Douglas N. Walton considers the question of whether the conventions of informal conversation can be articulated more precisely than they are at present. Specifically, he addresses the problem of the fallacy of ad hominem argumentation as it occurs in natural settings. Can rules be formulated to determine if criticisms of apparent hypocrisy in an argument are defensible or refutable? Walton suggests that they can, and ultimately defends the thesis that ad hominem reasoning is not fallacious per se. He carries his analysis to the core of action--theoretic reasoning--by examining a number of specimen arguments. As suggested by the title, the conclusion of ad hominem argument is demonstrated to be relative to the arguer's position. In the appendixes of the book, articles by Gerald McAuliffe and Gordon R. Lowe illustrate vivid and powerful cases in which Walton's contentions are put to the test.

What is text understanding? It is the dynamic process of constructing coherent representations and inferences at multiple levels of text and context, within the bottleneck of a limited-capacity working memory. The field of text and discourse has advanced to the point where researchers have developed sophisticated models of comprehension, and identified the particular assumptions that underlie comprehension mechanisms in precise analytical or mathematical detail. The models offer a priori predictions about thought and behavior, not merely ad hoc descriptions of data. Indeed, the field has evolved to a mature science. The contributors to this volume collectively cover the major models of comprehension in the field of text and discourse. Other books are either narrow -- covering only a single theoretical framework -- or do not focus on systematic modeling efforts. In addition, this book focuses on deep levels of understanding rather than language codes, syntax, and other shallower levels of text analysis. As such, it provides readers with up-to-date information on current psychological models specified in quantitative or analytical detail.

The papers in this volume were originally presented at the Symposium on Conversation, held at the University of New Mexico in July 1995. The symposium brought together scholars who work on face-to-face communication from a variety of perspectives: social, cultural, cognitive and communicative. Our aim for both the symposium and this volume has been to challenge some of the prevailing dichotomies in discourse studies: First, the cleavage between the study of information flow and the study of social interaction. Second, the theoretical division between speech-situation models and cognitive models. Third, the methodological split between the study of spontaneous conversation in natural context and the study of speech production and comprehension under controlled experimental conditions. And fourth, the rigid genre distinction between narrative and conversational discourse. All four dichotomies have been useful either methodologically or historically. But important as they may have been in the past, the time has perhaps come to work toward an integrated approach to the study of human communication, one that will be less dependent on narrow reductions. Both the ontological primacy and the methodological challenge of natural face-to-face communication are self evident. Human language has evolved, is acquired, and is practiced most commonly in the context of face-to-face communication. Most past theory-building in either linguistics or psychology has not benefited from the study of face-to-face communication, a fact that is regrettable and demands rectification. We hope that this volume tilts in the right direction.

My impulse when I decided to collect into a single volume the essays on topics in logical theory and related subjects that I have written in the last fifteen years was to borrow from the title of a work by Sextus Empiricus, and call my collection "Against the Logicians." Although the essays address a variety of problems that interest me, the thread that runs through them is a scepticism about how logicians see things. So, the title appealed to me. However, I had second thoughts and chose instead a title of one of my own essays, "In Defense of Informal Logic", which emphasizes my support for other approaches. Although my criticisms of logical theory are designed to cut deeply, I do not want to be unresponsive to the needs that it is supposed to satisfy. However, my position that we have adequate resources for critically analyzing a particular argument and 00 not need a theory of argumentation, will not completely satisfy those who think that there is a need for it. So, I want them to know that I am taking their concerns seriously.

Recent concerns with the evaluation of argumentation in informal logic and speech communication center around nondemonstrative arguments that lead to tentative or defeasible conclusions based on a balance of considerations. Such arguments do not appear to have structures of the kind traditionally identified with deductive and inductive reasoning, but are extremely common and are often called "plausible" or "presumptive," meaning that they are only provisionally acceptable even when they are correct. How is one to judge, by some clearly defined standard, whether such arguments are correct or not in a given instance? The answer lies in what are called argumentation schemes -- forms of argument (structures of inference) that enable one to identify and evaluate common types of argumentation in everyday discourse. This book identifies 25 argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning and matches a set of critical questions to each. These two elements -- the scheme and the questions -- are then used to evaluate a given argument in a particular case in relation to a context of dialogue in which the argument occurred. In recent writings on argumentation, there is a good deal of stress placed on how important argumentation schemes are in any attempt to evaluate common arguments in everyday reasoning as correct or fallacious, acceptable or questionable. However, the problem is that the literature thus far has not produced a precise and user-friendly enough analysis of the structures of the argumentation schemes themselves, nor have any of the documented accounts been as helpful, accessible, or systematic as they could be, especially in relation to presumptive reasoning. This book solves the problem by presenting the most common presumptive schemes in an orderly and clear way that makes them explicit and useful as precisely defined structures. As such, it will be an indispensable tool for researchers, students, and teachers in the areas of critical thinking, argumentation, speech communication, informal logic, and discourse analysis.

This accessible book provides a practical discussion of the main elements of argumentation as illustrated by 30 public arguments from a recent year on a wide variety of social, cultural, and scientific topics. Arguing is an important form of communication in any society and a principal way in which ideas are exposed, discussed, and modified. The real-life examples examined in this book reflect the different considerations that go into composing arguments and the range of strategies that can be chosen as vehicles for our positions. They demonstrate the roles that emotion can play along with other modes of conveying evidence, from the use of images to the use of gestures. They show the power of threats, comparisons, and consequences. What emerges is an instructive discussion that illustrates the way we argue and that shows argument, invention, and evaluation in action. This book is a stimulating read for anyone interested in argument and public discourse and can be used as a supplemental text for courses in argumentation, persuasive communication, critical thinking, composition, and informal logic.

Assembling an unprecedented range of considered responses to the noted contributions to philosophy made by Marcelo Dascal, this collection comprises the work of his many friends, colleagues and former students. Beginning with a series of articles on Dascal’s influential insights on philosophical controversy, this volume continues with explorations of Dascal’s celebrated scholarship on Liebnitz, before moving on to papers dealing with his philosophy of language, including interpretations by Dresner and Herring on the phenomenon of emoticons. Taken as a whole, they provide a compelling commentary on Dascal’s prolific and voluminous publications and include fresh perspectives on the theory of argumentation and the ethics of communication. The material collected here extends to political philosophy, such as Morris-Reich's paper exploring the ways in which German social scientists confront issues of antisemitism, the psychology of genius, and the origins of norms in society and culture. Much of the analysis is directly connected to, or influenced by, the philosophical themes, ideas and concepts developed throughout the years by Marcelo Dascal, while others have a looser connection to his work. All of them, however, attest to the remarkable and multifaceted philosophical persona of Marcelo Dascal, who is the guiding light of the rich conceptual dialogue running through this book. ​ ​