The importance of codebreaking and signals intelligence in the diplomacy and military operations of World War II is reflected in this study of the cryptanalysts, not only of the US and Britain, but all the Allies. The codebreaking war was a global conflict in which many countries were active. The contributions reveal that, for the Axis as well as the Allies, success in the signals war often depended upon close collaboration among alliance partners.

An omnibus edition of nine volumes of postwar histories declassified by the National Security Agency in 2010. The research was carried out by the Army Security Agency relying on captured documents and interviews with prisoners. This is an absolutely essential primary reference for anyone interested in cryptography as a vital aspect of World War II. The volumes include: Volume I: Synopsis Volume 2: Notes on German High Level Cryptography and Cryptanalysis Volume 3: The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command, Armed Forces Volume 4: The Signal Intelligence Service of the Army High Command Volume 5: The German Air Force Signal Intelligence Service Volume 6: The Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section Volume 7: Goering's "Research" Bureau Volume 8: Miscellaneous Volume 9: German Traffic Analysis of Russian Communications

Have you ever wondered how successful Hitler's codebreakers were at breaking Allied codes during World War 2? The wartime story of codebreaking has almost exclusively centred around Allied successes, particularly that of Bletchley Park breaking the Enigma code. However, the Germans in particular were extremely active in codebreaking and had their successes. But it was not until after the war that the extent or otherwise of their triumphs could be gauged. With the war in Europe at an end, in April-May 1945 British and American codebreaking teams hunted for their German counterparts to find out just how good they had been. There were lessons to be learned for the post-war period for Western military intelligence. This publication is a summary of the European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II as revealed by 'TICOM' Investigations and by other Prisoner of War Interrogations and Captured Material, Principally German and completed in May 1946. This is available on the National Security Agency website. TICOM - Target Intelligence Committee - was a shadowy Anglo-American organisation set up in October 1944 whose cover name disguised its real purpose - the seeking out in the immediate aftermath of the war of German Sigint staff for interrogation. This edited volume extracts key data from the 1000 pages of the original documents to create a fascinating and technical insight into German cryptography. The book is a technical summary of the TICOM documents using the words of those who collected the data. The complex data was written for military analysis so the Allies could assess Hitler's codebreaking operation during the war. It becomes clear that Hitler's team understood that the Enigma cipher machine had weaknesses and that they had various ingenious machines either developed or under development as the war drew to a close. Lack of resources - and running out of time - put paid to any major operational deployment of this machinery, but underlines the fact that German ingenuity came close to a situation where they would have made Bletchley Park's task almost impossible. Includes a report on the interrogation of 5 leading Germans in Nuremburg, September 1945 regarding signals intelligence. They are: General Jodl, Grand Admiral Donitz, General Field Marshall Keitel, Herr von Ribbentrop and Field Marshall Goering.

In 1974 Frederick W. Winterbotham's book The Ultra Secret disclosed the Allied success in breaking the German high command ciphers in World War II, and a new form of history began—the study of intelligence and its impact on military operations and international politics. This guide documents and annotates over 800 sources that have appeared in the past 20 years. It examines and evaluates primary and secondary sources dealing with the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also covers sources on the Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers. The book examines and annotates primary and secondary sources on the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also provides details on sources concerned with Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.

In 1974 Frederick W. Winterbotham's book The Ultra Secret disclosed the Allied success in breaking the German high command ciphers in World War II, and a new form of history began—the study of intelligence and its impact on military operations and international politics. This guide documents and annotates over 800 sources that have appeared in the past 20 years. It examines and evaluates primary and secondary sources dealing with the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also covers sources on the Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers. The book examines and annotates primary and secondary sources on the role of ULTRA and MAGIC in the Pearl Harbor attack, the battles of the Atlantic, Coral Sea, and Midway, and the campaigns in the Mediterranean, Northwest Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific, as well as in the realm of espionage and special operations. It also provides details on sources concerned with Sigint and cryptanalytic programs of the Axis and neutral powers.

In his Foreword, Professor Jones writes 'Mr Collier takes the opportunity to review the contributions of all forms of Intelligence, and the use and misuse that was made of them, in all the major phases of World War II. His task has required very wide reading of the great volume of original documents and derivative literature now available, and I admire the judgement that is evident throughout the book. Within the limits of treating the widest aspects of Intelligence in World War II in a small compass, Mr Collier has told the whole truth, fortunately without it turning out to be very unfavorable; and in the lessons to be drawn from it we indeed have one element of security if properly applied'.Basil Collier throws fresh light on the low priority given to Intelligence between the wars; the tendency of ministers and senior officials to rely less on intelligence reports than their own individual hunches; the failure to foresee the invasion of Norway; why, even with the aid of Enigma it was impossible to turn the scales in Crete, and why the Americans, though privy to some of Japans most closely guarded secrets, allowed the Pearl Harbor attack to take them by surprise.