Armies of Arabia is the first book to comprehensively analyze the armed forces of the Gulf monarchies. Zoltan Barany explains the conspicuous ineffectiveness of Gulf militaries with a combination of political-structural and sociocultural factors. Following a brief exposition on their historical evolution, he explores the region's six armies of the region comparatively, through the lenses of military politics, sociology, economics, and diplomacy. The book'sthemes come together in the last chapter that critically evaluates the Saudi and Emirati armed forces' record in the on-going war in Yemen.

Since the Second World War, Arab armed forces have consistently punched below their weight. They have lost many wars that by all rights they should have won, and in their best performances only ever achieved quite modest accomplishments. Over time, soldiers, scholars, and military experts have offered various explanations for this pattern. Reliance on Soviet military methods, the poor civil-military relations of the Arab world, the underdevelopment of the Arab states, and patterns of behavior derived from the wider Arab culture, have all been suggested as the ultimate source of Arab military difficulties. Armies of Sand, Kenneth M. Pollack's powerful and riveting history of Arab armies from the end of World War Two to the present, assesses these differing explanations and isolates the most important causes. Over the course of the book, he examines the combat performance of fifteen Arab armies and air forces in virtually every Middle Eastern war, from the Jordanians and Syrians in 1948 to Hizballah in 2006 and the Iraqis and ISIS in 2014-2017. He then compares these experiences to the performance of the Argentine, Chadian, Chinese, Cuban, North Korean, and South Vietnamese armed forces in their own combat operations during the twentieth century. The book ultimately concludes that reliance on Soviet doctrine was more of a help than a hindrance to the Arabs. In contrast, politicization and underdevelopment were both important factors limiting Arab military effectiveness, but patterns of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture was the most important factor of all. Pollack closes with a discussion of the rapid changes occurring across the Arab world-political, economic, and cultural-as well as the rapid evolution in war making as a result of the information revolution. He suggests that because both Arab society and warfare are changing, the problems that have bedeviled Arab armed forces in the past could dissipate or even vanish in the future, with potentially dramatic consequences for the Middle East military balance. Sweeping in its historical coverage and highly accessible, this will be the go-to reference for anyone interested in the history of warfare in the Middle East since 1945.

“Written with great accuracy, detail, enthusiasm, and insight . . . a new perspective on the well-trodden story of the Arab Revolt” (Military History Matters on its Book of the Year, Silver Award–winner). Striking where the enemy is weakest and melting away into the darkness before he can react. Never confronting a stronger force directly, but using audacity and surprise to confound and demoralize an opponent. Operations driven by good intelligence, area knowledge, mobility, speed, firepower, and detailed planning, and executed by a few specialists with indigenous warriors—this is unconventional warfare. T. E. Lawrence was one of the earliest practitioners of modern unconventional warfare. His tactics and strategies were used by men like Mao and Giap in their wars of liberation. Both kept Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom close at hand. This book examines the creation of the “Hedgehog” force, looks at the formation of armored car sections and other units, and focuses on the Hejaz Operations Staff, the Allied officers and men who took Lawrence’s idea and prosecuted it against the Ottoman Turkish army, assisting Field Marshal Allenby to achieve victory in 1918. Stejskal concludes with an examination of how Hedgehog influenced special operations and unconventional warfare, including Field Marshal Wavell, the Long Range Desert Group, and David Stirling’s SAS. “Makes a convincing case that the roots of modern special operations, particularly effective guerrilla warfare, are to be found in British participation in the Arab Revolt against Ottoman Turkish rule during WWI.” —Publishers Weekly

While today the military of the United Arab Emirates is described admiringly as a 'little Sparta', just 60 years ago the only security forces in the Emirates were the armed retainers of the Ruling Sheikhs and a small British-led, locally-raised Arab force. Through a combination of direct oversight by rulers, investment in its nationals, engagement of expatriates and the purchase of cutting edge military hardware, the UAE Armed Forces has become, arguably, the most capable Arab military. In the last decade, it has also gained considerable experience through its military operations in Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This book traces the little-known history of the country’s military from 1951 to 2020. It provides unparalleled detail on the constituent forces that evolved into the UAE Armed Forces in 1976, and how that unified force has evolved to the present. It provides essential background information on how the country’s geography, demographics and political system have shaped its military, the enduring roles of the military and the history of each military service. It also details the political and command structure governing the military, and its manpower and materiel characteristics. The book concludes with an explanation of how the UAE has been able to develop such a highly capable military for its size in a relatively short period of time.

Twenty years ago, the Persian Gulf War captured the attention of the world as the first test of the U.S. Army since the Vietnam War and the first large-scale armor engagement since World War II. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his subsequent ouster by the U.S.-led coalition are keys to understanding today's situation in the Middle East. The coalition partnerships cemented in that initial operation and in the regional peacekeeping operations that followed provided the basis for a growing series of multinational efforts that have characterized the post-Cold War environment. Moreover, the growing interoperability of U.S. air, sea, and land forces coupled with the extensive employment of more sophisticated weapons first showcased in Desert Storm have become the hallmark of American military operations and the standard that other nations strive to meet.

The dramatic eruption of the Arab peoples from Arabia after their adoption of the Muslim faith in the 7th century remains one of the most extraordinary events in world history. By the end of that century they ruled a state that stretched from the Atlantic to India, from southern Arabia to Central Asia, covering an area far greater than that of the Roman Empire. Therefore warfare, at least among the nomadic bedouin, was a normal aspect of life. Complemented by numerous illustrations, including eight full page colour plates by Angus McBride, this detailed text by David Nicolle tells the real story of the armies of the Muslim conquest.

Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt examines the use and exploitation of intelligence in formulating Britain’s strategy for the Arab Revolt during the First World War. It also presents a radical re-examination of the achievements of T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) as an intelligence officer and guerrilla leader. Modern intelligence techniques such as Sigint, Imint and Humint were incorporated into strategic planning with greater expertise and consistency in Arabia than in any other theatre during the war, and their deployment as tactical support for the Arab forces was decisive. Using much previously unpublished material, this study shows conclusively how Britain’s intelligence community in Arabia influenced the conduct of the Arab campaign, promoted a full-scale guerrilla war and thereby facilitated the Arab armies’ march north into Syria, Palestine and the modern Middle East. Polly A. Mohs contributes to the unveiling of another hidden corner of the history of the Middle East and to a better understanding of the significance of intelligence in formulating strategic processes in the modern era. Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, military history, Middle East history, British imperial history, guerrilla warfare and insurgency.