Pauliina Remes and Juha Sihvola In the course of history, philosophers have given an impressive variety of answers to the question, “What is self?” Some of them have even argued that there is no such thing at all. This volume explores the various ways in which selfhood was approached and conceptualised in antiquity. How did the ancients understand what it is that I am, fundamentally, as an acting and affected subject, interpreting the world around me, being distinct from others like and unlike me? The authors hi- light the attempts in ancient philosophical sources to grasp the evasive character of the specifically human presence in the world. They also describe how the ancient philosophers understood human agents as capable of causing changes and being affected in and by the world. Attention will be paid to the various ways in which the ancients conceived of human beings as subjects of reasoning and action, as well as responsible individuals in the moral sphere and in their relations to other people. The themes of persistence, identity, self-examination and self-improvement recur in many of these essays. The articles of the collection combine systematic and historical approaches to ancient sources that range from Socrates to Plotinus and Augustine.

Self-knowledge - a person's knowledge of their own thoughts, character, and psychological states - has long been a central focus of philosophical enquiry. The concerns which occupy ancient thinkers with regard to self-knowledge, however, diverge in critical ways from contemporary investigations on the topic. In this volume, based upon the eighth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, leading scholars explore the treatment of self-knowledge in ancient Greek thought, particularly in Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic thinkers, and Plotinus. A number of chapters identify specific modes of self-knowledge in ancient thought, such as knowledge of one's individual moral or political character in Plato, or one's own discursive thought as compared to that arising from the self-presence of intellect in Plotinus. Others identify interesting points of convergence with contemporary thinking to make interventions in existing debates as well as to articulate new research questions, such as whether Plato regarded self-knowledge as synoptic and diachronic in the Republic, or whether self-knowledge is a condition on virtue for Aristotle. By exploring the distinctions between the fundamental assumptions and conceptual frameworks in which ancient and modern philosophers examine self-knowledge, this volume makes a novel contribution to current scholarship in the field.

Drawing on classical antiquity and Western and Eastern philosophy, Richard Sorabji tackles in Self the question of whether there is such a thing as the individual self or only a stream of consciousness. According to Sorabji, the self is not an undetectable soul or ego, but an embodied individual whose existence is plain to see. Unlike a mere stream of consciousness, it is something that owns not only a consciousness but also a body. Sorabji traces historically the retreat from a positive idea of self and draws out the implications of these ideas of self on the concepts of life and death, asking: Should we fear death? How should our individuality affect the way we live? Through an astute reading of a huge array of traditions, he helps us come to terms with our uneasiness about the subject of self in an account that will be at the forefront of philosophical debates for years to come. “There has never been a book remotely like this one in its profusion of ancient references on ideas about human identity and selfhood . . . . Readers unfamiliar with the subject also need to know that Sorabji breaks new ground in giving special attention to philosophers such as Epictetus and other Stoics, Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, and the ancient commentators on Aristotle (on the last of whom he is the world's leading authority).”—Anthony A. Long, Times Literary Supplement

This book-length treatment provides a unified account of what is distinctive in the ancient approach to the self-refutation argument.

This is a major reinterpretation of ancient philosophy that recovers the long Greek and Roman tradition of philosophy as a complete way of life--and not simply an intellectual discipline. Distinguished philosopher John Cooper traces how, for many ancient thinkers, philosophy was not just to be studied or even used to solve particular practical problems. Rather, philosophy--not just ethics but even logic and physical theory--was literally to be lived. Yet there was great disagreement about how to live philosophically: philosophy was not one but many, mutually opposed, ways of life. Examining this tradition from its establishment by Socrates in the fifth century BCE through Plotinus in the third century CE and the eclipse of pagan philosophy by Christianity, Pursuits of Wisdom examines six central philosophies of living--Socratic, Aristotelian, Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic, and the Platonist life of late antiquity. The book describes the shared assumptions that allowed these thinkers to conceive of their philosophies as ways of life, as well as the distinctive ideas that led them to widely different conclusions about the best human life. Clearing up many common misperceptions and simplifications, Cooper explains in detail the Socratic devotion to philosophical discussion about human nature, human life, and human good; the Aristotelian focus on the true place of humans within the total system of the natural world; the Stoic commitment to dutifully accepting Zeus's plans; the Epicurean pursuit of pleasure through tranquil activities that exercise perception, thought, and feeling; the Skeptical eschewal of all critical reasoning in forming their beliefs; and, finally, the late Platonist emphasis on spiritual concerns and the eternal realm of Being. Pursuits of Wisdom is essential reading for anyone interested in understanding what the great philosophers of antiquity thought was the true purpose of philosophy--and of life.

Hadot shows how the schools, trends, and ideas of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy strove to transform the individual's mode of perceiving and being in the world. For the ancients, philosophical theory and the philosophical way of life were inseparably linked. Hadot asks us to consider whether and how this connection might be reestablished today.

Self-knowledge - a person's knowledge of their own thoughts, character, and psychological states - has long been a central focus of philosophical enquiry. The concerns which occupy ancient thinkers with regard to self-knowledge, however, diverge in critical ways from contemporary investigations on the topic. In this volume, based upon the eighth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, leading scholars explore the treatment of self-knowledge in ancient Greek thought, particularly in Plato, Aristotle, Hellenistic thinkers, and Plotinus. A number of chapters identify specific modes of self-knowledge in ancient thought, such as knowledge of one's individual moral or political character in Plato, or one's own discursive thought as compared to that arising from the self-presence of intellect in Plotinus. Others identify interesting points of convergence with contemporary thinking to make interventions in existing debates as well as to articulate new research questions, such as whether Plato regarded self-knowledge as synoptic and diachronic in the Republic, or whether self-knowledge is a condition on virtue for Aristotle. By exploring the distinctions between the fundamental assumptions and conceptual frameworks in which ancient and modern philosophers examine self-knowledge, this volume makes a novel contribution to current scholarship in the field.