To assist the Army in its reorientation toward conventional combat operations, the authors of this report identify capability gaps in the field artillery and actions that the Army should consider taking from today to roughly 2030.

ADP 3-19 Fires July 2019, defines and describes the fires warfighting function in terms of its major tasks, capabilities, functions, and processes, and describes the integration of capabilities and their associated effects through the targeting and operations processes. The successful employment of fires depends on the integration and synchronization of all elements of fires across domains and in concert with the other warfighting functions. This manual forms the foundation for training and Army education curricula on fires. The scope of this publication is broad in order to cover fires as a complete entity. It gives equal treatment to the diverse assets that contribute to the fires warfighting function. The term "fires" in this document includes lethal and nonlethal effects, as delivered by Army, joint, and multinational capabilities. To create effects in multi-domain operations, Army leaders must consider the fires warfighting function in an inclusive manner, integrating assets and effects...

In response to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Army's plan to provide interim automated fire support capabilities for its light and heavy divisions. GAO found that, in the early 1980's, the Army provided most heavy divisions and one light division with an automated artillery fire command and control (C2) system. The Army is developing a new system with improved mobility and capability called the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); however, most of the light divisions do not have an automated fire support C2 capability and AFATDS is not scheduled to be fielded before 1990. In determining the interim solution for light divisions, the Army must decide between low-cost and low-risk equipment with limited capability and a system which would provide greater capability at increased cost and fielding time. Although the Army did not plan to upgrade or replace the heavy divisions' capabilities until after it fielded AFATDS it funded an interim improvement program for some elements of heavy division equipment. If major problems occur in AFATDS' development, the Army could improve fire support C2 with the use of the Light Field Artillery Tactical Data System for the heavy divisions, but that would not fully meet heavy divisions' requirements. GAO believes that Congress should: (1) ask the Army to fully explain the trade-offs between the lower-cost equipment and the more capable AFATDS solution; and (2) consider reducing the Army fiscal year 1987 request for AFATDS or restrict the use of funds.

In response to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the Army's plan to provide interim automated fire support capabilities for its light and heavy divisions. GAO found that, in the early 1980's, the Army provided most heavy divisions and one light division with an automated artillery fire command and control (C2) system. The Army began development of a new system with improved mobility and capability called Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); however, most of the light divisions do not have an automated fire support C2 capability and AFATDS is not scheduled to be fielded before 1990. In determining the interim solution for light divisions, the Army must decide between low-cost and low-risk equipment with limited capability and a system which would provide greater capability at increased cost and fielding time. Although the Army did not plan to upgrade or replace the heavy divisions' capabilities until after the AFATDS is fielded, it funded an interim improvement program for some elements of heavy division equipment. If major problems occur in AFATDS development, the Army could improve fire support C2 with the use of the Light Field Artillery Tactical Data system for the heavy divisions but it would not fully meet heavy division requirements. GAO believes that Congress should: (1) ask the Army to fully explain the trade-offs between the lower cost equipment and the more capable AFATDS solution; and (2) consider reducing the Army fiscal year 1987 request for AFATDS or restrict the use of funds.

TP 525-3-4, The U.S. Army Functional Concept for Fires (AFC-F) describes Army fires built to support future, joint, Army, and multinational operations, focusing on how fires support combined arms maneuver. The AFC-F presents strategic guidance from key leaders as a future fires vision, and then derives required capabilities from this vision. These required capabilities form the foundation for future capability development DOTMLPF-P changes. The AFC-F describes future fires capabilities through four key fires tenets: fires must be precise, responsive, effective, and multifunctional. Fires must be precise, operating with accuracy, producing desired effects only on desired targets, building confidence in fires units' capabilities. Fires must be responsive, deploying rapidly and achieving appropriate effects on the target. Fires must be effective, providing appropriate capacity, range, and lethality in a wide spectrum of operations. Finally, fires must be multifunctional, task organized to respond easily to a wide variety of circumstances and conditions. Leaders and Soldiers conduct both fire support and air and missile defense tasks

Lethal and Non-Lethal Fires: Historical Case Studies of Converging Cross-Domain Fires in Large Scale Combat Operations, provides a collection of ten historical case studies from World War I through Desert Storm. The case studies detail the use of lethal and non-lethal fires conducted by US, British, Canadian, and Israeli forces against peer or near-peer threats. The case studies span the major wars of the twentieth-century and present the doctrine the various organizations used, together with the challenges the leaders encountered with the doctrine and the operational environment, as well as the leaders' actions and decisions during the conduct of operations. Most importantly, each chapter highlights the lessons learned from those large scale combat operations, how they were applied or ignored and how they remain relevant today and in the future.