The author reminds us all of the huge part that British capital, British people and British technology played in transforming Argentina into a modern 20th century economy. He also analyses the reasons for Argentina's loss of momentum in the post-war world.Much of the history has been forgotten and/or misjudged. That does not make it any less important. In fact, it deserves to be recognised as there are lessons that could be learned from the “golden decade” of development. Those who have an interest in history and development, especially in Argentina, including academics, journalists, historians, and economists will all find this economic and social history of interest.

At the opening of the twentieth century, Britain's influence in Argentina was at its peak and resembled, in certain ways, its position in countries such as Australia and Canada. Yet, in the following generation, British preeminence was persistently threatened, and Argentina's prospects plunged into a seemingly irreversible decline. Why did the Anglo-Argentine connection, which appeared so mutually beneficial in 1900, become strained to the breaking point by 1939? This book shows that Britain's efforts in Argentina were usually more pathetic than imperialistic, but that in periods of difficulty (1914 to 1918, and in the 1930s), British pressure unwittingly helped into power a political party that brought destruction, not merely to British interests, but also to the Argentine Republic's future promise.

In 1806 a British expeditionary force captured Buenos Aires. Over the next eighteen months, Britain was sucked into a costly campaign on the far side of the world. The Spaniards were humbled on the battlefield and Montevideo was taken by storm, but the campaign ended in disaster when 6000 redcoats and riflemen surrendered following a bloody battle in the streets of the Argentine capital. So ended one of the most humiliating and neglected episodes of the entire Napoleonic Wars.In The British Invasion of the River Plate Ben Hughes tells the story of this forgotten campaign in graphic detail. His account is based on research carried out across two continents. It draws on contemporary newspaper reports, official documents and the memoirs, letters and journals of the men who were there.He describes the initially successful British invasion, which was stopped when their troops were surrounded in Buenos Aires main square and forced to surrender, and the second British attack which was eventually defeated too. His narrative covers the course of the entire campaign and its aftermath. While focusing on the military and political aspects of the campaign, his book gives an insight into the actions of the main protagonists William Carr Beresford, Sir Home Popham, Santiago de Liniers and Black Bob Craufurd and into the experiences of the forgotten rank and file.He also considers the long-term impact of the campaign on the fortunes of the opposing sides. Many of the British survivors went on to win glory in the Peninsular War. For the Uruguayans and Argentines, their victory gave them a sense of national pride that would eventually encourage them to wrest their independence from Spain.

During the nineteenth century, British-owned railways grew under the protection of an Argentine ruling elite that considered railways both instruments and symbols of progress. Under this program of support for foreign enterprise, Argentina had by 1914 built the largest railway network in Latin America. During the first decades of the twentieth century, the railways were successful in following a policy of calculated disregard for Argentine interests in general. However, following the end of World War I, the British economic empire began to decline and Argentine economic nationalism grew. A number of popularistic political movements incorporated economic nationalism into their platforms, and even among the ruling elite there were signs of increasing nationalistic sentiment. Although most studies of economic nationalism have emphasized the importance of the middle-class Radical party in the rise of xenophobia, Winthrop R. Wright's study shows that antiforeign economic nationalism was not entirely a reaction to the conservative elite. Between 1932 and 1938 the nationalistic programs of General Agustin Justo's government—basically a conservative regime—led the British interests to decide to sell their holdings. The British govemment had arrived at a position of supporting the economic withdrawal of the large British-owned firms long before Juan D. Perón appeared on the political scene. Perón combined traditional Argentine economic nationalism with his own scheme to gain power over all elements in Argentina. His solution to the railway problem, although more dramatically executed, did not differ greatly from that of the conservative Justo. Perón purchased the railways outright in 1947–1948, but his use of nationalism was in reality covering his own inability to outbargain Britain and the United States following the conclusion of World War II.