Born in Russia in 1887, Alexander Gumberg immigrated to the United States in 1903. He returned to Russia in 1917 as an American businessman sympathetic to the progress of Russia's Revolution. After the Bolshevik seizure of power on November 7, Gumberg became a secretary, translator, and adviser to the American Red Cross Commission and the Committee on Public Information. Through him a Soviet-American dialogue formed despite the lack of official relations. Gumberg advised congressmen who hoped to establish diplomatic ties between the two countries. He helped American publicists, publications, and institutions which sought to present a favorable, or at least balanced, picture of Soviet Russia. Gumberg did not seek to start a revolution to change the world, or to alter the morality of man. He did contribute quietly to a better understanding between the future superpowers when their normal ties had been broken.

The author made use of recently available collections of personal letters and documents of Progressive reformer Raymond Robins in the papers of his sister, Elizabeth Robins, at the Fales Library of New York University to develop this complete analysis of Robins and his work.

Between 1917 and 1920--from the Bolshevik Revolution to the definitive statement of American opposition to Bolshevik Russia--Soviets and Americans searched for ways to effect meaningful interactions between their two nations in the absence of formal diplomatic relations. During these years, wide-ranging discussions occurred on a variety of serious issues, from military collaboration and economic relations to the comprehensive settlement of political and military disputes. At the same time, extensive debates took place in both countries about the nature of the relations between them. As McFadden shows in this pathbreaking book, based on research in Soviet archives as well as previously unused private collections and government archives in the United States and Great Britain, a surprising number of concrete agreements were reached between the two countries. These included continued operation of the American Red Cross in Russia, the transfer of war materials from the Russian army to the Americans, the sale of strategic supplies of platinum from the Bolsheviks to the United States, and the exemption of a number of American corporations from Soviet government nationalization decrees. Numerous important diplomats and politicians were involved in these negotiations. McFadden offers a timely reevaluation in a post-Cold War era.

Foundations of Russian Military Flight focuses on the early use of balloons and aircraft by the Russian military. The best early Russian aircraft included flying boats designed by Dimitrii Grigorovich and large reconnaissance-bombers created by Igor Sikorsky. As World War I began, the Imperial Russian Navy made use of aircraft more quickly than the army. Indeed, the navy established a precursor to the aircraft carrier. The Imperial Russian Army came to respect over time the work of aircraft that evolved from reconnaissance and bomber to fighter planes. Over 250 army pilots during the war received awards of high distinction for their wartime flights. After the 1917 revolution, both the new Bolshevik government and the reactionary White forces created air arms to combat each other. In the 1920s, the Soviet Union and Germany negotiated agreements that allowed Germany to violate the Treaty of Versailles by building military aircraft and training German military pilots in the USSR. This provided the Soviet Union access to the latest aviation technology and prevented them from falling too far behind the West in this crucial sphere.

Unique account of how ordinary people shaped Soviet-American relations in the 1930s told through the adventures of two Russian humourists.

In The First Cold War, Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani review the Wilson administration’s attitudes toward Russia before, during, and after the Bolshevik seizure of power. They argue that before the Russian Revolution, Woodrow Wilson had little understanding of Russia and made poor appointments that cost the United States Russian goodwill. Wilson later reversed those negative impressions by being the first to recognize Russia’s Provisional Government, resulting in positive U.S.–Russian relations until Lenin gained power in 1917. Wilson at first seemed unsure whether to recognize or repudiate Lenin and the Bolsheviks. His vacillation finally ended in a firm repudiation when he opted for a diplomatic quarantine having almost all of the ingredients of the later Cold War. Davis and Trani argue that Wilson deserves mild criticism for his early indecision and inability to form a coherent policy toward what would become the Soviet Union. But they believe Wilson rightly came to the conclusion that until the regime became more moderate, it was useless for America to engage it diplomatically. The authors see in Wilson’s approach the foundations for the “first Cold War”—meaning not simply a refusal to recognize the Soviet Union, but a strong belief that its influence was harmful and would spread if not contained or quarantined. Wilson’s Soviet policy in essence lasted until Roosevelt extended diplomatic recognition in the 1930s. But The First Cold War suggests that Wilson’s impact extended beyond Roosevelt to Truman, showing that the policies of Wilson and Truman closely resemble each other with the exception of an arms race. Wilson’s intellectual reputation lent credibility to U.S. Cold War policy from Truman to Reagan, and the reader can draw a direct connection from Wilson to the collapse of the USSR. Wilsonians were the first Cold War warriors, and in the era of President Woodrow Wilson, the first Cold War began.