The EU and the US are the preeminent examples of multi-level polities and both have highly developed competition policies. Despite these similarities however, recent developments suggest that they are moving in different directions in the area of antitrust federalism. This book examines multi-level governance in competition policy from a comparative perspective. The book analyses how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. Inspired by the increasingly divergent policy developments taking place on both sides of the Atlantic, the author asks whether the EU and the US can draw policy lessons from each other’s experiences in antitrust federalism. Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US reveals the similarities and differences between the European and American models of antitrust federalism whilst employing policy network models in its comparative analysis of issues such as opacity and accountability in networks. The book is essentially multidisciplinary in its effort to initiate dialogue between the Law and Political Science literatures in this field. This book will be of particular interest to academics, students and practitioners of Competition Law, Constitutional Law and Political Science.

This book analyses multi-level governance in competition policy, or "antitrust federalism", in the US and the EU from a comparative perspective. The book compares how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. The book compares how competition laws and authorities of different levels - the federal and the state levels in the US and the national and the supranational levels in the EU - interact with each other. The EU and the US stand among the strongest existing examples of multi-level polities and they developed mature competition policies. Despite such similarities, however, recent developments imply that they are moving in different directions in the field of antitrust federalism. Inspired by these divergent policy developments taking place at both sides of the Atlantic, the book addresses three principal research questions: firstly, what are the key similarities and differences between the US and the EU in terms of antitrust federalism; secondly, what are the reasons for differences (if any), and finally, can the US and the EU draw any policy lessons from each others' experiences in antitrust federalism? The book is essentially multidisciplinary in nature and it aims to initiate a dialogue between the law and political science literatures in its field.

This book asks whether the current push to increase uniformity in substantive and procedural competition policy and enforcement in Europe, as well as in related institutional structures, is desirable. It focuses on European Union (EU) competition policy and enforcement (related to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the merger rules), the equivalent rules in the Member States, and the relationships between these different legal orders. Uniformity has many benefits; yet, the advantages of diversity are also legion, enabling more policy experimentation and innovation; and improving the ability to accommodate national preferences. Contrary to the overwhelming view of academics, practitioners and regulators in this area, the book argues that uniformity is insufficient and examines ways of achieving a better mix of uniformity and diversity (the EU's motto is 'United in Diversity'). To achieve this better mix, the book offers a new framework for European competition law: Co-ordinated Diversity. Finally, this book discusses whether Co-ordinated Diversity fits with the current legal order in the EU, as well as the EU constitutional settlement more generally, and suggests some ways that it might be made compatible with this order with relative ease. The book's impact could be significant: changing the results in individual cases; the way cases are argued; and what information is relevant. More importantly, it builds the theoretical foundations for fundamentally altering the way in which the EU and the Member States' competition authorities interact, allowing space for disagreement and uncertainty. The aim is to improve the effiiciency and effectiveness of competition policy-making and enforcement in Europe. It should also increase the legitimacy in this field (rebalancing towards the Member States). Co-ordinated Diversity provides a new way of seeing the EU that better blends difference, when this is demanded, with uniformity and its benefits, as necessary. A timely and ambitious work, this book will be read with interest by all practitioners and academics interested in EU competition law, as well as the related fields of political science and economics.

How is it that two broadly similar systems of competition law have reached different results across a number of significant antitrust issues? While the United States and the European Union share a commitment to maintaining competition in the marketplace and employ similar concepts and legal language in making antitrust decisions, differences in social values, political institutions, and legal precedent have inhibited close convergence. With The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust, Daniel J. Gifford and Robert T. Kudrle explore many of the main contested areas of contemporary antitrust, including mergers, price discrimination, predatory pricing, and intellectual property. After identifying how prevailing analyses differ across these areas, they then examine the policy ramifications. Several themes run throughout the book, including differences in the amount of discretion firms have in dealing with purchasers, the weight given to the welfare of various market participants, and whether competition tends to be viewed as an efficiency-generating process or as rivalry. The authors conclude with forecasts and suggestions for how greater compatibility might ultimately be attained.

The classic debate surrounding the prolific role of the European Union in defining spheres of competence and power relationships has long divided scholarly opinion. However, in recent years, the long-standing acquiescence to the broad powers of the Union has given way to the emerging perception of a competence problem in Europe. For a long period it was taken for granted that the European Community could act whenever its action was justified on the basis of the widely interpreted objectives of the Treaties. However this context has since changed. There is a widespread perception of a competence problem in Europe and the overabundance of provisions limiting the Union's competences is one of the most obvious marks left by the Lisbon Treaty. This book discusses the extent to which the parameters of power throughout the Union and its Member States have been recast by the recent implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and doctrines developed by the European Court of Justice. Comprised of contributions from a vast array of leading practitioners and academics in the field of EU Law, this volume assesses the debate surrounding the political identity of the European Union, and further illustrates the relevance of the Federal theory of sharing competences for the development of EU Law. Finally, the question of new potential limits to Union's competence is addressed. If anything, this broad reflection on the notion of competence in the EU law context is a way of opening up the question of the nature and contours of the political identity of the European Union.

This book departs from the 'statist' imagination by suggesting the EU is a federal union of states, or a federation. Dedicated to the constitutional theory of federalism, this book gives the strengths and weaknesses of a federation as a political form, its histories, and current perils for the EU.