Red light running, which is defined as the act of a motorist entering an intersection after the traffic signal has turned red, caused almost 5,000 crashes in Virginia in 2003, resulting in at least 18 deaths and more than 3,800 injuries. In response to a June 2, 2004, directive from Virginia Secretary of Transportation Whittington W. Clement, an evaluation of the photo-red enforcement programs that operate in Virginia was undertaken. Generally, Virginia's photo-red programs are technically feasible. Case law strongly indicates that the programs pass legal muster in the three key areas: privacy, equal protection, and due process, and public opinion surveys suggest that roughly two-thirds of respondents support red light cameras. There is, however, a practical issue with regard to issuing citations for out-of-state motorists, as noted in the report. Although an economic analysis was not feasible in the study time frame, a limited fiscal analysis suggests that, in general, Virginia localities are not generating net revenue. Finally, an operational analysis based on violations and crashes shows a potential but not definite safety improvement. The cameras clearly affect driver behavior; across the 23 intersections where reliable citation data could be obtained, citations decreased by an average of 21% per intersection. Further the data show that the cameras are correlated with a definite decrease in crashes that are directly attributable to red light running, a definite increase in rear-end crashes, a possible decrease in angle crashes, a net decrease in injury crashes attributable to red light running, and an increase in total injury crashes. More time is needed to determine whether the severity of the eliminated red light running crashes was greater than that of the induced rear-end crashes. The report recommends that Virginia's photo-red enforcement programs be continued for an additional year to resolve this question and to collect additional data that was not feasible during the 6-month time frame of this report.

Red light running is a significant public health concern, killing more than 800 people and injuring 200,000 in the United States per year (Retting et al., 1999a; Retting and Kyrychenko, 2002). To reduce red light running in Virginia, six jurisdictions (Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax City, Fairfax County, Falls Church, Vienna) deployed red light cameras at some point during the 10-year period when they were permitted under Virginia law. This report documents the safety impacts of those cameras based on 7 years of crash data for the period January 1, 1998, through December 31, 2004. Consistent with the findings of a previous Virginia study (Garber et al., 2005), this study finds that cameras are associated with an increase in rear-end crashes (about 27% or 42% depending on the statistical method used as shown in Tables ES1 and H1) and a decrease in red light running crashes (about 8% or 42% depending on the statistical method used as shown in Tables ES1 and H2). This report also shows that there is significant variation by intersection and by jurisdiction: one jurisdiction (Arlington) suggests that cameras are associated with an increase in all six crash types that were explicitly studied (rear-end, angle, red light running, injury red light running, total injury, and total) whereas two other jurisdictions saw decreases in most of these crash types. It is therefore not surprising that when the comprehensive crash costs for rear-end and angle crashes are monetized, the cameras are associated with an increase in crash costs in some jurisdictions (e.g., an annual increase of $140,883 in Arlington) and a net reduction in comprehensive crash costs in other jurisdictions (e.g., an annual reduction of $92,367 in Vienna). When these results are aggregated across all six jurisdictions, the cameras are associated with a net increase in comprehensive crash costs. However, when considering only injury crashes, if the three fatal angle crashes that occurred during the after period are removed from the analysis (the only fatalities that occurred during the study out of 1,168 injury crashes), then the cameras were associated with a modest reduction in the comprehensive crash cost for injury crashes only. These results cannot be used to justify the widespread installation of cameras because they are not universally effective. These results also cannot be used to justify the abolition of cameras, as they have had a positive impact at some intersections and in some jurisdictions. The report recommends, therefore, that the decision to install a red light camera be made on an intersection-by-intersection basis. In addition, it is recommended that a carefully controlled experiment be conducted to examine further the impact of red light programs on safety and to determine how an increase in rear-end crashes can be avoided at specific intersections.

The goal of this research was to find out which automated enforcement programs have been successful and what contributed to their success, as well as which programs have been unsuccessful and to draw lessons from their experiences. This was accomplished through a comprehensive assessment of automated speed and red light running enforcement activity in the United States and Canada, which led to the development of guidelines to assist agencies in implementing and operating successful automated enforcement programs. Over 350 jurisdictions with current or past automated enforcement programs were contacted by survey and phone as part of the assessment. In addition to the survey, an extensive literature review was conducted to determine the effect of the programs, cost effectiveness, and resource requirements, and to get the perspective of the public.