The issue of American POWs/MIAs from American involvement in the Second Indochina War was the single greatest emotional and political issue to emerge following the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces and cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. American policy and motives, although honest and altruistic in intent, vacillated from administration to administration and became a source of disenfranchisement between a large segment of the American electorate and the U.S. Government. The rescue of Americans in captivity or the recovery and subsequent identification of Americans who died in captivity, crashes, or battlefield incidents was a by-product of the ad hoc formalization of the intelligence and operational process. This paper examines this process historically, addressing U.S. policy objectives. Conclusions drawn examine the probability of greater success in the issue compared with alternative foreign policy initiatives. The recommendations stem from lessons painfully derived from the Indochina experience and are applicable to future American conflicts. Keywords: Americans missing in Southeast Asia, Prisoners of war/missing in action, Vietnam, Warfare, Military operations. (jg).