This paper develops an analytical framework for airport congestion pricing by considering variable passenger time costs. We find that, first, congestion delays will not be fully internalized at the carrier level under different market structures, including those airports dominated by a monopoly airline. Therefore, congestion pricing is necessary regardless of the market structures. Second, although congestion pricing is welfare-improving, it may not be Pareto-improving. This might explain why congestion pricing is unpopular in the real world.

Problem definition: Congestion pricing offers an appealing solution to urban parking problems--charging varying rates across time and space as a function of congestion may shift demand and improve allocation of limited resources. It aims to increase the accessibility of highly desired public goods and to reduce traffic caused by drivers who search for available parking spaces. At the same time, complex policies make it harder for consumers to make search-based decisions. We investigate the effect of congestion pricing on consumer and social welfare. Academic/practical relevance: This paper contributes to the theory and practice of the management of scarce resources in the public sector, where welfare is of particular interest. Methodologically, we contribute to the literature on structural estimation of dynamic spatial search models. Methodology: Using data from the City of San Francisco, both before and after the implementation of a congestion pricing parking program, SFpark, we estimate the welfare implications of the policy. We use a dynamic spatial search model to structurally estimate consumers' search costs, distance disutilities, price sensitivities, and trip valuations. Result: We find that congestion pricing increases consumer and social welfare by more than 4% and reduces search traffic by more than 10% in congested regions compared to fixed pricing. But congestion pricing may hurt welfare in uncongested regions, in which the focus should be on increasing utilization. Moreover, an unnecessarily complex congestion-pricing scheme makes it difficult for consumers to make search-based decisions. We find that a simpler pricing policy may yield higher welfare than a complex one. Lastly, compared to a policy that imposes limits on parking durations, congestion pricing increases social welfare by allocating the scarce resource to consumers who value it most. Managerial implications: The insights from SFpark offer important implications for local governments who consider alternatives for managing parking and congestion, and for public sector managers who evaluate the tradeoffs between approaches to manage public resources.

Over the past several decades, commercial air traffic has been growing at a far greater rate than airport capacity, causing airports to become increasingly congested. How can we accommodate this increased traffic and at the same time alleviate traffic delays resulting from congestion? The response outside the US has been to set a maximum number of slots and use administrative procedures to allocate these among competing airlines, with the most important consideration being 'grandfather rights' to existing carriers. The United States, on the other hand, has used administrative procedures to allocate slots at only four airports. In all other cases, flights have been handled on a first-come, first-served basis, with aircraft queuing for the privilege of landing or taking off from a congested airport. While recognizing the advantages of slot systems in lessening delays, economists have criticized both approaches as being sub-optimal, and have advocated procedures such as slot auctions, peak-load pricing and slot trading to better utilize congested airports. Edited by an international team of air transport economists and drawing on an impressive list of contributors, Airport Slots provides an extremely comprehensive treatment of the subject. It considers the methods currently used to allocate slots and applies economic analysis to each. The book then explains various schemes to increase public welfare by taxing or pricing congestion, and describes alternate slot-allocation schemes, most notably slot auctions. In addition, Airport Slots outlines the complexities involved in slot-allocation methods, including the requirement for multiple slots - a take-off slot at London Heathrow is useless unless there is a landing slot available at Frankfurt for a London Frankfurt flight. Finally, the book explores the economic pitfalls of slot-allocation schemes; for example, controls may not be required if external delay costs are internalized by a dominant carrier at its hub. Airport Slots provides a valuable contribution to the debate on how best to limit airport congestion. The book's comprehensive treatment of the subject matter provides the reader with a 'one-stop' volume to explore airport congestion and slot-allocation schemes, offering valuable insights to academics and practitioners alike.

"The presence of preexisting tax distortions, and the form of revenue recycling, can crucially affect the size -- and possibly even the sign -- of the welfare effect of road pricing schemes. The efficiency gains from recycling congestion tax revenues in other tax reductions can amount to several times the Pigouvian welfare gains from congestion reduction"--Cover.

This paper investigates the distributional impact of airport congestion pricing on commercial, commuter, miscellaneous, and general aviation. It extends Daniel's (1995) stochastic bottleneck model in three significant directions by allowing for non-homogeneous aircraft operating and time costs, differentiation in preferred times of operation, and elastic demand. The model also includes endogenous, intertemporal traffic adjustments in response to queuing delay and fees. The relative costs of queuing and schedule delays are estimated using data from Minneapolis-St. Paul airport. Simulations show equilibrium traffic patterns, queuing delays, schedule delays, congestion fees, airport revenues, and changes in surplus for each category of aviation.