Universal conscription has been the main form of military recruitment in the 19th and 20th centuries. In central Asia and the Middle East it has been ruthlessly imposed on agrarian and undeveloped societies, with little regard for individual interest, economic disruption, or intense local resistance. Providing a study of conscription, this work includes contributions from social and political historians on a subject traditionally covered by military historians. It focuses on Ottoman Turkey, Egypt (where some of the most extreme forms of conscription occurred), Iran, central Asia and the Balkans, and covers feudal militarization, unfree service and conscription of serfs, the press gang, military slavery, recruitment in the labour market, mercenaries, privateers, sales of Bedouin services, and resistance.

In a series of probing essays covering various periods in America’s military history, this official history tells the story of how United States weapons were developed and produced, what notable managers and organizations were involved, and which weapons from those periods had a significant impact on America’s wars.

India has long been motivated to modernize its military, and it now has the resources. But so far, the drive to rebuild has lacked a critical component—strategic military planning. India's approach of arming without strategic purpose remains viable, however, as it seeks great-power accommodation of its rise and does not want to appear threatening. What should we anticipate from this effort in the future, and what are the likely ramifications? Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta answer those crucial questions in a book so timely that it reached number two on the nonfiction bestseller list in India. "Two years after the publication of Arming without Aiming, our view is that India's strategic restraint and its consequent institutional arrangement remain in place. We do not want to predict that India's military-strategic restraint will last forever, but we do expect that the deeper problems in Indian defense policy will continue to slow down military modernization."—from the preface to the paperback edition

"A Council on Foreign Relations book"--Cover.

David Herrmann's work is the most complete study to date of how land-based military power influenced international affairs during the series of diplomatic crises that led up to the First World War. Instead of emphasizing the naval arms race, which has been extensively studied before, Herrmann draws on documentary research in military and state archives in Germany, France, Austria, England, and Italy to show the previously unexplored effects of changes in the strength of the European armies during this period. Herrmann's work provides not only a contribution to debates about the causes of the war but also an account of how the European armies adopted the new weaponry of the twentieth century in the decade before 1914, including quick-firing artillery, machine guns, motor transport, and aircraft. In a narrative account that runs from the beginning of a series of international crises in 1904 until the outbreak of the war, Herrmann points to changes in the balance of military power to explain why the war began in 1914, instead of at some other time. Russia was incapable of waging a European war in the aftermath of its defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-5, but in 1912, when Russia appeared to be regaining its capacity to fight, an unprecedented land-armaments race began. Consequently, when the July crisis of 1914 developed, the atmosphere of military competition made war a far more likely outcome than it would have been a decade earlier.