Essay from the year 2013 in the subject Politics - Topic: Peace and Conflict, Security, grade: 1,7, , language: English, abstract: The center of gravity paradigm created and published by Carl von Clausewitz in his famous study about the appearance of war is nowadays still widely used to describe the core incitements and driving factors of warring factions, political parties, militias and even terrorist groups. In a short summary this military term of a center of gravity is defined as the one or few main forces where a party in a conflict drives its willpower and its strength from. It is a common element amongst the members and supporters of this group and with reference to Clausewitz’s study, it is this key element the opponent needs to identify and to overcome in order to break the willpower of the party and to finally conquer them. For that reason various studies have been undertaken und research has been performed with regards to the center of gravity in warfare as well as the center of gravity for terrorist groups and esp. for Al Qaeda. In the case of Al Qaeda most completed studies and published documents agreed to the point that the ideology preached by the core leaders of the network is the key element, where their followers draw their support and willpower from. At the same time Al Qaeda these days transformed itself to a loose network with just a common brand name and ideology, but without much central guidance or command. Numerous groups throughout all parts of world emerge and entitle themselves with the name Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda affiliated. Often there are no or just minor links to the former core leadership of Al Qaeda. For that reason it seems, that the network called Al Qaeda with most of its global affiliates is not more a strict hierarchical structured group, nor is it a self-contained network anymore with its origin in the mountain region of the Afghan-Pakistan (AfPak) border area. Al Qaeda seems to have many different appearances. Therefore the underlying hypothesis of this essay is that beside the remaining core of Al Qaeda in the AfPak region, the name Al Qaeda is nowadays used as a corporate name of different local or regional acting terrorist groups in order to provide a powerful proof of their willingness and capability. In that line the outcome of the hypothesis argues that the CoG for Al Qaeda affiliates is derived from their own and individual domestic or regional issues and interests as well as their regional supremacy.

This paper postulates that Al Qaeda's center of gravity is Osama Bin Laden and his brand of Islamist extremism. Looking at Al Qaeda as a system the following characteristics emerge as COG candidates at the strategic level: its fighting force financial capacity external support leadership and extremist Muslim ideology. Each of these candidates is analyzed to include discussion of capabilities requirements and vulnerabilities. Clausewitz indicated that a center of gravity in a popular uprising is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. Bin Laden fits the Clausewitzian definition of a personality leading a popular uprising. Only today this uprising is on a global scale with the objective of overthrowing the world order. Bin Laden rallies Muslim extremists. His charisma vision wealth and leadership abilities are the reasons Al Qaeda is an effective terrorist organization striking fear across the globe while winning admiration among many in the Muslim world.

Today, Islamicist organizations are becoming more widespread and diffuse. They often lack a direct connection to al Qaeda's strategic leadership but are inspired by its ideology. Al Qaeda's operational role is subdued, but its ideological, propaganda, and support roles are critical to its affiliates. Many groups now adhere to the original goals and ideology of al Qaeda, which extends the scope of its influence well beyond that of the original organization, although al Qaeda itself is still considered the most dangerous of all transnational extremist groups and is America's principal enemy.

Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

Al Qaeda's operational center of gravity is correctly identifiable by using operational warfare's principles and processes. The author uses the terrorist network, Al Qaeda, as an illustration of the process in correctly identifying a center of gravity for a terrorist force, a force not fitting the common definition of a conventional or unconventional operational force. In applying the principles and processes of operational warfare in this analysis, the author first needed to determine the war on terrorism's strategic enemy and that strategic enemy's objective, because it is from the national strategic, or political objective objectives, that operational objectives are derived. In analysis of the strategic enemy, the author postulates that radical Wahhabi Islamic terrorist groups, when viewed in holistically, comprise a "will of the people, more precisely defined as, radical Wahhabi Islamic fundamentalism." In conclusion, the author states that it turns out that defining Al Qaeda's center of gravity is "easy" relatively speaking, but it is the courses of action deriving from that center of gravity which are hard to define, develop, and execute in defeating not only Al Qaeda, but "Adversary."

The key to any successful strategic campaign begins with an analysis of both the friendly and threat strategic center of gravity. This analysis drives the development of the campaign plan by familiarizing planners with an understanding of how both belligerents organize, fight, and make decisions. Consequently, the improper identification or miscalculation of the center of gravity will lead to the misapplication of the elements of national power and ultimately to a campaign plan that will not meet the stated strategic objectives. While Joint and service doctrine/manuals generally agree on a common definition of center of gravity, considerable discrepancies still exist regarding the specific nature of center of gravity and its relationship to critical vulnerabilities. Dr. Joe Strange, a professor at the Marine Corps University, makes a recommendation for defining this relationship. He has developed a model that bridges the gap between the center of gravity and critical vulnerabilities by identifying critical capabilities and critical requirements. Dr. Strange posits that it is necessary to understand the center of gravity, critical capability, critical requirement, and critical vulnerability relationship in order to grasp fully the environment in which this campaign will take place. This model will be used for this analysis. The purpose of this paper is three-fold: first, to determine a workable definition of terrorism and how this definition applies to the new religiously based terrorism the world witnessed on 11 September; second, to conduct a comprehensive strategic level center of gravity analysis that will identify the relative strength and weaknesses of the U.S. led coalition and the al Qaeda terrorist network and; third, to present potential friendly and enemy response strategies.

Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating al-Qaeda based and inspired terrorism is a declared policy of the U.S. Government. Three key strategic objectives have been identified for accomplishing this: attacking al-Qaeda's terror network, undermining radicalization and recruitment, and hardening homeland defense. The present monograph proposes a distinct "jihad-realist" approach for undermining radicalization and recruitment to al-Qaeda. First, a brief discussion of six means for ending terrorist organizations is provided. Second, the premises of a jihad-realist approach are described. Third, a jihad-realist Shari'a case against al-Qaeda's terrorism is presented. In conclusion, key assertions are summarized, and several specific policy recommendations offered for national security personnel charged with formulating and executing counterterrorist messaging strategy.