In this paper, we develop an endogenous growth model with financial intermediation to examine the effects of financial repression on growth, inflation, and welfare. By limiting the liquidity provision, binding reserve requirements always suppress economic growth while their effect on inflation is a function, among other things, of the degree of repression. For example, contrary to previous claims, if financial repression is severe enough so that an informal financial sector emerges, liberalization is inflationary. Notwithstanding, liberalization in these cases is always welfare improving. Finally, we characterize the condition that gives rise to a unique optimal level of binding reserve requirements, i.e., the optimal degree of quot;moderatequot; financial repression.

Financial repression (legal restrictions on interest rates, credit allocation, capital movements, and other financial operations) was widely used in the past but was largely abandoned in the liberalization wave of the 1990s, as widespread support for interventionist policies gave way to a renewed conception of government as an impartial referee. Financial repression has come back on the agenda with the surge in public debt in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, and some countries have reintroduced administrative ceilings on interest rates. By distorting market incentives and signals, financial repression induces losses from inefficiency and rent-seeking that are not easily quantified. This study attempts to assess some of these losses by estimating the impact of financial repression on growth using an updated index of interest rate controls covering 90 countries over 45 years. The results suggest that financial repression poses a significant drag on growth, which could amount to 0.4-0.7 percentage points.

This paper examines the empirical relationship between long–run growth and the degree of financial development, proxied by the ratio of bank credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. We find that this proxy enters significantly and with a positive sign in growth regressions on a large cross–country sample, but with a negative sign using panel data for Latin America. Our findings suggest that the main channel of transmission from financial development to growth is the efficiency of investment, rather than its volume. We also present a model where the negative correlation between financial intermediation and growth results from financial liberalization in a poor regulatory environment.

Examines monetary and financial policies and their effects on rates of economic growth in developing countries and describes balanced assessment of the role of money, banking and finance in the process of economic development.