Using a uniquely hand-collected dataset, we examine how financial analysts react to expectations management in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) period. We find evidence that management issues pessimistic public guidance to lower analysts' expectations to a beatable level in the new regulatory environment. Majority of the analysts revised their forecasts downward immediately (in terms of days rather than weeks) after the issuance of a pessimistic public guidance. The magnitude of the downward revision is significantly greater for firms that beat the expectations through managerial guidance than firms that beat the expectations without guidance. In addition, firms that beat analysts' expectations through pessimistic guidance are able to achieve a larger positive earnings surprise at the earnings announcement than the “legitimate beaters”

This study documents that the number of firms that MBE has declined in the early 2000s. Furthermore, the results of the study suggest that the market detects expectations management and applies a discount to firms that use this strategy to MBE. The findings also indicate that prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure, the market is surprised by earnings announcements and reacts differently to the strategies used to MBE. Subsequent to Regulation Fair Disclosure, however, the market is aware of downward expectations management and does not react differently to strategies used to MBE. This study contributes to the literature by using a sample that includes a post Regulation Fair Disclosure and Sarbanes-Oxley Act time period. It also extends the literature by jointly examining the market reaction to two strategies that previously had been examined independently. The results of this study are helpful to standard and policy setters who devise laws to improve financial reporting and investor confidence in the capital markets.-- Abstract.

Advances in Quantitative Analysis of Finance and Accounting (New Series) is an annual publication designed to disseminate developments in the quantitative analysis of finance and accounting. The publication is a forum for statistical and quantitative analyses of issues in finance and accounting as well as applications of quantitative methods to problems in financial management, financial accounting, and business management. The objective is to promote interaction between academic research in finance and accounting and applied research in the financial community and the accounting profession.

This study examines the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on the relevance of company-sponsored conference calls. Measuring relevance by a conference call's ability to improve analyst forecast accuracy and consensus, I find larger improvements in both variables during the period surrounding conference calls in the post-FD era versus the pre-FD era. These findings imply that in the post-FD era relatively more about a firm's upcoming earnings becomes known during conference calls, consistent with FD's success in eliminating selective disclosure.

We contribute to the literature on Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in three ways. First, we provide evidence on whether FD has achieved its intended effect of leveling the information playing field by examining whether differences across investors' information quality prior to earnings announcements have declined after the pronouncement of the regulation. We find strong evidence of a decline in earnings announcement period trading volume attributable to differential prior precision after FD consistent with a more level playing field. Second, we re-examine whether FD has resulted in firms reducing or chilling their information flows (disclosures) to investors. Contrary to prior work, we find that there is evidence of an overall reduction or chill in information flows after FD relative to a quot;cleanerquot; pre-FD period than the pre-FD period used in other studies. Third, we document that while the leveling effect of FD is relatively wide-spread, the chill effect is driven by (i) relatively smaller, high technology firms and (ii) relatively larger firms with high book-to-market ratios. We interpret the latter result as evidence that firms with relatively high costs of public disclosure chose to eliminate the disclosure altogether rather than broadening access to the disclosure.

Preface; The Role of Revenues and Costs in CEO Compensation; The Importance of Intellectual Capital Reporting: Perspectives from Finance Professionals; Has Regulation Changed the Market's Reward for Meeting or Beating Expectations?; Reaction of the Brazilian Stock Market to Positive and Negative Shocks; Earnings Management to Meet Earnings Benchmarks: Evidence from Japan; Audit in Ukraine; Auditor Reputation and Auditor Independence: Evidence from an Emerging Market; Trends of the Returns-Earnings Associations Over the Last Three Decades; Managers' Discretionary Behaviour, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: An Empirical International Analysis; Index.