Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist org. than the one that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. The pre-9/11 AQ was akin to a corp., with Osama Bin Laden acting as a CEO issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates. It has transformed into a diffuse global network and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with varying degrees of independence. Contents of this report: (1) Background; (2) AQ Origins; (3) Afghanistan; (4) Pakistan; (5) Arabian Peninsula; (6) Iraq; (7) North Africa/Sahel: Islamic Maghreb; Algeria; The Sahel; (8) Somalia; The Islamic Courts Union, Al Shabaab; (9) Radical Islamist Groups in SE Asia: Jemaah Islamiya; Abu Sayyaf Group; (10) AQ¿s Global Strategy and Long Term Policy Implications.

Al Qaeda (AQ) has evolved into a significantly different terrorist organization than the one that perpetrated the September 11, 2001, attacks. At the time, Al Qaeda was composed mostly of a core cadre of veterans of the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union, with a centralized leadership structure made up mostly of Egyptians. Most of the organization's plots either emanated from the top or were approved by the leadership. Some analysts describe pre-9/11 Al Qaeda as akin to a corporation, with Osama Bin Laden acting as an agile Chief Executive Officer issuing orders and soliciting ideas from subordinates.

Contents: (1) Introduction: Al Qaeda: Statements 1994-2001: Founding Principles; ¿Declaration of Jihad¿; ¿Clash of Civilizations¿; (2) Al Qaeda Post-9/11; ¿The Goals of the New York Strike¿; Al Qaeda Statements in 2004-2007; Outreach and 'Truce¿ Proposals; Iraq and Al Qaeda¿s Ideology; Strategic Perspectives; Tactical Differences?; Iraq and Al Qaeda¿s Regional Ambitions; The ¿Islamic State of Iraq¿ and Discord; Political Goals and Perspectives on Reform; The Three Foundations; Al Qaeda on Democracy and Reform; Strategic Framework; Targeting Israel; The Importance of Oil; (3) Implications and Conclusion: Al Qaeda¿s Audiences; Pragmatic Messianism; Al Qaeda and the Jihadist International.

After a more than a decade and a half of combating Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States faces a diverse array of threats from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa. While senior Al Qaeda figures reportedly remain based in Pakistan, the network includes a number of affiliates across the Middle East and Africa including Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Shabaab. Al Qaeda also retains a small but possibly growing presence in Afghanistan. U.S. officials have stated that Al Qaeda still maintains a foothold in Syria through its ties to Hay'at Tahrir al Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front), though the exact nature of that relationship may be evolving. This report examines the threat posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa as described by U.S. officials and outside observers, as well as the U.S. approach to date in responding to these threats. The rise of the Islamic State and its rapid territorial expansion across Syria and Iraq has at times eclipsed the attention directed towards Al Qaeda, at least in the public debate. However, U.S. officials have warned that Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the United States, and that some of its affiliates in the Middle East have the capability to do so. It is also possible that Al Qaeda could leverage the Islamic State's setbacks in Iraq and Syria to bolster its recruits, resources, and prestige. AQ affiliates that have primarily targeted local governments have also turned their efforts to Western interests in the region, aiming at soft targets-such as hotels-frequented by Americans or Europeans. U.S. officials have cautioned that some Al Qaeda affiliates may increasingly turn to this type of attack as a way of remaining "competitive" for funds and recruits, in light of the wide publicity garnered by such attacks carried out by the Islamic State. Congressional concerns regarding these issues might shape ongoing reevaluations of the laws that underpin U.S. counterterrorism policy, including the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) as well as successive National Defense Authorization Acts that have progressively broadened the scope of the U.S. military's involvement in training and equipping foreign forces for counterterrorism purposes. Overall, Congress has addressed the enduring presence of Al Qaeda affiliates through a number of channels, including oversight of executive branch counterterrorism policies and practices; authorization and appropriations of U.S. funds for counterterrorism activities; and oversight of assistance for partner nations engaged in such activities.

After nearly a decade and a half of combating Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States faces an increasingly diverse threat from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa. While senior Al Qaeda figures reportedly remain based in Pakistan, the network maintains a number of affiliates across the Middle East and Africa including Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Shabaab. Al Qaeda also retains a small but growing presence in Afghanistan. U.S. officials have stated that Al Qaeda still maintains a foothold in Syria through its ties to Jabhat Fatah al Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front). This report examines the threat posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa as described by U.S. officials and outside observers, as well as the U.S. approach to date in responding to the threat posed by individual groups. The rise of the Islamic State and its rapid territorial expansion across Syria and Iraq has at times eclipsed the attention directed towards Al Qaeda, at least in the public debate. However, U.S. officials have warned that Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the United States, and that some of its affiliates in the Middle East have the capability to do so. AQ affiliates that have primarily targeted local governments in the region have also turned their efforts to Western interests abroad, aiming at soft targets-such as hotels-frequented by Americans or Europeans. U.S. officials have cautioned that some Al Qaeda affiliates may increasingly turn to this type of high-profile attack as a way of remaining "competitive" for funds and recruits, in light of the wide publicity garnered by the Islamic State. Congressional concerns regarding these issues might shape ongoing reevaluations of the laws that underpin current U.S. counterterrorism policy, including the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40). In addition to the AUMF, Congress has addressed the emergence of Al Qaeda affiliates through a number of channels, including oversight of executive branch counterterrorism policies and practices; authorization and appropriations of U.S. funds for counterterrorism operations; and oversight of assistance for partner nations engaged in such operations.

Are we safer from terrorism today and is our homeland security money well spent? This book offers answers and more.

This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Examines terrorists¿ involvement in a variety of crimes ranging from motor vehicle violations, immigration fraud, and mfg. illegal firearms to counterfeiting, armed bank robbery, and smuggling weapons of mass destruction. There are 3 parts: (1) Compares the criminality of internat. jihad groups with domestic right-wing groups. (2) Six case studies of crimes includes trial transcripts, official reports, previous scholarship, and interviews with law enforce. officials and former terrorists are used to explore skills that made crimes possible; or events and lack of skill that the prevented crimes. Includes brief bio. of the terrorists along with descriptions of their org., strategies, and plots. (3) Analysis of the themes in closing arguments of the transcripts in Part 2. Illus.