Alternative Models of Choice Under Uncertainty and Demand for Health Insurance
Title | Alternative Models of Choice Under Uncertainty and Demand for Health Insurance PDF eBook |
Author | M. Susan Marquis |
Publisher | |
Pages | 7 |
Release | 1996 |
Genre | Health insurance |
ISBN |
A Comparison of Alternative Models for the Demand for Medical Care
Title | A Comparison of Alternative Models for the Demand for Medical Care PDF eBook |
Author | Naihua Duan |
Publisher | |
Pages | 147 |
Release | 1982 |
Genre | Health insurance |
ISBN | 9780833003836 |
This report evaluates alternative statistical models of the demand for medical care. The report discusses the estimation problems, the alternative models considered, and the choice of a final model. Chapter 2 briefly describes the design of the Health Insurance Study, which is the source of the data, and the sample. Chapter 3 provides a rationale for and description of each of the models considered, and Chap. 4 indicates the sensitivity of the empirical results to the estimation model. Chapter 5 compares the models empirically in terms of forecast bias and mean squared forecast error, using a split-sample technique. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of this study.
The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance
Title | The Theory of Demand for Health Insurance PDF eBook |
Author | John A. Nyman |
Publisher | Stanford University Press |
Pages | 228 |
Release | 2003 |
Genre | Health & Fitness |
ISBN | 9780804744881 |
Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.
Moral Hazard in Health Insurance
Title | Moral Hazard in Health Insurance PDF eBook |
Author | Amy Finkelstein |
Publisher | Columbia University Press |
Pages | 161 |
Release | 2014-12-02 |
Genre | Medical |
ISBN | 0231538685 |
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Choice of Health Insurance and Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Title | Choice of Health Insurance and Models of Decision Making Under Uncertainty PDF eBook |
Author | Jessica S. Banthin |
Publisher | |
Pages | 332 |
Release | 1991 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Choice Under Uncertainty and the Demand for Health Insurance
Title | Choice Under Uncertainty and the Demand for Health Insurance PDF eBook |
Author | M. Susan Marquis |
Publisher | |
Pages | 50 |
Release | 1986 |
Genre | Consumers' preferences |
ISBN |
Testing Between Alternative Models of Choice Under Uncertainty
Title | Testing Between Alternative Models of Choice Under Uncertainty PDF eBook |
Author | Raymond C. Battalio |
Publisher | |
Pages | |
Release | 2013 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Experiments have identified a number of well-known violations of expected utility theory, giving rise to alternative models of choice under uncertainty, all of which are able to explain these violations. In this article, predictions of several prominent rival formulations are examined. No single alternative consistently organizes choices. Among the more important inconsistencies, we identify conditions generating systematic fanning in of indifference curves in the unit probability triangle, and find risk-loving over a number of gambles with all positive payoffs, in cases where prospect theory predicts risk aversion.