Following AT&T/Time Warner and the recent adoption of U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines, vertical merger policy has again become a subject of intense debate. Some commentators have argued that vertical merger enforcement is too lax and should be invigorated, in particular in the U.S. Others see a greater risk of false positives and argue that the standard for intervention should remain high in such cases. Against this background, this article discusses the economics of assessing vertical mergers with a particular emphasis on recent European case practice.

With the adoption of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, the U.S. antitrust agencies have updated their guidance on vertical mergers for the Twenty-First Century. Although economists have long recognized the procompetitive benefits most vertical mergers generate, the law has not always followed suit, and has sometimes condemned vertical mergers for making the merged firm more efficient. In this article, we attempt to catalogue the extensive list of efficiencies that vertical mergers can generate, trace the often halting efforts to incorporate these insights into the law, and propose a framework that courts and agencies can use to assess the likely competitive effects of vertical transactions. We draw heavily upon leading cases, particularly Baker Hughes and AT&T, with two refinements. First, consistent with the final Guidelines (but not the earlier draft) and the economic literature noting a symmetry between unilateral anticompetitive effects (raising rivals' costs) and procompetitive effects (the elimination of double marginalization), which we call the “unilateral effects tradeoff,” we argue a plaintiff alleging a raising rivals cost (RRC) theory of harm must also address EDM as part of its prima facie case. Second, if the plaintiff carries its prima facie burden, then the defendant should be able to argue, and courts and Agencies should seriously consider, the full range of procompetitive efficiencies, which we call a “holistic efficiency analysis.”

This article analyzes three recent vertical mergers: a private antitrust case attacking the consummated merger of Jeld-Wen and Craftmaster Manufacturing Inc. (“CMI”) that was cleared by the DOJ in 2012 but subsequently litigated and won by the plaintiff, Steves & Sons in 2018; and two recent vertical merger matters investigated and cleared (with limited remedies) by 3-2 votes by the Federal Trade Commission in early 2019 -- Staples/Essendant and Fresenius/NxStage. There are some factual parallels among these three matters that make it interesting to analyze them together. First, the DOJ's decision to clear Jeld-Wen/CMI merger appears to be a clear false negative, and the two dissenting Commissioner suggest that the recent FTC decisions similarly are false negatives. Second, the DOJ and possibly the FTC in Staples/Essendant may have overlooked the “Frankenstein Monster” scenario of input foreclosure. Third, both the DOJ and the FTC in Fresenius/NxStage also apparently relied on the absence of complaints in making their clearance decisions. The analysis of these mergers also suggests several policy implications involving the need to analyze the full range of anticompetitive concerns, the potential for merger retrospectives by independent (as opposed to staff) researchers, the height of the evidentiary burden on the agencies to show competitive harm in light of their limited budgets, and the need for greater transparency in Commission statements, as well as the potential errors in relying on a lack of complaints.

The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that can occur in vertical mergers and the types of economic and factual analysis of competitive effects that can be applied to those mergers during the HSR review process. The analysis in the article also identifies several legal and policy issues that the agencies would consider when they undertake the process of revising the Vertical Merger Guidelines. The Appendix contains a listing and summary of the vertical merger cases challenged by the DOJ and FTC since 1994.

The generally well-accepted belief motivating modern antitrust analysis of vertical mergers -- i.e., acquisitions that combine companies in different levels of the same supply chain -- is that they are generally procompetitive or neutral. That belief is based upon a significant body of empirical evidence. Indeed, as former U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Bureau of Economics head Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade concluded, “[c]onsistent with the large set of efficiency motives for vertical mergers . . . the [empirical] evidence on the consequences of vertical mergers suggests that consumers mostly benefit from mergers that firms undertake voluntarily.” That view of the empirical evidence is consistent with other meta-studies of the empirical evidence by leading industrial organization economists from academia and the U.S. antitrust agencies. Consistent with this evidence, the U.S. antitrust agencies typically have rarely challenged vertical mergers. When they have challenged vertical mergers, they have tended to resolve concerns with narrowly tailored behavioral remedies, such as firewalls to prevent the sharing of rivals' competitively sensitive information, non-discrimination clauses to eliminate incentives to disfavor rivals, and requirements to supply and/or license competitors. This Article is organized as follows: Section I sets forth the empirical evidence supporting the widespread understanding that vertical integration is generally procompetitive or neutral, and responds to the major critiques of these studies. Section I also discusses typical justifications for vertical integration, namely avoiding the costly and risky processes of forming, administering, and enforcing contracts with independent suppliers and customers. Section II lays out the economic approach to antitrust analysis of vertical mergers, briefly addressing calls for the U.S. antitrust agencies to update their 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Section III discusses remedies. The final section offers closing thoughts focusing on the relative expertise of agencies and courts as compared to merging parties in evaluating the costs and benefits of vertical integration.

We develop a model of vertical mergers with open auctions upstream, This setting may be appropriate for industries where inputs are procured via auction-like "requests for proposal." For example, Drennan et al (2020) reports that a model of this type was used during the CVS-Aetna merger investigation, Our approach contrasts with a growing body of work on vertical mergers where input prices are determined through Nash bargaining, We discuss how the vertical merger effects of raising rivals' costs and eliminating double markup might be quantified in our particular model.