This book examines the causes of the economic and political crisis in Argentina in 2001 and the process of strong economic recovery. It poses the question of how a country which defaulted on its external loans and was widely criticized by international observers could have succeeded in its growth and development despite this decision in 2002. It examines this process in terms of the impact of neo-liberal policies on the economy and the role of development strategy and the state in recovering from the crisis

This book examines the causes of the economic and political crisis in Argentina in 2001 and the process of strong economic recovery. It poses the question of how a country which defaulted on its external loans and was widely criticized by international observers could have succeeded in its growth and development despite this decision in 2002. It examines this process in terms of the impact of neo-liberal policies on the economy and the role of development strategy and the state in recovering from the crisis

Anew, innovation-led growth model would enable Argentina to increase economic stability and achieve stronger shared prosperity. Argentina can escape boom-and-bust cycles and accelerate its recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic with an innovation-driven economy that, in addition to factor accumulation, fuels higher productivity growth across all its sectors. Such a growth model should build on Argentina’s strengths in human capital, research, and firm-level capabilities, which would help diversify the economy and make it more inclusive and less susceptible to external shocks, providing the country with a stronger buffer at times of uncertainty. Despite the volatility of the past few decades, Argentina has been able to develop important pockets of success in high-end research and in frontier productive sectors such as biotechnology and knowledge economy. All of these should be better exploited and strengthened through public-private partnerships, targeted investments, and an enabling business environment to increase innovation’s contribution to economic growth. A resilient economic recovery will, in part, require a long-term vision and a policy framework that builds a sustainable national innovation system. To contribute to the strengthening of such a national innovation system, this report reviews holistically the innovation performance in Argentina, identifies some of the main gaps and strengths, and discusses appropriate policy responses. The report also examines regional differences in innovation performance and reviews the policy effectiveness of recent initiatives that have focused on industry and science linkages and knowledge-based entrepreneurship. The lessons from these impact evaluations and fi ndings of the comparative evaluation of Argentina’s innovation landscape are intended to provide guidance in the design and strengthening of existing and future innovation policies in Argentina.

Review: "Series of well-written articles analyzes elements that comprise successful stabilization programs, as well as impact of deregulation, privatization, tax reform, and trade liberalization. Discusses reform efforts in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Israel, Mexico, Peru, and Turkey"--Handbook of Latin American Studies, v. 57. http://www.loc.gov/hlas/

The catastrophic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 marks the tragic end to Argentina's initially successful, decade-long experiment with sound money and market-oriented economic reform. The IMF consistently Supported Argentina's stabilization and reform efforts in the decade leading up to the current crisis and often pointed to many of Argentina's policies as examples for other emerging-market economies to emulate. In this policy analysis, former IMF Chief Economist Michael Mussa addresses the obvious question: What went wrong in Argentina and what important errors did the IMF make in either supporting inappropriate policies or in failing to press for alternatives that might have avoided catastrophe? He emphasizes that the persistent inability of the Argentine authorities at all levels to run a responsible fiscal policy--even when the Argentine economy was performing very well--was the primary avoidable cause of the country's catastrophic financial collapse. The IMF failed to press aggressively for a more responsible fiscal policy. Mussa also addresses the role of the Convertibility Plan, which linked the Argentine peso rigidly at parity with the US dollar and played a central role in both the initial success and ultimate collapse of Argentina's stabilization and reform efforts. While the IMF accepted this plan as a basic policy choice of the Argentine authorities so long as it remained viable, it erred in the summer of 2001 by extending further massive support for unsustainable policies, rather than insisting on a new policy strategy that might have mitigated some of the damage from a crisis that had become unavoidable. Mussa lays out what needs to be done to restore economic andfinancial stability in Argentina and begin the process of recovery, including the proper role of the IMF and the international community. He also examines what the IMF can do to avoid repeating the types of mistakes it made in t

The "Argentine disappointment"—why Argentina persistently failed to achieve sustained economic stability during the twentieth century—is an issue that has mystified scholars for decades. In Straining the Anchor, Gerardo della Paolera and Alan M. Taylor provide many of the missing links that help explain this important historical episode. Written chronologically, this book follows the various fluctuations of the Argentine economy from its postrevolutionary volatility to a period of unprecedented prosperity to a dramatic decline from which the country has never fully recovered. The authors examine in depth the solutions that Argentina has tried to implement such as the Caja de Conversión, the nation's first currency board which favored a strict gold-standard monetary regime, the forerunner of the convertibility plan the nation has recently adopted. With many countries now using—or seriously contemplating—monetary arrangements similar to Argentina's, this important and persuasive study maps out one of history's most interesting monetary experiments to show what works and what doesn't.

This volume documents and explains the remarkable resilience of emerging market nations in East Asia and Latin America when faced with the global financial crisis in 2008-2009. Their quick bounceback from the crisis marked a radical departure from the past, such as when the 1982 debt shocks produced a decade-long recession in Latin America or when the Asian financial crisis dramatically slowed those economies in the late 1990s. Why? This volume suggests that these countries' resistance to the initial financial contagion is a tribute to financial-sector reforms undertaken over the past two decades. The rebound itself was a trade-led phenomenon, favoring the countries that had gone the farthest with macroeconomic restructuring and trade reform. Old labels used to describe "neoliberal versus developmentalist" strategies do not accurately capture the foundations of this recovery. These authors argue that policy learning and institutional reforms adopted in response to previous crises prompted policymakers to combine state and market approaches in effectively coping with the global financial crisis. The nations studied include Korea, China, India, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, accompanied by Latin American and Asian regional analyses that bring other emerging markets such as Chile and Peru into the picture. The substantial differences among the nations make their shared success even more remarkable and worthy of investigation. And although 2012 saw slowed growth in some emerging market nations, the authors argue this selective slowing suggests the need for deeper structural reforms in some countries, China and India in particular.