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Currently, a significant amount of discussion in the United States Air Force centers on Effects-Based Operations (EBO) as the new way to fight. This debate ranges from Military Operations Research Society (MORS) workshops sponsored by senior civilian and military leaders to articles and booklets written by USAF general officers. This paper will provide a definition and brief discussion of EBO before focusing on its main area EBO Wargaming, Experimentation, and Exercises. The EBO in Wargaming, Experimentation, and Exercises section of the will address EBO as a concept and process and finally a concept of operations (CONOPS). In addition, it will explore an experimentation strategy for determining the "good" and "bad" aspects of EBO and how to logically progress from Wargames through Experiments to Exercises. In an effort to map the road ahead for analysis of EBO, the paper will address four questions: 1) How are Effect-Based Operations currently analyzed and/or characterized in wargames, experiments, and exercises? 2) What are the indicators of success for Effects-Based Operations in wargames, experiments, and exercises? 3) What tools and techniques are available to analyze and measure the indicators of success and do any shortfalls exist in this set of tools and techniques? 4) What can be done to improve the analysts of Effects-Based Operations? This paper will conclude by highlighting on-going efforts to incorporate and implement Effects-Based Operations in future wargames, experiments, and excises and potential impacts on doctrine, organization, training, and leadership.

Distributed by the Government of Canada Depository Services Program.

Effects-based operations (EBO) are defined for thismonograph as operations conceived and planned in a systems framework thatconsiders the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects

In issue 51 of JFQ, the commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, General James Mattis, USMC, published an article indicating that the "ideas reflected in EBO [effects-based operations], ONA [operational net assessment], and SoSA [system-of-systems analysis] have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for U.S. and multinational personnel." The commander then directed, "Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the terms and concepts related to EBO, ONA and SoSA in our training, doctrine development, and support of JPME." The USJFCOM directive to "turn off" EBO concepts is not well advised. Although the command has vigorously pursued development of EBO concepts, over time efforts have rendered a valuable joint concept unusable by promising unattainable predictability and by linking it to the highly deterministic computer-based modeling of ONA and SoSA. Instead of pursuing a constructive approach by separating useful and proven aspects of EBO and recommending improvements, USJFCOM has prescribed the consumption of a fatal poison. General Mattis declares that "the term effects-based" is fundamentally flawed ... and goes against the very nature of war." We disagree. EBO is combat proven; it was the basis for the success of the Operation Desert Storm air campaign and Operation Allied Force. A very successful wartime concept is sound and remains an effective tool for commanders. It is valuable for commanders to better understand cause and effect? -- to better relate objectives to the tasks that forces perform in the operational environment. While there are problems associated with how EBO has been implemented by some organizations, they can be easily adjusted. As a military, we must understand the value of EBO, address concerns in its implementation, and establish a way ahead to gain the benefits and avoid the potential pitfalls of the concept.

This paper analyzes Effects-Based Operations as the most effective way to frame future joint operations in a complex, uncertain environment. This new complex and uncertain environment is characterized by adversaries who have increasingly more access to weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects and whose actions will likely be very unpredictable, and could directly threaten the American homeland. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld stated that, "such new, unexpected and dangerous adversaries must be dissuaded, deterred, and defeated without undue cost to American interests abroad or attacks on the U.S. homeland." In a speech presented March 2002, on transformation he stated that what is needed now at the threshold of the 21st Century is a "new way of thinking and a new way of fighting." The Joint Forces Command has adopted and continues to evolve the concept of EBO within a Joint warfighting construct to answer in part to both challenges. This paper determined that EBO shows great promise as a broad organizing approach to future warfare but has significant obstacles to overcome to be successfully integrated into a new Joint warfighting construct. EBO has been unfairly scrutinized due service centric views and rivalries. These service centric views must be overcome to ensure joint procurement of compatible C4ISR systems, the development of effective war gaming or modeling tools, and the requirement for the integration of joint, hard realistic training. EBO should provide the framework for service doctrine to expand ensuring a synergy between elements of national power, capabilities of each service, domains in which each service operates and the process of thinking and conducting future warfare.