This book provides a comprehensive overview of the implications of tax avoidance for a firm’s capital structure, highlighting the key role played by free cash flow and agency conflicts. First, the book provides an outline of the theories and empirical evidence concerning the role of taxes in the Theory of Capital Structure. It reviews the studies investigating the relationship between agency conflicts and capital structure. The book explores the role of free cash flow and agency conflicts in the relationship between tax avoidance and capital structure. In the final section, the results of an empirical investigation conducted on a sample of U.S. public firms are also presented. The empirical research examines whether and how tax avoidance is associated with debt covenant violation across the stages of the corporate life cycle. Specifically, the research uses the concept of the corporate life cycle stage to analyse whether and how the association between tax avoidance and debt covenant violation varies in different agency settings. Consistent with the hypotheses drawn on the Agency Theory, the findings of the empirical research suggest life cycle stages moderate the association between tax avoidance and debt covenant violation. Overall, this book sheds light on the potential implications of tax avoidance activities for a firm’s capital structure. The book will be of interest to both experienced and early-stage scholars interested in the topic. Moreover, the book will also be of interest to policymakers, investors, analysts, lenders, and other market participants.

We show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy. Net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations, when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit. The effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower's alternative sources of finance are costly. In addition, despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors, borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation.

The First Guide to Understanding and Capitalizing on the $1 Trillion-Plus Loan Syndications and Trading Market! The Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading is the first resource especially designed to equip institutional investors and professional money managers with expert analysis and insights on every key aspect of this rapidly growing financial market. Co-published by McGraw-Hill and the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), The Handbook of Loan Syndications and Trading fully explains the evolution and history of the loan market…primary and secondary markets …analytics and performance…the credit agreement… pricing and all legal and regulatory issues. This comprehensive reference guide features: First-ever guidance on the booming loan syndications and trading market, covering every topic that investors and money managers need to know Over 40 contributions from the leading players in loan syndication, including Standard & Poor's, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, along with top Buyside Institutions and Law Firms Valuable insights and observations from industry experts A comprehensive A-Z glossary of all loan syndications and trading terms Dozens of helpful tables, charts, and examples

Are restrictive covenants effective mechanisms in mitigating agency problems? Is the magnitude of the increase in the cost of debt due to agency problems non-trivial? We tackle these questions using a large dataset of public bonds. Contrary to the view that covenants in public bond contracts are standard boilerplates that serve little purpose, we find significant benefits in terms of reduction in the cost of debt associated with covenants. Restrictions on investment activities or financing activities, for example, reduce the cost of debt by about 50-70 basis points. These findings suggest that investors view covenants as important instruments in mitigating agency problems, and an increase in the cost of debt due to agency problems could be substantial. The findings also confirm a link between accounting information and the cost of debt. We also find that high growth firms and firms with low probability of default are less likely to include covenants suggesting that the costs of covenants outweigh benefits for these types of firms.

The goals of this monograph are to explain the models and techniques and make it more accessible, introduce the main strands of this literature, and explain how dynamic models can be taken to the data and estimated, providing a guide to 3 methodologies: generalized method of moments, simulated method of moments, and maximum simulated likelihood.