Since the first aircraft accident was attributed to the improper use of automation technology in 1996, the aviation community has recognized that the benefits of flight deck technology also have negative unintended consequences from both the technology itself and the human interaction required to implement and operate it. This mixed methods study looks at the relationship of technology to the severity of aircraft mishaps and the policy implications resulting from those relationships in order to improve safety of passenger carrying aircraft in the United States National Airspace System. U.S. mishap data from the National Transportation Safety Board and the Aviation Safety Reporting System was collected covering aircraft mishaps spanning the last twenty years. An ordinal regression was used to determine which types of flight deck technology played a significant role in the severity of aircraft mishaps ranging from minor to catastrophic. Using this information as a focal point, a qualitative analysis was undertaken to analyze the mechanisms for that impact, the effect of existing policy guidance relating to the use of technology, and the common behaviors not addressed by policy that provide a venue to address aviation safety. Some areas of current policy were found to be effective, while multiple areas of opportunity for intervention were uncovered at the various levels of aircraft control including the organizational, the supervisory, the preparatory, and the execution level that suggest policy adjustments that may be made to reduce incidence of control failure by cockpit automation.

This research study evaluates the role of policy regarding the use of automation in flight on the safety of aviation in the United States. Specifically, following the investigation of several high-profile aircraft mishaps that identified misuse or overuse of automation at inappropriate times during flight, several best practices have developed among airline operators as to the acceptable use of flight automation. However, there has never been a coordinated governmental policy on the use of automated equipment, procedures, or communication promulgated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the International Civil Aviation Organisation (CIAO), or industry work groups. While there has been considerable research among social scientists on the impact of human error and misunderstanding on automated systems, and while great progress has been made in the area of human factor consideration in designing air planes and the systems used to control them, there has been little research on the public policy aspect of these considerations. Even though the FAA has established a research group specifically dedicated to the impact of human factor considerations on flying (Chandra & Gray hem, 2012), there has been no subsequent discussion on the policy changes those results should dictate.

The increasing complexity and automation of flight control systems pose a challenge to federal policy regarding aircraft certification and pilot training. Despite significant commercial aviation safety improvements over the past two decades, flight control automation and aircraft complexity have been cited as contributing factors in a number of major airline accidents, including two high-profile crashes overseas involving the recently introduced Boeing 737 Max variant in 2018 and 2019. These crashes have directed attention to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight of aircraft type certification and pilot training practices for transport category aircraft, particularly as they pertain to complex automated flight control systems. As aircraft systems have evolved over the past three decades to incorporate new technologies, Congress has mandated FAA to streamline certification processes, with the primary motivation being to facilitate the development of new safety-enhancing technologies. Modern commercial aircraft rely on "fly-by-wire" flight control technologies, under which pilots' flight control inputs are sent to computers rather than through direct mechanical linkages to flight control systems. The fly-by-wire software contains flight control laws and logic that, in addition to optimizing performance efficiency, protect the aircraft from commanded actions that could put the airplane in an unsafe state. Automated flight control systems have largely been viewed as having a positive effect on safety, and accident rates have improved considerably over the past two decades. However, the increasing complexity of automated flight systems has sometimes caused confusion and uncertainty, contributing to improper pilot actions during critical phases of flight and in some cases leading pilots to unintentionally place an aircraft in an unsafe condition. Besides designing these systems in a manner that minimizes pilot errors and the consequences of those errors, aircraft designers and operators face challenges regarding maintaining piloting skills for flight crews to be able to take over and manually fly the aircraft safely if critical systems fail. They also face challenges regarding documentation and pilot training effectiveness in building accurate mental models of how these complex systems operate. The primary goals of ongoing efforts to address these challenges are to enhance pilot situation awareness when using automation and reduce the likelihood of mode errors and confusion, while at the same time not overburdening pilots with intricate systems knowledge beyond what is necessary. In the ongoing investigations of two Boeing 737 Max crashes, Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, concerns have been raised about the design of an automated feature called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) and its reliance on a single angle-of-attack sensor even though the aircraft is equipped with two such sensors. These concerns led to the worldwide grounding of all Boeing 737 Max aircraft until the MCAS safety concerns can be resolved, significantly impacting both U.S. and foreign airlines that operate the aircraft. These recent aviation accidents have prompted reviews of the manner in which modern transport category aircraft are certified by FAA and its foreign counterparts, and in particular, the roles of regulators and manufacturers in the certification process. The challenges of certifying increasingly complex aircraft are largely being met by delegating more of FAA's certification functions to aircraft designers and manufacturers. This raises potential conflicts between safety and quality assurance on the one hand and competitive pressures to market and deliver aircraft on the other. Under Organization Designation Authorization (ODA), FAA can designate companies to carry out delegated certification functions on its behalf.

It is well known that improvements in space and aviation are the leader of today's technology, and the aircraft is the most important product of aviation. Because of this fact, the books on aircraft are always at the center of interest. In most cases, technologies designed for the aerospace industry are rapidly extending into other areas. For example, although composite materials are developed for the aerospace industry, these materials are not often used in aircraft. However, composite materials are utilized significantly in many different sectors, such as automotive, marine and civil engineering. And materials science in aviation, reliability and efficiency in aircraft technology have a major importance in aircraft design.

Two Airbus accidents at Nagoya, Japan and Toulouse, France in April and June 1994 highlighted the problem of the highly-automated airplane and its interface with pilots. As technologies in the engineering design progress so quickly in airplane automation, training philosophies toward the 'glass cockpit' may need to be re-evaluated. Many pilots, young and old, praise the advantages brought by the new technology. On the other hand, many have complained about the increasing workload and the danger of automation features which are not in their control. In this thesis, I evaluate the accidents of the highly-automated airplane and the probable solutions which can be applied in the training phase to reduce the accident rates. The training philosophies given to the crewmembers remaining in the cockpit of highly-automated airplanes should guarantee flying safety with limited time and resources in the absence of rigorous regulations. Air transportation surely is the most popular business today and in the future. The machine has been updated to include more automatic controls. Now our concern is to upgrade the human capability to stay abreast of technology and keep flying safe. That is the reason for this thesis, whose contribution to aviation safety is to recommend adequate training philosophies for highly-automated airplane users.

Flight is inherently a risky venture, carried out in a hostile environment at great speed. Realistically and regrettably, a commitment to aviation safety can achieve no more than 'as few accidents as possible'. Moreover, the tragic events of 11 September 2001 have conclusively demonstrated that aviation safety goes beyond accident prevention from a technical point of view and extends to more profound political, strategic and legal dimensions. Accordingly, aviation safety requires a multidisciplinary approach: technical, economic, managerial, and legal. This ground-breaking study analyzes, from a legal point of view, the mandate of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) relating to aviation safety in the light of changes which have taken place since the conclusion of the Chicago Convention, including the expansion of the international civil aviation community, the liberalization of the aviation industry, the introduction of new technology, and existing as well as new and emerging terrorist threats. The author clearly demonstrates that ICAO, as the worldwide governmental organization for international civil aviation, should be allowed a more proactive role in enhancing aviation safety. Describing in great detail the contributions of ICAO to the global safety regime and mechanisms, he submits effective ways to rationalize ICAO's quasi-legislative and enforcement functions in order to enhance aviation safety through the rule of law. Among the important topics arising in the course of the analysis are the following: global ramifications of national and regional initiatives; auditing of state compliance with international standards; characterization of crimes against the safety of civil aviation; importance of ensuring that safety requirements are not compromised by profit considerations; burgeoning of airline alliances, code-sharing and outsourcing activities; demands for simplification and unification of certain regulatory procedures; prohibition of the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight; development of new technology, such as satellite-based navigation systems; and importance of the rule of law and the system of checks and balances in international organizations. As a plea to consider civil aviation safety obligations not only as merely contractual obligations between States but as obligations owed to the international community as a whole, this book is sure to give rise to far-reaching discussions and follow-up among policymakers and the interested legal community in the years to come.