The magazine of mobile warfare.

This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.

On Armor tells three important and interconnected stories. The first is a tale of a technology, in particular, the rise and fall of the main battle tank—a type of armored vehicle that came to dominate land warfare in the middle of the 20th century but is now obsolete. The second is a history of ideas. The problem that armored vehicles created for 20th-century armies was as much about concepts of operation as it was about technology. Those who got the philosophy right did well. Those who lacked either the imagination or the intellectual capital to understand the rapidly evolving potential of the armored vehicle failed miserably. The third story is one of organization. Gudmundsson pays particular attention to how armored vehicles were combined with other forces to form an extraordinarily rich variety of units and formations. He also comments on the current and future roles various types of armor will play on the battlefield. The main battle tank is probably the single most important fighting vehicle of the 20th century. At the same time, as Gudmundsson makes clear, it is only one of the many different types of armored vehicle that have played an important role in recent warfare. Neither the past glory nor the current obsolescence of the main battle tank can be understood without reference to vehicles such as the armored car, assault guns of various kinds, armored engineer vehicles, and armored personnel carriers. This text also explores the role that mobile operations in World War I played in fostering the development of armored warfare; the rapid decline of the French Army from its highpoint as the leading tank army in the world; the role that weapons other than the tank played in the rise of the German armored force; and the relationship between British ideas of armored warfare and the growth of the American armored force in World War I.

Includes 24 maps This thesis begins with a brief history of armored vehicles from their earliest concepts to the modern battle tank of today. It critically examines the decision not to include tank units with the first American combat forces deployed in Vietnam and the irrationality of that decision in light of a similar decision made prior to the Korean conflict. Tanks were deployed in limited numbers in Vietnam in spite of a decision to the contrary and, once there, I proved their usefulness and their ability to perform in a tropical environment against an elusive enemy. Examples of the tank’s effectiveness in Vietnam are given and the feasibility of deploying major armored forces to that country is discussed. Problems created by insufficient armor are addressed as well as the limitations and vulnerabilities of tanks and other armored vehicles. Armor doctrine is traced from the tank’s role in breaking the stalemate of World War I through the formative years of World War II, and its application to the war in Vietnam. Since most armored weapons were designed primarily for conventional warfare, a number of modifications were required to adapt the weapons to an unconventional war. Some of the more significant modifications are described. Finally, lessons learned by the Vietnam experience and their future application are discussed. Concluding consideration in the paper is whether or not decision makers will need these lessons learned or continue to make the same mistakes.

This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas