In reduced-form pricing models, it is usual to assume a fixed recovery rate to obtain the probability of default from credit default swap prices. An alternative credit risk measure is proposed here: the maximum recovery rate compatible with observed prices. The analysis of the recent debt crisis in Argentina using this methodology shows that the correlation between the maximum recovery rate and implied default probabilities turns negative in advance of the credit event realization. This empirical finding suggests that the maximum recovery rate can be used for constructing early warning indicators of financial distress.

In reduced-form pricing models, it is usual to assume a fixed recovery rate to obtain the probability of default from credit default swap prices. An alternative credit risk measure is proposed here: the maximum recovery rate compatible with observed prices. The analysis of the recent debt crisis in Argentina using this methodology shows that the correlation between the maximum recovery rate and implied default probabilities turns negative in advance of the credit event realization. This empirical finding suggests that the maximum recovery rate can be used for constructing early warning indicators of financial distress.

Inhaltsangabe:Introduction: Since the beginning of the last century, investors in capital markets have strongly relied on rating agencies assessments of credit quality to decide on investments. Due to their important role in debt markets, they are supposed to provide accurate ratings without delay. However, cases like the defaults of WorldCom or Enron have damaged their reputation. In particular, credit rating agencies have been heavily criticized for their role during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Many economists blame the rating agencies for having played a major part in the securitization process of mortgage loans by providing too high rating grades; and thus sowing the seeds of the crisis. Having rated credit derivatives like collateralized debt obligations with best grades, the rating agencies encouraged banks and other financial institutions to keep these assets in their portfolios. As a result, it caused severe problems for the banking sector when these products heavily lost in value. Along with imprecise assessments of creditworthiness, the slow reaction of rating agencies has been critizised over the last few years. Therefore, the question of how well the agencies assess credit quality arises. This question is of great importance because of their dominant role on capital markets and the fact that decisions are made upon their ratings. To put it more precisely, this study asks whether the agencies process and convey new information to the market. On the other hand, it might be the case that market participants anticipate any change in the credit quality of a company before these institutions publish their assessments. Answering this question is of particular importance: if the rating announcements convey unknown information and the market reacts, then rating agencies are a systemic part of capital markets and policy should consider stricter regulation to prevent manipulation and failures like those described above. Conversely, if their announcements do not contain any new information or to put it differently, if markets react faster then we could think about using market based indicators instead in order to assess credit risk. In this case, the economic task of signaling creditworthiness could be handed over, among others, to Credit Default Swaps (see Chapter 2), which is also suggested by Hart & Zingales. This thesis contributes to the field of rating agencies performance measurement. Evaluating their announcements with the [...]

We investigate the relationship between credit rating events and credit default swap spreads for EU countries around the Subprime and European Debt Crises. Using event studies and OLS regressions we analyse the behavior of CDS spreads before, around and after credit rating events. Our results indicate that CDS spreads anticipate positive rating events as early as 2-3 months before the event however the anticipation for negative events is only 1-2 months prior; in addition we also observe announcement and post announcement effects in some instances. We also find that the behavior of CDS spreads and credit rating events has undergone a significant change after the crisis period. On similar lines, using logit and multinomial logit regressions we find that a change in CDS spreads are effective in predicting forthcoming credit rating events.

This book, unique in its composition, reviews the academic empirical literature on how CDSs actually work in practice, including during distressed times of market crises. It also discusses the mechanics of single-name and index CDSs, the theoretical costs and benefits of CDSs, as well as comprehensively summarizes the empirical evidence on important aspects of these instruments of risk transfer. Full-time academics, researchers at financial institutions, and students will benefit from the dispassionate and comprehensive summary of the academic literature; they can read this book instead of identifying, collecting, and reading the hundreds of academic articles on the important subject of credit risk transfer using derivatives and benefit from the synthesis of the literature provided.

Master's Thesis from the year 2010 in the subject Economics - Finance, grade: 5.0 (Schweiz), University of Zurich (Wirtschaftswissenschaften), language: English, abstract: The current developments in the credit or bond markets, influenced by the financial crisis and the economic downturn, revive a discussion about credit derivatives as an instrument of speculation and one cause or determinant of the financial crisis. Currently, CDS are used to speculate against the solvency of the different governments. Critics look at CDS contracts as Overthecounter (OTC) instruments that are not regulated and as bilateral contracts which can have a big influence on the financial position of market participants and on the real credit markets. CDS contracts are mainly instruments for investors to insure against a default of the debtor. For the seller of the CDS they are a possibility to participate in risks he perhaps could not have taken on the bond markets otherwise. These contracts separate the default risk of the debtor from the market conditions, e.g. the market interest rates. They make it possible to only trade the credit risk of a company or a country. Therefore, they can be instruments to proof the bond values and indicators for the real credit risk of the underlying. The discussion about CDS contracts is mostly a discussion including many prejudices and it deals with aspects from different topics which cannot be mixed. Therefore, a clear picture of advantages and disadvantages and especially values and risks of CDS is difficult to be found in the current public discussion and economic newspaper articles. A further phenomenon is that bond markets and CDS markets have lost their connection in the financial crisis. So the credit risk on both markets is valued differently: the prices on the two markets differed so much that market participants used these arbitrage possibilities to earn credit riskfree money for themselves and their customers It can be traded with a simple combination of the underlying bond and the fitting CDS contract. One of the causes of the basis can be the different liquidity level in the two separated markets. For the development of the basis during the crisis it is important to ask how big the changes are compared to the situation before the financial crisis and also how important the credit rating or the industry of the reference entity is.. The price difference, if the CDS price is lower than the credit risk priced by the bond of the same reference entity, is negative basiscalled