This study is a historical analysis of the campaign waged by Field Marshal von Manstein on the Russian southern front during the winter 1942-43. The study begins just after the 6th Army’s encirclement in Stalingrad and describes the four principal phases of Manstein’s campaign: the attempted relief of the 6th Army; the protection of Army Group A as it disengaged from the Caucasus; the prevention of Manstein’s lines of communications from being cut; and the counterblow to regain the initiative. The lessons learned from the campaign provide a perspective of battle at the operational level of war. The factors leading to Manstein’s success are discussed and include: superior generalship at the operational level; superior tactical maturity of the Germans; and German tactical and operational agility. The study describes the transition from the operational defensive to the operational offensive and how a defender can have the initiative. Manstein’s use of depth is explained. The concepts of center of gravity and operational art as they pertain to this campaign are also described. The study concludes with the implications of the lessons learned for a NATO-Soviet conflict in a central European scenario. The study points out that Manstein demonstrated that victory is possible even when forced to react to the enemy’s plan. The ability of NATO to replicate, today, the agility of Manstein’s forces and the synchronization achieved by his commanders is questioned. The implications of NATO’s lack of operational depth, in contrast to Manstein, are described. The impact of changes in force design since World War II are also explained.

The study begins just after the 6th Army's encirclement in Stalingrad and describes the four principal phases of Manstein's campaign: the attempted relief of the 6th Army; the protection of Army Group A as it disengaged from the Caucasus; the prevention of Manstein's lines of communication from being cut; and the counterblow to regain the initiative. The lessons learned from the campaign provide a perspective of battle at the operational level of war. The factors leading to Manstein's success are discussed and include: superior generalship at the operational level; superior tactical maturity of the Germans; and German tactical and operational agility. The study describes the transition from the operational defensive to the operational offensive and how a defender can have the initiative. Manstein's use of depth is explained. The concepts of center of gravity and operational art as they pertain to this campaign are also described. The study concludes with the implications of the lessons learned for a NATO-Soviet conflict in a central European scenario. The study points out that Manstein demonstrated that victory is possible even when forced to react to the enemy's plan. The ability of NATO to replicate, today, the agility of Manstein's forces and the synchronization achieved by his commanders is questioned. The implications of NATO's lack of operational depth, in contrast to Manstein, are described. The impact of changes in force design since World War II are also explained.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze selected campaigns/operations of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in order to draw lessons from those campaigns as they relate to command, control, communications (C3) and logistics — subjects of immediate and relevant interest to those who take up the profession of arms. But all too often, histories of battles, campaigns and entire conflicts neglect the treatment of these areas. And when these factors are dealt with, the treatment they receive is likely to be rather shallow, lacking the depth necessary for the student to analyze these factors/functions as they related to overall success or failure. This analysis will be conducted of specific, delineated functions as they relate to C3, but owing to the far reaching scope of logistics, this paper will be limited to treating a few critical aspects of logistics as they impacted on the campaigns of Manstein and the German Army. The second chapter will introduce Manstein to the reader and highlight his accomplishments. Chapter III will deal with C3 functions as they related, supported or were used by Manstein, and the fourth chapter will deal with key logistics issues as they influenced/impacted the campaigns of Manstein. The final chapter will present some conclusions and broad lessons derived from the German experience in general.

This volume and the series that provides its context, restores that which was lost and concealed to the historical record. Exploring newly-released Russian archival materials, it reveals the unbounded ambitions that shaped the Stavka's winter offensive and the full scope and scale of the Red Army's many offensive operations. For example, it reflects on recently-rediscovered Operation Mars, Marshal Zhukov's companion-piece to the more famous Operation Uranus at Stalingrad. It then reexamines the Red Army's dramatic offensive into the Donbas and Khar'kov region during February, clearly domonstrating that this offensive was indeed conducted by three rather than two Red Army fronts. Included are over one hundred operational maps that highlight key aspects of the offensives as well as many photographs of key historical figures.

A selection of the Military Book Club: An “informative and objective” biography of a genius commander and a study of his loyalty to the Nazi cause (Library Journal). To many close students of World War II, Erich von Manstein is considered the greatest commander of the war, if not the entire twentieth century. He devised the plan that conquered France in 1940 and led an infantry corps in that campaign. At the head of a panzer corps, he reached the gates of Leningrad in 1941, then took command of 11th Army and conquered Sevastopol and the Crimea. After destroying another Soviet army in the north, he was given command of the ad hoc Army Group Don to retrieve the German calamity at Stalingrad, whereupon he launched a counteroffensive that, against all odds, restored the German front. Afterward, he commanded Army Group South, nearly crushing the Soviets at Kursk, and then skillfully resisted their relentless attacks as he traded territory for coherence in the East. Though an undoubtedly brilliant military leader—whose achievements, considering the forces at his disposal, rivaled of Patton, Rommel, MacArthur, and Montgomery—surprisingly little is known about Manstein himself, save for his own memoir and the accolades of his contemporaries. In this book, we finally have a full portrait of the man, including his campaigns, and an analysis of what precisely kept a genius like Manstein harnessed to such a dark cause. A great military figure, but a man who lacked a sharp political sense, Manstein was very much representative of the Germano-Prussian military caste of his time. Though Hitler was uneasy about the influence he’d gained throughout the German Army, Manstein ultimately declined to join any clandestine plots against his Führer, believing they would simply cause chaos, the one thing he abhorred. Though he constantly opposed Hitler on operational details, he considered it a point of loyalty to simply stand with the German state, in whatever form. Though not bereft of personal opinions, his primary allegiances were, first, to Deutschland and, second, to the soldiers under his command, who’d been committed against an enemy many times their strength. It is thus through Manstein that the attitudes of other high-ranking officers who fought during the Second World War, particularly on the Eastern Front, can be illuminated. This book is a “well-researched, convincingly reasoned analysis of a general widely considered one of WWII’s great commanders” (Publishers Weekly). Includes photographs.