America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974 examines recently released and declassified British and American government documents, in order to scrutinize the roles played by both of these countries during the Cyprus crisis of 1974. It evaluates British and American aims towards Cyprus, analysing in particular the roles played by British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and US Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, and their respective relationships with the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish governments. Also, the book considers Whitehall and Washington's responses to the Greek military coup, the Turkish invasion, the two Geneva conferences on Cyprus and the second, consolidatory, phase of the Turkish invasion. Ultimately, the book seeks to ascertain whether there exists any credible evidence to support the belief that Britain and/or America were complicit in the coup against President Makarios as well as whether they colluded with Ankara in her subsequent partition of the island.

This book examines the ideological and socio-political discourses shaping the remembrance and representation of Britain and the Cyprus conflict of 1974 within Greek Cypriot society. By combining the official with the popular and drawing on an extensive range of oral history interviews, this monograph shows that a suspicion born out of Britain’s long (neo-)colonial connection to Cyprus has come to frame the image and understanding of British actions associated with the events, and lasting consequences, of 1974. Indeed, with the island of Cyprus still divided, and the requirement to remember a national imperative, this book has a direct contemporary relevance. However, within the existent literature, while much has been written about the political roots of the Cyprus conflict, no study has yet sought to systematically analyse and understand the influences shaping the history and memory of British actions on Cyprus in 1974. One defined by the existence of 'partitionist' conspiracies, collusive accusations and a series of memory distortions which continue to resonate strongly irrespective of the evidence that is now available. As such, by analysing the influences shaping the image of Britain in 1974, one can begin to understand in ever greater detail the Anglo–Greek Cypriot relationship in a modern context.

This book provides the first bilateral study of Greek–US relations during Greece’s transition to democracy in the second half of the 1970s. Following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, which led to the collapse of the Greek dictatorship and Athens’ partial withdrawal from NATO, many scholars have claimed that Greece moved away from the United States. This book explicitly rejects this view. It argues that Greek political leaders continued to view close relations with the United States as an integral part of Greek national security despite the disappointment felt during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. At the same time, the Greek leadership could not overlook the anti-American movement, and had to respond to and manage it. In the United States, relations with Greece became part of the clash between the executive and legislative branches of government. Both President Gerard R. Ford and President Jimmy Carter proclaimed their commitment to restoring relations with Athens. This book highlights the continuity between the Republican and Democratic administrations of the 1970s in foreign policy objectives. Drawing on Greek, US and British archival records, it charts the evolving connections between Greece and the United States through the Greek–Turkish disputes, the impact of anti-Americanism and the Greek–NATO relationship offering original insight into this Cold War special relationship.

At a time when the question of separatism is becoming increasingly significant in international politics, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession is the first and only comprehensive account of the ways in which states fight acts of secession on the world stage.

From 1967 to 1974, the military junta ruling Greece attempted a dramatic reshaping of the nation, implementing ideas and policies that left a lasting mark on both domestic affairs and international relations. Bringing together leading scholars from a range of disciplines, The Greek Military Dictatorship explores the junta’s attempts to impose authoritarian rule upon a rapidly modernizing country while navigating a complex international landscape. Focusing both on foreign relations as well as domestic matters such as economics, ideology, religion, culture and education, this book offers a fresh and well-researched study of a key period in modern Greek history.

In 1974 the Greek colonels ousted the Greek-Cypriot leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, and Turkey retaliated by invading and seizing a third of the island. Cyprus remains split in two, like Berlin before the wall came down, bristling with troops and spying bases, and permanently policed by the United Nations. Henry Kissinger claimed he could do nothing to stop the coup because of the Watergate crisis, but this book presents evidence to support the view that it was no failure of American foreign policy, but the realization of a long-term plot. The authors describe the strategic reasons for Washington's need to divide the island. Their account encompasses an international cast of characters that includes Eden, Eisenhower, Nixon, Kissinger, Wilson, Callaghan, Grivas, and the leaders of the two halves of the divided island, Clerides and Denktas.