Strong labor protections for ordinary workers are often portrayed as a 'luxury developing countries cannot afford'. No study has been more influential in propagating this perversity trope in the context of the Indian economy than the QJE article of Besley and Burgess (2004). Their article provides econometric evidence that pro-worker regulation resulted in lower output, employment, investment and productivity in India's registered manufacturing sector. This paper reviews existing critiques of Besley and Burgess (2004), which highlight conceptual and measurement errors and uncover econometric weaknesses. The paper takes a step beyond these: it reports a failure to replicate Besley and Burgess' findings and demonstrate the non-robustness of their results. My deconstruction is not only about the econometrics, however. I show that Besley and Burgess' findings are not just inconsistent with their theoretical priors, but also internally contradictory and empirically implausible, taxing any person's capacity for belief. The paper, written by two 'useful economists', exhibits a gratuitous empiricism in which priors trump evidence. On all counts, it fails the test of being useful to the purpose of 'evidence-based' public policy advice.

A new dataset of 1,948 retail stores in India compiled by the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys shows that 27 percent of the stores report labor regulations as a problem for their business. Using these data we analyze the effect of labor regulation on employment at the store level. We find that stricter labor regulation has a strong negative effect on employment. Our estimates show that labor reforms are likely to increase employment by 22 percent of the current level for an average store.

Using industry-level data disaggregated by states, this paper finds a positive impact of trade liberalization on labor-demand elasticities in the Indian manufacturing sector. These elasticities turn out to be negatively related to protection levels that vary across industries and over time. Furthermore, we find that these elasticities are not only higher for Indian states with more flexible labor regulations, they are also impacted to a larger degree by trade reforms. Finally, we find that after the reforms, volatility in productivity and output gets translated into larger wage and employment volatility, theoretically a possible consequence of larger labor-demand elasticities.

This paper studies the economic effects of legal amendments on different types of labor laws. It examines the effects of amendments to labor dispute laws and amendments to job security legislation. It also identifies the effects of legal amendments related to the most contentious regulation of all-Chapter Vb of the Industrial Disputes Act-which stipulates that firms with 100 or more employees cannot retrench workers without government authorization. The analysis finds that laws that increase job security or increase the cost of labor disputes substantially reduce registered sector employment and output but do not increase the labor share. Labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, are the hardest hit by laws that increase job security while capital-intensive industries are most affected by higher labor dispute resolution costs. The paper concludes that widespread and increasing use of contract labor may have brought some output and employment gains but did not make up for the adverse effects of job security and dispute resolution laws.

Law and Employment analyzes the effects of regulation and deregulation on Latin American labor markets and presents empirically grounded studies of the costs of regulation. Numerous labor regulations that were introduced or reformed in Latin America in the past thirty years have had important economic consequences. Nobel Prize-winning economist James J. Heckman and Carmen Pagés document the behavior of firms attempting to stay in business and be competitive while facing the high costs of complying with these labor laws. They challenge the prevailing view that labor market regulations affect only the distribution of labor incomes and have little or no impact on efficiency or the performance of labor markets. Using new micro-evidence, this volume shows that labor regulations reduce labor market turnover rates and flexibility, promote inequality, and discriminate against marginal workers. Along with in-depth studies of Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Jamaica, and Trinidad, Law and Employment provides comparative analysis of Latin American economies against a range of European countries and the United States. The book breaks new ground by quantifying not only the cost of regulation in Latin America, the Caribbean, and in the OECD, but also the broader impact of this regulation.

India’s growing economic and socio-political importance on the global stage has triggered an increased interest in the country. This Handbook is a reference guide, which surveys the current state of Indian politics and provides a basic understanding of the ways in which the world’s largest democracy functions. The Handbook is structured around four main topics: political change, political economy, the diversity of regional development, and the changing role of India in the world. Chapters examine how and why democracy in India put down firm roots, but also why the quality of governance offered by India’s democracy continues to be low. The acceleration of economic growth since the mid-1980s is discussed, and the Handbook goes on to look at the political and economic changes in selected states, and how progress across Indian states continues to be uneven. It concludes by touching on the issue of India’s international relations, both in South Asia and the wider world. The Handbook offers an invigorating initiation into the seemingly daunting and complex terrain of Indian politics. It is an invaluable resource for academics, researchers, policy analysts, graduate and undergraduate students studying Indian politics.