Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) carries a complicated history of terrorist violence in Northern Africa. The colonial influences on Africa are a long-standing cause of the focus of organizations such as AQIM on Western and European interests. Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, AQIM's current leader, has not only published threats against citizens and countries outside of Algeria, but has carried out attacks in seven countries, targeting citizens of Europe and Africa, causing more than 5,000 fatalities, injuries, and kidnappings. Unlike other Salafi jihadist organizations allied with al Qaeda, AQIM interacts with criminal organizations in activities such as drug smuggling for South American drug cartels. Using equipment, weapons, uniforms, passports, and vehicles captured from attacks in conjunction with vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers, the AQIM threat continues to gather momentum. AQIM is also known to have SA-7 man-portable air-defense systems and anti-tank guided missiles. From drug trade funds and kidnap ransoms, it is estimated that AQIM has an annual operating budget of $10 million. AQIM has become the wealthiest of al Qaeda affiliates, using that wealth in a hearts-and-minds campaign among the residents of the Sahara-Sahel region. In terms of revenue, that places AQIM between a small pharmaceutical company and a steel manufacturer, and within the top 1,000 for employment opportunities. Generations of discontent youth in the Maghreb combined with warlords and criminal networks provides an ideal environment from which AQIM can recruit, indoctrinate, and train as well as establish numerous criminal allies. Counterterrorist organizations and other international resources must synchronize and focus efforts that detour recruitment efforts of AQIM, prevent further expansion, capture its resources and leadership, and ultimately dissolve the organization.

Rebranded in 2007, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the latest incarnation of Algerian radical Islamism. Initially focused on attacks with great political resonance against Algerian governmental and military targets, the group has progressively shifted its priorities, alongside its geographical and operational features. In the past few years, the countries of the Sahel region (Mauritania, Malì, Niger, Chad) have been increasingly affected by AQIM's actions. This geographical shift was the result both of a weakening of AQIM within Algeria, due to the tough counter-terrorist measures adopted by the regime, and of the "business opportunities" and the wider operational freedom offered by the Sahelian environment. The aim of this paper is to briefly address a series of questions concerning AQIM's "Sahelization" and its consequences for Algerian foreign policy.

Since the 9/11 attacks, America's understanding of Al Qaeda has evolved along with the organization itself. In recent years attention to Al Qaeda's so called "affiliates" in Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and most recently Syria has overtaken concern about Al Qaeda's core in Pakistan. The North African terrorist organization Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is one such affiliate. Many Americans first became familiar with AQIM when media reports linked it loosely to the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic compounds in Benghazi, Libya on 9/11/12 that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens. The horrific hostage crisis at an Algerian gas facility in January 2013, which was far more closely linked to the group, further increased concern about the threat it posed and played into anxieties about what many viewed as a resurgent Al Qaeda threat. This assessment of the threat from AQIM is based on an analysis of available open-source documentation. The authors find that although AQIM is a serious regional problem, its similarity to the Al Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden should not be exaggerated, as AQIM does not currently seem bent on global jihad. In most situations, the wisest policy responses to the AQIM threat will focus on supporting local actors and U.S. allies in Europe.

This excellent report has been professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction. The United States faces an important strategic question in northwest Africa: what level of activity by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) would constitute a sufficient threat to U.S. national security interests to warrant a more aggressive political, intelligence, military, and law enforcement response? AQIM already poses the greatest immediate threat of transnational terrorism in the region, and its operational range and sophistication continue to expand. Since 2007, the group has professed its loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's senior leadership and claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks in the subregion. These attacks have included the use of suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, kidnapping operations, and assassinations. AQIM's targets include African civilians, government officials, and security services; United Nations (UN) diplomats and Western embassies; and tourists, aid workers, and private sector contractors. As a result, combating AQIM is the focus of substantial foreign security assistance provided by Western countries, including the United States and France, to their partner nations in the Maghreb and Sahel. In 2005, the United States created the Trans-Sahara Counterterror-ism Partnership (TSCTP) to coordinate activities by the Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to combat terrorism in the region. Now including 10 African countries, TSCTP operates with a combined annual interagency budget of approximately $120 million. However, the extent of the threat posed by AQIM and the appropriate U.S. response remain hotly debated in both academic and policy circles. These debates question the seriousness of the threat posed by a relatively small group of hundreds of militants operating in mountainous and arid areas of Africa, their level of ideological commitment versus their criminal and financial motivations, and even the potential complicity of regional security services in supporting AQIM. The United States needs to understand the nature of the threat that AQIM poses today as well as current trends highlighting the future capabilities and intentions of the group. Only with these assessments in place can U.S. policymakers make appropriate decisions on questions about counterterrorism in northwest Africa that are hotly but inconclusively debated.