With the development of the “long war,” the U.S. military’s focus has shifted dramatically from its traditional emphasis on conventional operations to irregular and indirect approaches to safeguard America’s vital interests. One of the least understood aspects of Irregular Warfare is Unconventional Warfare (UW), which includes operations conducted through, with or by indigenous forces and provides the U.S. with an indirect means of accomplishing its objectives. This thesis examines the current ability of Special Operations Forces to conduct UW with air support, specifically air support provided by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This thesis examines the questions—Does AFSOC currently have airpower assets with the capability to support UW operations with mobility, resupply, and fires? Three case studies were used to examine airpowers role in UW: Allied support to the French resistance in WWII, United States support to the Hmong during the conflict in Laos and a hypothetical scenario using AFSOC’s current capabilities. The three case studies were examined using the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and unity of effort. The analysis found that AFSOC could currently support UW operations, but effectiveness would be limited by a number of factors.

With the development of the "long war," the U.S. military's focus has shifted dramatically from its traditional emphasis on conventional operations to irregular and indirect approaches to safeguard America's vital interests. One of the least understood aspects of Irregular Warfare is Unconventional Warfare (UW), which includes operations conducted through, with or by indigenous forces and provides the U.S. with an indirect means of accomplishing its objectives. This thesis examines the current ability of Special Operations Forces to conduct UW with air support, specifically air support provided by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). This thesis examines the questions--Does AFSOC currently have airpower assets with the capability to support UW operations with mobility, resupply, and fires? Three case studies were used to examine airpowers role in UW: Allied support to the French resistance in WWII, United States support to the Hmong during the conflict in Laos and a hypothetical scenario using AFSOC's current capabilities. The three case studies were examined using the evaluation criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and unity of effort. The analysis found that AFSOC could currently support UW operations, but effectiveness would be limited by a number of factors.

Throughout the history of warfare, the use of non-traditional soldiers, weapons and tactics to counter the conventional military has become increasingly important. Our enemies in the 21st century rely upon unconventional and irregular methods of warfare to attack the United States. To counter this threat, the U.S. Air Force must ensure the right mix of aircraft to protect America from attack. What is the role of airpower in this new era of conflict? These roles will be defined through case studies in both unconventional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN). I will argue that despite the capabilities of the current Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) fleet of aircraft, it lacks the capability to successfully engage in UW and COIN throughout the globe. The current attack and mobility fleet is too large for a majority of the world's airfields, and is too expensive (required infrastructure to support such aircraft) to transfer to partner nations. I recommend AFSOC acquire additional light attack, light mobility, light utility and rotary wing aircraft to meet the 21st century requirements of irregular warfare.

In light of technological advances and multiplying irregular conflicts, conventional wisdom suggests airpower as the ideal, low-cost means of conducting modern warfare—and the air control method adopted by the British between the two world wars seems to back this up. Swift and precise targeting from above was considered more humane, after all, sparing civilians as well as British soldiers during punitive expeditions in unruly colonial regions. But what conventional wisdom misses, and this book makes clear, is how the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) innovative approach actually worked—relying on British airmen on the ground at least as much as on airborne technology to control restive tribes and villages. The RAF and Tribal Control tells the story of these forgotten airmen, the RAF special service officers who, embedded among local populations and indigenous tribes, collected vital intelligence, developed targets, directed air strikes when necessary, and, perhaps most important, provided personal assessments of airpower’s qualitative effects against primarily guerrilla forces. Airpower is a highly technological endeavor. But in wars where the human dimension takes primacy, Richard Newton reminds us that measuring the effectiveness of air actions requires a qualitative approach that is nearly impossible via overhead sensors. And this is where the RAF special service officers came in—airmen who understood the local cultures and peoples, they served as conduits for information and communication between the colonial administration and the tribes and villages. It was their ground-level contributions that made the integration of airpower into the civilian administration of colonies and mandates possible. This first in-depth account of the RAF special service officers’ role brings to light previously unpublished insights. The RAF and Tribal Control fills a significant gap in the history of air warfare. In doing so, the book dispels the notion that airpower alone is effective in small wars and irregular conflicts—and reveals the importance of the “boots-on-the-ground” human component in waging unconventional air warfare, both in the days of the RAF’s vaunted air control and in our own time.

This essential book offers a compelling and original interpretation of the rise of military aviation. Jeremy Black, one of the world’s finest scholars of military history, provides a lucid analysis of the use of airpower over land and sea both during the two world wars and the more limited wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Considering both the theory and praxis of air power, the author begins with hot air balloons, and then highlights the use of zeppelins, piston engine fighters, jet bombers, and finally the so-called Military Revolution of today. While discussing the growth of American and European military aviation, Black, a pioneer in emphasizing the importance of non-Western military history for understanding global developments, also traces the emergence of air power in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Black breaks new ground by exploring not only to conventional war—both inside and outside Europe—but also to the use of air power in unconventional wars, especially critical given to the spread of insurgencies around the globe. He vividly describes traditional debates over the pros and cons of strategic bombing and aircraft carriers versus battleships and gives equal attention to managerial, doctrinal, and technological innovations. The author shows how better management resulted in increasing lethality of close air support of the RAF during the latter part of World War II and at the same times highlights the limits of air power with case studies of the two Gulf Wars. The author goes beyond our traditional understanding of air power associated with bombing and fighter engagements, adding the important elements associated with naval power, including ground/logistics support, anti-aircraft measures, and political constraints. As he explains, air power has become Western politicians’ weapon of choice, spreading maximum destruction with the minimum of commitment. His current and comprehensive study considers how we got to this point, and what the future has in store. Anyone seeking a balanced, accurate understanding of air power in history will find this book an essential introduction.

The U.S. Air Force leadership plans in the near term to identify and implement a range of initiatives for enhancing the service's contributions to irregular warfare (IW) operations. This monograph is the result of a "quick-turn" study to provide the leadership with a menu of actions it could consider to strengthen and expand the Air Force's capabilities to take part in joint and interagency efforts in irregular warfare.