In 'America's Munitions 1917-1918,' readers are presented with a detailed and comprehensive exploration of the United States' logistical and manufacturing efforts during World War I. The collection meticulously documents the transition of American industry from peacetime to a wartime economy, showcasing a remarkable array of literary styles, from reports and letters to technical descriptions, which together illuminate the significant and complex contribution of the United States to the Allied victory. The anthology stands out for its thorough examination of both the technological innovations and the bureaucratic challenges faced, shedding light on an often-overlooked aspect of military history. The contributions of the United States War Department, under the stewardship of Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell, reveals an intricate tapestry of collaboration between government officials, industry leaders, and military personnel. This collection aligns with historical narratives on World War I but delves deeper into the logistical marvels and the strategic planning that powered the American war effort, thereby offering a unique lens through which to view the conflict. The diverse backgrounds of the contributors, ranging from military strategists to industrial magnates, collectively enhance the anthology's exploration of America's wartime mobilization and its repercussions. This anthology is recommended for anyone interested in the intricacies of war logistics, the history of technological innovation in warfare, or the broader socio-economic impact of World War I on the United States. It provides readers with a unique opportunity to delve into the depths of America's industrial and military prowess during a pivotal moment in world history. Through its comprehensive coverage and diverse perspectives, 'America's Munitions 1917-1918' fosters a deeper understanding of the war and its aftermath, making it an invaluable resource for both scholars and enthusiasts of military history.

This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures. In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction. Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This Leavenworth Paper was prepared by the USAA Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAA Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. Despite originally being published in 1984, this Leavenworth Paper also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.

This work came at the request of the Secretary of War: WASHINGTON, D. C., DECEMBER 24, 1918. Dear Mr. Crowell: American munitions production, which for some time has been in your charge, played an important pa.rt in the early decision of the war, yet the very immensity and complexity of the problem has made it difficult for this accomplishment to be adequately understood by the public or in fact by any except those who have had occasion to give the matter special study. As the whole people have been called upon to make sacrifices fer the war, all the people should be given an opportunity to know what has been done in their behalf in munitions production, and I therefore ask that you have prepared a historical statement of munitions product-ion, so brief that all may have time to read it, so nontechnical that all may be able readily to understand it, and so authoritative that all may rely upon its accuracy. Cordially yours, NEWTON D. BAKER Secretary of War Crowell began: Except in one or two instances, this account of the production of munitions in America for the war against Germany and her allies contains nothing about secret devices invented during the period under discussion. When the necessity for silence with respect to vital matters brought about a voluntary censorship in American publications, the land was filled with rumors of new and revolutionary developments in war materiel, particularly of new weapons of offense. It is fair to the American public today to state that such rumors were not. without foundation. American inventiveness rose splendidly to the emergency. The expected American offensive in 1919 would have had its "surprises" in numbers, some of which might well have proved to be decisive. Certain of these inventions had been put in large production before the armistice was declared, others had been carried to an advanced experimental stage that insured their success. Since the value of these innovations as part of the Nation's permanent military assets depends largely upon their secret nature, it would be obviously unwise to mention or describe them at this time. . . .