“Armor Command is a candid book presenting the activities and observations of an armor commander who was among the first overseas and in action against the European Axis in World War II. All who are interested in the activities of combat troops that make or break the reputations of high military figures and all those who desire an understanding of life in the combat zone will find this book of compelling interest. Military men will find it of professional value for it deals with the problems of a small command in the initial campaign against the German-Italian Allies. Among other things it deals with the problems of the meeting engagement and the withdrawal—two of the most difficult operations in war.”—Foreword

The Personal Story Of A Commander Of The 13th Armored Regiment, Of The CCB, 1st Armored Division, And Of The Armored School During World War II.

Most histories of the U.S. Army in World War II view the Mediterranean Theater of Operations primarily as a deadly training ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on the beaches of Oran, in the hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in the MTO would not have materialized without the leadership of battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops, ineffective leadership at higher levels, and deficiencies in equipment, organization, and mobilization. Barry portrays these officers as highly trained, adaptable, and courageous in their first combat experiences in North Africa and Sicily. Their leadership, he argues, brought discipline, maturity, experience, and the ability to translate common operational guidance into tactical reality, and thus contributed significantly to battlefield success in North Africa and Sicily in 1942-1943. To explain how this happened, he examines their prewar experiences, including professional military education and unit training exercises; personal factors such as calmness and physical resilience under fire; and the ability to draw upon doctrine, creatively apply the resources at their disposal, and clearly define and communicate mission goals and means. He also reveals how battalion leaders incorporated technological innovations into combined arms maneuvers by employing tank capabilities and close air support doctrine. As Barry's assessment shows, these battalion commanders were not the sole reason for the Allied triumph in North Africa and Sicily, but victory would not have been possible without the special brand of military leadership they exhibited throughout those campaigns. Under their leadership, even inexperienced units were able to deliver credible combat performance, and without the regular army battalion leaders, U.S. units could not have functioned tactically early in the war. One of the few studies to focus on tactical adaptation at the battalion level in conventional warfare, Barry's book attests to the pivotal value of professional military education-and makes an important contribution to today's "organizational learning" debate-while providing an in-depth view of adaptation of U.S. infantry and armored forces in 1942-1943.

Robert Forczyk covers the development of armoured warfare in North Africa from Rommel's Gazala offensive in 1942 through to the end of war in the desert in Tunisia in 1943. The war in the North African desert was pure mechanized warfare, and in many respects the most technologically advanced theatre of World War II. It was also the only theatre where for three years British and Commonwealth, and later US, troops were in constant contact with Axis forces. World War II best-selling author Robert Forczyk explores the second half of the history of the campaign, from the Gazala offensive in May 1942 that drove the British forces all the way back to the Egyptian frontier and led to the fall of Tobruk, through the pivotal battles of El Alamein, and the final Allied victory in Tunisia. He examines the armoured forces, equipment, doctrine, training, logistics and operations employed by both Allied and Axis forces throughout the period, focusing especially on the brigade and regimental level of operations. Fully illustrated throughout with photographs, profile artwork and maps, and featuring tactical-level vignettes and appendices analysing tank data, tank deliveries in-theatre and orders of battle, this book goes back to the sources to provide a new study of armoured warfare in the desert.

As the Afrika Korps withdrew after a bruising defeat at El Alamein, it became apparent that Axis forces would not be able to maintain their hold over Libya. Rommel pulled his troops back to Tunisia, digging in along the Mareth Line, and turned westwards t

Includes the lineages and honors for all armies, corps, divisions, and separate combined arms brigades in order to perpetuate and publicize their traditions, honors, and heraldic entitlements, organized under Tables of Organization and Equipment that have been active in the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army of the United States since the beginning of World War II. Included in this edition is the 12th Infantry Division (formerly the Philippine Division), which did not appear in the earlier one. The lineages are current though 1 October 1997. Brigade headquarters and headquarters companies or headquarters, except for aviation and engineer brigades, organic to the above-mentioned combat divisions since ROAD (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions) in the early 1960s have also been incorporated. (Divisional aviation and engineer brigades are branch specific and therefore have been omitted.) The lineages and honors for Army National Guard divisions and separate combined arms brigades that were active on 1 October 1997 are also included.--Preface.