This book is a study of Anglo-French relations and military policy making in the First World War, which considers the strategic policies and operational planning of the British and French armies in the joint campaign fought on the western front. It examines the influence of incompatible British and French strategic objectives, the role of the allies' military and political leaders and the institutional development of the military alliance, on the alliance relationship and military policy making.

This book is a study of Anglo-French relations and military policy making in the First World War, which considers the strategic policies and operational planning of the British and French armies in the joint campaign fought on the western front. It examines the influence of incompatible British and French strategic objectives, the role of the allies' military and political leaders and the institutional development of the military alliance, on the alliance relationship and military policy making.

Germany's invasion of France in August 1914 represented a threat to the great power status of both Britain and France. The countries had no history of co-operation, yet the entente they had created in 1904 proceeded by trial and error, via recriminations, to win a war of unprecedented scale and ferocity. Elizabeth Greenhalgh examines the huge problem of finding a suitable command relationship in the field and in the two capitals. She details the civil-military relations on each side, the political and military relations between the two powers, the maritime and industrial collaboration that were indispensable to an industrialised war effort and the Allied prosecution of war on the western front. Although it was not until 1918 that many of the war-winning expedients were adopted, Dr Greenhalgh shows that victory was ultimately achieved because of, rather than in spite of, coalition.

This book provides a thorough examination of the relations between the men in the British, French and American armies on the Western Front of the First World War. The Allied victory in 1918 was built on the backs of British, French, and American soldiers who joined together to fight for a common cause. Using the diaries, records, and letters of these men, Chris Kempshall shows how these soldiers interacted with each other during four years of war. The British army that arrived in France in 1914 became isolated from their French allies and unable to coordinate with them. By 1916, Britain’s professional soldiers were replaced by civilians who learned to love their French ally, who reached out to them in friendship. At the end of the war the introduction of American soldiers caused hope and conflict before perceived British failures brought the alliance to the brink of collapse. Final cooperation between these three nations saw them victorious.

Nearly fourteen million people died during the First World War. But why, and for what reason? Already many contemporaries saw the Great War as a "pointless carnage" (Pope Benedict XV, 1917). Was there a point, at least in the eyes of the political and military decision makers? How did they justify the losses, and why did they not try to end the war earlier? In this volume twelve international specialists analyses and compares the hopes and expectations of the political and military leaders of the main belligerent countries and of their respective societies. It shows that the war aims adopted during the First World War were not, for the most part, the cause of the conflict, but a reaction to it, an attempt to give the tragedy a purpose - even if the consequence was to oblige the belligerents to go on fighting until victory. The volume tries to explain why - and for what - the contemporaries thought that they had to fight the Great War.

This is an important new study examining the military operations of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914–18 through the lens of its communications system. Brian Hall charts how new communications technology such as wireless, telephone and telegraph were used alongside visual signalling, carrier pigeons and runners as the British army struggled to develop a communication system adequate enough to wage modern warfare. He reveals how tenuous communications added to the difficulties of command and control during the war's early years, and examines their role during the major battles of the Somme, Arras, Ypres and Cambrai. It was only in 1918 that the British army would finally develop a flexible and sophisticated communications system capable of effectively coordinating infantry, artillery, tanks and aeroplanes. This is a major contribution to our understanding of British military operations during the First World War, the learning processes of armies and the revolution in military affairs.

In little over three weeks of intensive fighting, which not only witnessed the first British use of poison gas, but also the debut of New Army divisions filled with citizen volunteers, British forces at Loos managed to drive up to two miles into the German positions. However, they were unable to capitalise on their initial gains. After suffering nearly 60,000 casualties (three times the number suffered by their opponents) and being driven from the German lines in disorder, bitter recrimination followedNick Lloyd presents a reassessment of the Battle of Loos, arguing that it was vital to the development of new strategies and tactics. He places it within its political and strategic context, as well as discusses command and control and the tactical realities of war on the Western Front during 1915.