This volume provides the first comprehensive history of the arms racing phenomenon in modern international politics, drawing both on theoretical approaches and on the latest historical research. Written by an international team of specialists, it is divided into four sections: before 1914; the inter-war years; the Cold War; and extra-European and post-Cold War arms races. Twelve case studies examine land and naval armaments before the First World War; air, land, and naval competition during the 1920s and 1930s; and nuclear as well as conventional weapons since 1945. Armaments policies are placed within the context of technological development, international politics and diplomacy, and social politics and economics. An extended general introduction and conclusion and introductions to each section provide coherence between the specialized chapters and draw out wider implications for policymakers and for political scientists. Arms Races in International Politics addresses two key questions: what causes arms races, and what is the connection between arms races and the outbreak of wars?

Arms races are often associated with the Cold War, but they're still a reality around the world today. Issues such as military aggression and nuclear weapons are complex, but they're presented to readers in an accessible way. A fact-filled main text, engaging full-color photographs, and helpful graphic organizers richly present details about the arms race. Readers are challenged to think for themselves about international arms races as they explore discussion questions and are asked to compare and contrast the viewpoints of experts. Although news stories about weapons and wars might seem frightening to young people, this volume stresses the importance of facts over fearmongering.

Martin McGuire has written for the specialist and the concerned layman a highly original and valuable contribution to our understanding of the arms race, based upon economic theory in general and the theory of economic duopoly in particular. He calls attention to the fact that when two world powers face each other with massive allocations of resources for arms, and when each regards the other as the major, if not the sole, threat to its own security, the question of accurate information about the strength and intentions of the adversary arises for each side in many and various ways. As a result, this study is a pioneering, analytic effort to approach the value of keeping secrets from or of obtaining information about an enemy. The author is concerned with such questions as: what is the loss in being only 50 percent confident rather than certain that the adversary doesn't have more X missiles or missiles of yield W megatons or of accuracy C thousand feet? Should one insist on being 95 percent sure when bargaining for arms control? How can a side compensate for its uncertainty most efficiently? An understanding of these problems can not only increase our security; it may help as well to contain or control the entire two-sided race.

Demonstrating the ways in which work in a broad range of fields can be pulled together in the analysis of conflict, this book provides the reader with a general introduction to the principles of conflict analysis and lays a methodological foundation for the further development of the interdisciplinary field of peace science. The text begins with an extensive survey of arms race models, from the classic Richardson model to models exploring the effects of factors such as the domestic and international economic environment, public opinion and party politics, and weapons technology and information development. The processes of individual and group problem-solving, in both crisis and non-crisis conditions, are examined, drawing on work in economics, operations research, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. Building on this diverse body of work, the author moves on to develop a framework for conflict management with which to approach a variety of conflict situations and applies this procedure to the United States-Soviet arms control conflict. Walter Isard is cited by Mark Blaug as one of the Great Economists Since Keynes (CUP, 1989 paper edition).

Discussions of key domestic and international aspects of missile defense, arms control, and arms races.

There have been scientific studies of the nuclear arms race, and there have been political exposés -- yet no book until now has given the general reader a complete and accessible history of the events, forces and factors that have brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. In this revealing account, Ronald Powaski examines two basic questions: What keeps the nuclear arms race going and why is it so difficult to end? Starting with the opening days of World War II, when Roosevelt gave the go-ahead for the secret development of the atom bomb, the famous Manhattan Project, Powaski traces the unfolding arms race up to the current day. He takes us through Truman's decision to use the bomb against Japan in 1945, the Cold War era and the missile crisis of Kennedy's administration, to the detente years of the seventies and the defense and arms control policies of Ronald Reagan, including "Star Wars" and START (the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). As Powaski explains, both the United States and the Soviet Union now have a combined total of almost 50,000 nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms treaties and agreements are threatening to collapse, he argues, while the proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons throughout the world has given many countries the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Emphasizing the role of the United States, Powaski shows how one president after another has promised to do his utmost to end the nuclear weapons competition, yet each one has actually increased the quantity or quality of these weapons in the American arsenal. March to Armageddon reveals this startling discrepancy between presidential words and actions.--Publisher description.