This major revision to United States Army publication, Army Regulation AR 600-20 Army Command Policy July 2020, prescribes the policies and responsibilities of command, which include the Army Ready and Resilient Campaign Plan, military discipline and conduct, the Army Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, the Army Harassment Prevention and Response Program, and the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program.This regulation implements DoDI 1020.03, DoDI 1300.17, DoDI 1325.02, DoDI 1325.06; DoDI 1342.22; DoDI 5240.22, DoDI 5240.26, DoDI 5505.18; DoDI 6495.02; DoDI 6495.03, DoDD 1350.2, DoDD 6495.01, DoDD 5205.16 and DoDD 7050.06. Also, it prescribes the policy and responsibility of command, which include the Army Ready and Resilient Campaign Plan, military discipline and conduct, the Army Equal Opportunity Program, and the Army Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program. The 30-day advanced publication requirement has been waived because the revision implements previously published law, DoD directives and instructions, and Army directives that need to be consolidated and communicated to the field as soon as possible. This regulation applies to the Regular Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It also applies to all assigned, attached, or operationally controlled U.S. Army Corrections Command personnel, and all Army Corrections System prisoners incarcerated in Army Corrections System facilities. Chapters 6 and 7 and appendix E apply to members of the Army National Guard of the United States when on active duty Title 10 orders, for 30 days or more. In all other cases, members of the Army National Guard are governed by regulations issued by the Chief, National Guard Bureau consistent with Chief, National Guard Bureau's authorities under 32 USC 110, 10 USC 10503, and DoDD 5105.77. It also applies where stated to Department of the Army Civilians. Portions of this regulation that prescribe specific conduct are punitive, and violations of these provisions may subject offenders to nonjudicial or judicial action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The equal opportunity terms found in the glossary are applicable only to uniformed personnel. AR 690-600 and AR 690-12 contains similar terms that are applicable to Department of the Army Civilians.

This manual, TRADOC Pamphlet TP 600-4 The Soldier's Blue Book: The Guide for Initial Entry Soldiers August 2019, is the guide for all Initial Entry Training (IET) Soldiers who join our Army Profession. It provides an introduction to being a Soldier and Trusted Army Professional, certified in character, competence, and commitment to the Army. The pamphlet introduces Solders to the Army Ethic, Values, Culture of Trust, History, Organizations, and Training. It provides information on pay, leave, Thrift Saving Plans (TSPs), and organizations that will be available to assist you and your Families. The Soldier's Blue Book is mandated reading and will be maintained and available during BCT/OSUT and AIT.This pamphlet applies to all active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard enlisted IET conducted at service schools, Army Training Centers, and other training activities under the control of Headquarters, TRADOC.

The U. S. Secretary of the Army appointed the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee(FHIRC or Committee) and directed it to "conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Fort Hoodcommand climate and culture, and its impact, if any, on the safety, welfare and readiness of ourSoldiers and units." In addressing this mandate, the FHIRC determined that during the time periodcovered by the Review, the command climate relative to the Sexual Harassment/Assault Responseand Prevention (SHARP) Program at Fort Hood was ineffective, to the extent that there was apermissive environment for sexual assault and sexual harassment.As set forth in this Report, specific Findings demonstrate that the implementation of theSHARP Program was ineffective. During the review period, no Commanding General or subordinateechelon commander chose to intervene proactively and mitigate known risks of high crime, sexualassault and sexual harassment. The result was a pervasive lack of confidence in the SHARP Programand an unacceptable lack of knowledge of core SHARP components regarding reporting and certainvictim services. Under a structurally weak and under-resourced III Corps SHARP Program, theSexual Assault Review Board (SARB) process was primarily utilized to address administrative and notthe actual substantive aspects of the Program. While a powerful tool by design, the SARB processbecame a missed opportunity to develop and implement proactive strategies to create a respectfulculture and prevent and reduce incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment. From the III Corpslevel and below, the SHARP Program was chronically under-resourced, due to understaffing, lack oftraining, lack of credentialed SHARP professionals, and lack of funding. Most of all, it lackedcommand emphasis where it was needed the most: the enlisted ranks.A resonant symptom of the SHARP Program's ineffective implementation was significantunderreporting of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Without intervention from the NCOs andofficers entrusted with their health and safety, victims feared the inevitable consequences of reporting: ostracism, shunning and shaming, harsh treatment, and indelible damage to their career. Many haveleft the Army or plan to do so at the earliest opportunity.As part of the command climate, the issues of crime and Criminal Investigation Division(CID) operations were examined. The Committee determined that serious crime issues on and offFort Hood were neither identified nor addressed. There was a conspicuous absence of an effectiverisk management approach to crime incident reduction and Soldier victimization. A militaryinstallation is essentially a large, gated community. The Commander of a military installation possessesa wide variety of options to proactively address and mitigate the spectrum of crime incidents. Despitehaving the capability, very few tools were employed at Fort Hood to do so. Both the Directorate ofEmergency Services (DES) and the CID have a mandate and a role to play in crime reduction.Each contributed very little analysis, feedback and general situational awareness to the command towardfacilitating and enabling such actions. This was another missed opportunity.The deficient climate also extended into the missing Soldier scenarios, where no onerecognized the slippage in accountability procedures and unwillingness or lack of ability of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to keep track of their subordinates. The absence of any formalprotocols for Soldiers who fail to report resulted in an ad hoc approach by units and Military Police(MP) to effectively address instances of missing Soldiers during the critical first 24 hours, again withadverse consequences.Consistent with the FHIRC Charter, this Report sets forth nine Findings and offers seventyRecommendations.

This work is a collection of observations, insights, and advice from over 50 serving and retired Senior Non-Commissioned Officers. These experienced Army leaders have provided for the reader, outstanding mentorship on leadership skills, tasks, and responsibilities relevant to our Army today. There is much wisdom and advice "from one leader to another" in the following pages.

Discusses how to plan a staff ride of a battlefield, such as a Civil War battlefield, as part of military training. This brochure demonstrates how a staff ride can be made available to military leaders throughout the Army, not just those in the formal education system.