This paper examines the relationship between the control of airport slots by major airlines and their incentives to engage in service quality. We investigate a set of airline strategies regarding possible practices of slot hoarding and slot concentration through mergers aiming at erecting airport barriers to entry. We develop an econometric model of flight disruptions by allowing an integrated management of flight delays, cancellations, aircraft size, price and passengers per flight. We consider the case of the domestic airline industry in Brazil. We find evidence of the internalization of congestion externalities by dominant carriers. We also have some evidence of schedule padding, a strategic trade-off between delays and cancelations, and slot hoarding following a merger. Our results suggest that carriers intensify the internalization of congestion externalities when slot flight concentration increases.

Over the past several decades, commercial air traffic has been growing at a far greater rate than airport capacity, causing airports to become increasingly congested. How can we accommodate this increased traffic and at the same time alleviate traffic delays resulting from congestion? The response outside the US has been to set a maximum number of slots and use administrative procedures to allocate these among competing airlines, with the most important consideration being 'grandfather rights' to existing carriers. The United States, on the other hand, has used administrative procedures to allocate slots at only four airports. In all other cases, flights have been handled on a first-come, first-served basis, with aircraft queuing for the privilege of landing or taking off from a congested airport. While recognizing the advantages of slot systems in lessening delays, economists have criticized both approaches as being sub-optimal, and have advocated procedures such as slot auctions, peak-load pricing and slot trading to better utilize congested airports. Edited by an international team of air transport economists and drawing on an impressive list of contributors, Airport Slots provides an extremely comprehensive treatment of the subject. It considers the methods currently used to allocate slots and applies economic analysis to each. The book then explains various schemes to increase public welfare by taxing or pricing congestion, and describes alternate slot-allocation schemes, most notably slot auctions. In addition, Airport Slots outlines the complexities involved in slot-allocation methods, including the requirement for multiple slots - a take-off slot at London Heathrow is useless unless there is a landing slot available at Frankfurt for a London Frankfurt flight. Finally, the book explores the economic pitfalls of slot-allocation schemes; for example, controls may not be required if external delay costs are internalized by a dominant carrier at its hub. Airport Slots provides a valuable contribution to the debate on how best to limit airport congestion. The book's comprehensive treatment of the subject matter provides the reader with a 'one-stop' volume to explore airport congestion and slot-allocation schemes, offering valuable insights to academics and practitioners alike.

Over the past several decades, commercial air traffic has been growing at a far greater rate than airport capacity, causing airports to become increasingly congested. How can we accommodate this increased traffic and at the same time alleviate traffic delays resulting from congestion?Airport Slots provides a valuable contribution to the debate on how best to limit airport congestion. The book's comprehensive treatment of the subject matter provides the reader with a 'one-stop' volume to explore airport congestion and slot-allocation schemes, offering valuable insights to academics and practitioners alike.

Over the past several decades, commercial air traffic has been growing at a far greater rate than airport capacity, causing airports to become increasingly congested. How can we accommodate this increased traffic and at the same time alleviate traffic delays resulting from congestion? The response outside the US has been to set a maximum number of slots and use administrative procedures to allocate these among competing airlines, with the most important consideration being 'grandfather rights' to existing carriers. The United States, on the other hand, has used administrative procedures to allocate slots at only four airports. In all other cases, flights have been handled on a first-come, first-served basis, with aircraft queuing for the privilege of landing or taking off from a congested airport. While recognizing the advantages of slot systems in lessening delays, economists have criticized both approaches as being sub-optimal, and have advocated procedures such as slot auctions, peak-load pricing and slot trading to better utilize congested airports. Edited by an international team of air transport economists and drawing on an impressive list of contributors, Airport Slots provides an extremely comprehensive treatment of the subject. It considers the methods currently used to allocate slots and applies economic analysis to each. The book then explains various schemes to increase public welfare by taxing or pricing congestion, and describes alternate slot-allocation schemes, most notably slot auctions. In addition, Airport Slots outlines the complexities involved in slot-allocation methods, including the requirement for multiple slots - a take-off slot at London Heathrow is useless unless there is a landing slot available at Frankfurt for a London Frankfurt flight. Finally, the book explores the economic pitfalls of slot-allocation schemes; for example, controls may not be required if external delay costs are internalized by a dominant carrier at its hub. Airport Slots provides a valuable contribution to the debate on how best to limit airport congestion. The book's comprehensive treatment of the subject matter provides the reader with a 'one-stop' volume to explore airport congestion and slot-allocation schemes, offering valuable insights to academics and practitioners alike.

To help manage airport congestion, airlines operating at four U.S. airports--Washington's Reagan National and the three major New York City area airports--must obtain operating authorizations called slots from the FAA to take off or land. Airlines operating out of Reagan National also may not operate flights beyond a 1,250-mile perimeter without congressional approval. In addition to the 24 flights (12 round trips) previously approved, Congress recently authorized 16 more beyond-perimeter flights (8 round-trips) at Reagan National - flights that the airport authority fears will adversely affect Reagan National and the authority's ability to continue servicing its debt. Some airlines seeking to serve slot-controlled airports assert that slot control rules cause the airports to be underutilized or used inefficiently. This book reviews the effects of adding more beyond-perimeter flights from Reagan National; and how well slot control rules are working to reduce congestion, while maximizing capacity and encouraging competition. Also discussed are slot allocation and airline schedule data using a statistical model, and interviews with FAA officials and others.