defeatthe Viet Cong-led insurgency. The disparity in the fightingabilities between the Marines and South Vietnamese Armyunits hindered combat effectiveness. The lack of coordinationbetween the two forces, and between the Marine Corpsand U.S. Air Force, also led to heavy losses on the allied side.Enjoying logistical support from North Vietnam, the 1st VietCong Regiment was able to defeat South Vietnamese forceswhile largely evading American units.