From the Fashoda incident in 1898 to the current Blair-Jospin 'entente', this book reviews one century of Franco-British relations. Friend or foe? Partner or rival? Model or counter-model? The two countries continually wavered between two extremes. Yet, as this collection of papers show, they have always had more things in common than suspected in the first place, and there has always been a strong case for cooperation.

This work, intended to commemorate the centenary of the Entente Cordiale in 2004, examines aspects of Anglo-French relations since the late eighteenth century when both Britain and France were pre-eminent great powers at war with one another through to the post-Second World War period when both had become rival second class powers in the face of American and Soviet dominance. The chapters in this book examine and illuminate the nature of the Anglo-French relationship at certain periods during the last two hundred years, both in peacetime and in war and include political, economic, diplomatic, military and strategic considerations and influences. While the impact of Anglo-French relations is centred essentially on the European context, other areas are also considered including the Middle East, Africa and the North Atlantic. The elements of conflict, rivalry and cooperation in Anglo-French relations are also highlighted whether in peace or war. This book was previously published as a special issue of Diplomacy and Statecraft.

From the Fashoda incident in 1898 to the current Blair-Jospin 'entente', this book reviews one century of Franco-British relations. Friend or foe? Partner or rival? Model or counter-model? The two countries continually wavered between two extremes. Yet, as this collection of papers show, they have always had more things in common than suspected in the first place, and there has always been a strong case for cooperation.

This collection of essays reviews the politico-military relationship between Britain and France between the two World Wars. As well as examining the relationship between the two nations' armed services, the book's contributors also analyse key themes in Anglo-French inter-war defence politics - disarmament, intelligence and imperial defence - and joint military, political and economic preparations for a second world war.

Arguing about Empire analyses the most divisive arguments about empire between Europe's two leading colonial powers from the age of high imperialism to the post-war era of decolonization. Focusing on the domestic contexts underlying imperial rhetoric, Arguing about Empire adopts a case-study approach, treating key imperial debates as historical episodes to be investigated in depth. The episodes in question have been selected both for their chronological range, their variety, and, above all, their vitriol. Some were straightforward disputes; others involved cooperation in tense circumstances. These include the Tunisian and Egyptian crises of 1881-2, which saw France and Britain establish new North African protectorates, ostensibly in co-operation, but actually in competition; the Fashoda Crisis of 1898, when Britain and France came to the brink of war in the aftermath of the British re-conquest of Sudan; the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, early tests of the Entente Cordiale, when Britain lent support to France in the face of German threats; the 1922 Chanak crisis, when that imperial Entente broke down in the face of a threatened attack on Franco-British forces by Kemalist Turkey; World War Two, which can be seen in part as an undeclared colonial war between the former allies, complicated by the division of the French Empire between De Gaulle's Free French forces and those who remained loyal to the Vichy Regime; and finally the 1956 Suez intervention, when, far from defusing another imperial crisis, Britain colluded with France and Israel to invade Egypt -- the culmination of the imperial interference that began some eighty years earlier.

Heo conceptualizes reconciliation in International Relations theory and fills a gap by building a theoretical framework for interstate reconciliation. Combining historical and political scientific approaches, she analyses case studies from Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia.

Some sixty years after the Far Eastern War ended, this innovative new collection brings together five distinguished UK-based scholars and five from Japan to reappraise their respective country's leadership in the Malaya and Burma campaigns. This leadership is analyzed on various levels, ranging from the grand strategic to operational. The Japanese contributors examine the reasons for their forces, brilliant advances in 1941-42, whereas the British writers have to account for the disastrous defeat, characterized by the poor leadership of senior commanders such as Bennett and Percival. Between 1943 and 1945, the tables were turned dramatically, so the failure of Japanese command decisions then comes under critical scrutiny and the British have to explain how defeat was transformed into victory. Above all, this volume should stimulate interest in different methods and styles of military leadership in view of the contrasting approaches of the British and Japanese in the Second World War.