The importance to Western policymakers of determining the significance of Soviet strategic arms decisions is matched by the difficulty of doing so. The high stakes involved and, in many cases, the inadequacy of evidence can all too easily lead to generalizations that rest more on passionate conviction than on accepted principles of scholarly inquir

This book is a contribution to a project on the Soviet-U.S. strategic arms relationship conducted by the historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense. The project task was to set a historical record of Soviet and U.S. strategic programs and policies and to evaluate various arms race hypotheses.

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser's provocative work is organized in three parts. "The Questions behind the Questions" evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. "Alternative Nuclear Worlds" compares "mutual assured destruction capabilities" (MAD)--a world in which both superpowers' societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation--to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, "Decisions in MAD" addresses key choices facing American decision makers. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In this book Dr Christoph Bluth presents an original analysis of the build up of Soviet strategic forces from the death of Stalin to the SALT I agreement. The author is able to demonstrate how domestic priorities and internal power struggles account for the seeming inconsistencies of Soviet military and foreign policy.

This unique analysis of Soviet and Russian defense affairs provides an authoritative and thoroughly documented assessment from a former Soviet foreign policy insider. As an active and informed participant, Sokov's discussion of the evolution of the Soviet and Russian strategic posture offers fascinating and illuminating firsthand insights into Soviet weapons systems, elite decisionmaking, and bureaucratic politics during both the Soviet and Russian periods. The book thus casts light not merely on the development of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs, but on a much broader spectrum of issues linked to Soviet and Russian security policy formulation. With its combination of informed analysis and use of new documentation, this work will be invaluable for all concerned with U.S.-Russian strategic relations.

The first book anywhere to go inside the Soviet arms control decision-making process, this book reveals information previously known by no more than a handful of people, in the USSR and the U.S.--written by two of the players.

Soviet perceptions of American strategic doctrine have influenced then-use of military power in foreign policy. An understanding of how those perceptions are being derived at and of their specific contents is therefore essential to any reflection on direction that American defense policy should take. Particularly in the field of arms control and disarmament, Soviet perceptions carry severe implications for U.S. proposals as well as general behavior. Lockwood bases his examination on Soviet sources such as newspapers, periodicals, radio broadcasts, and books. He establishes that Soviet analysts tend to project their own notions of clear strategy onto U.S. doctrine and intentions. Starting from the premise that the Soviets mean what they say Lockwood is able to give a historical account of Soviet perceptions starting from "massive retaliation" up to and including Presidential Directive 59. In his final chapter, the author gives possible policy strategies to successfully counteract the Soviet military policy.