Chen Shen, a Divine level soldier who had withdrawn from the life of a forest of spears and a rain of swords, had been fooled by his master. He had muddleheadedly married his beautiful CEO, Shen Ao Xin. [You actually dared to bully my wife. Do you want to die?] The killing path officially opened ...

Increasingly humanitarian NGOs operate in the context of armed conflicts where the security risks are higher than in contexts of natural disaster. Working in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is particularly dangerous for humanitarians. This existential threat affects the physical existence of aid workers and the implementation of humanitarian programs, and the core beliefs of humanitarians and the underlying principles of humanitarian action. For NGOs it is difficult to accept that they are attacked despite their good intentions, sometimes even by the very communities they seek to help. For these reasons, humanitarian NGOs have to change their approaches to security by not only adapting their policies, procedures and structures to the changing environment, but also reviewing the underlying principles of their work. This book contributes to debates by demonstrating how issues of (in)security affect humanitarian NGOs and the humanitarian identity, situating the structural changes within the humanitarian NGO community in the context of conflict aid governance and explains how non-state actors establish their own governance structures, independent from state-sponsored solutions, and contributes to the emerging literature on the redefinition of the concept of epistemic communities.

Cyber threats can evolve with almost unimaginable speed and serious consequences for the nation's security. The Government needs to put in place - as it has not yet done - mechanisms, people, education, skills, thinking and policies which take into account both the opportunities and the vulnerabilities which cyberspace presents. Evidence received by the Committee suggested that in the event of a sustained cyber attack the ability of the Armed Forces to operate effectively could be fatally compromised due to their dependence on information and communication technology. The Committee has asked the Government to set out details of the contingency plans it has in place should such an attack occur. If it has none, it should say so - and urgently create some. The Committee was impressed by aspects of the co-operation and joint working between the MoD and private sector contractors. It welcomed the Government's commitment to foster a vibrant and innovative cyber security sector in the UK including a distinct role for the MoD to deliver military capabilities both to confront high-end threats and to provide a potential offensive capability. The opportunity created by cyber tools and techniques to enhance the military capabilities of our Armed Forces is clear. The MoD needs to explore this thoroughly. For this reason, the Committee supports the use of National Cyber Security Programme funding to develop these capabilities, but also wish to be assured that the MoD will maintain its investment in existing defence intelligence services which provide a vital UK cross-government capability